China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades. OSW Study 45/2013 by Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra et al.
C h i n a  v s .  C e n t r a l  a s i a
T h e  a c h i e v e m e n T s  o f  T h e  p a s T  T w o  d e c a d e s
a l e k s a n d r a  J a r o s i e w i c z ,  K r z y s z t o f  s t r a c h o t a
4 5
China vs. Central asia 
The achievemenTs of The pasT Two decades
aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof strachota
nUmBeR 45
waRsaw
ocToBeR 2013
co-operation: anna wołowska, marek matusiak
© copyright by ośrodek studiów wschodnich
im. marka Karpia / centre for eastern studies
conTenT ediToRs
adam eberhardt
ediToR
anna Łabuszewska
co-opeRaTion
Katarzyna Kazimierska
TRanslaTion
ilona duchnowicz
co-opeRaTion
nicholas furnival
GRaphic desiGn 
paRa-BUch
phoToGRaph on coveR
shutterstock
dTp
Groupmedia
maps
wojciech mańkowski
pUBlisheR
Ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
centre for eastern studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, warsaw, poland
phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
isBn 978-83-62936-30-4
Contents
MAIN POINTS /5
I.  ChINA ANd CeNTrAl ASIA – The bACkgrOuNd  
 fOr MuTuAl relATIONS /7
1.  The historical background /7
2.  The strategic background for relations between China  
 and Central Asia /9
2.1. Central Asia as seen by China – key challenges /10
2.2. China as seen by Central Asian countries – key challenges /13
3.  each party’s interests /15
II.  ChINA ANd CeNTrAl ASIA – The keY ASPeCTS  
 Of POlITICAl relATIONS ANd SeCurITY ISSueS /17
1.  The borders and the uyghur issue – from conflicts  
 to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization /17
2.  The stability issue in Central Asia vs. relations with China /20
3.  China in regional geopolitical games /21
4.  The Chinese model of building its political position  
 in Central Asia  /24
5.  Central Asian countries on China  /28
III.  ChINA’S eCONOMIC PreSeNCe IN CeNTrAl ASIA  
 – The AChIeveMeNTS Of The PAST TwO deCAdeS /31
1.   regional differences in the level and nature of co-operation /32
2.  China’s ‘assets’ in the region and plans for development /33
 2.1.  The oil and gas sector /33
 2.2. The uranium sector /49
 2.3. Other selected areas of co-operation /52
 2.4. Trade  /55
 2.5. Transport infrastructure – the New Silk road  /62
3.   The instruments of co-operation: loans and the SCO  /64
3.1.  loans /64
3.2.  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)  /68
4.   The balance of economic co-operation  /69
4.1.  The geopolitical dimension /69
4.2.  The economic dimension /70
IV.  ChINA’S PreSeNCe IN CeNTrAl ASIA IN The SOCIAl   
 dIMeNSION – The AChIeveMeNTS Of The PAST TwO   
 deCAdeS /72
V.  CONCluSION – fuTure ChAlleNgeS /75
MAPS /78
5O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
MAIN POINTS
•	 The	past	two	decades	have	been	a	period	of	fundamental	change	in	Cen-
tral	Asia	triggered	by	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	One	effect	of	this	was	that	
five	new	states	arose	in	the	region.	The	emergence	of	China’s	presence	as	
a	major	player	in	Central	Asia	has	been	among	the	fundamental	aspects	of	
these	regional	changes.
•	 Security	 issues	 are	 at	 the	 core	 of	 Chinese	 engagement	 in	 Central	Asia.	
In	the	regional	dimension,	China	wants	to	protect	its	western	province,	
Xinjiang,	from	possible	destabilisation	which	could	spread	from	Central	
Asian	countries	or	draw	inspiration	from	them.	In	broader	terms,	Beijing	
wants	to	secure	its	interests	with	regard	to	Russia	and	the	USA,	which	are	
also	present	and	active	in	the	region.	In	turn,	from	Central	Asia’s	point	
of	view,	securing	the	region	against	Chinese	expansion	is	of	fundamen-
tal	significance.	However,	at	 the	same	time,	 the	countries	 in	the	region	
are	aware	of	the	inevitability	of	co-operation	with	China,	and	have	been	
making	efforts	to	use	it	as	a	tool	for	strengthening	their	own	stability	and	
sovereignty.	
•	 Although	security	and	(in	broader	terms)	political	 issues	are	the	basis	
for	relations	between	China	and	Central	Asia,	the	main	field	of	play	for	
their	co-operation	is	economic	issues.	This	is	an	effect	of	two	realities:	
the	economic:	the	great	area	and	basic	willingness	for	co-operation,	and	
the	political:	mutual	 cautiousness	 and	 the	 self-restriction	of	 the	part-
ners,	 and	 above	 all,	 resistance	 from	Russia.	Despite	many	difficulties	
encountered	 over	 the	 past	 two	decades,	 China	has	 become	 a	 strategic	
economic	partner	for	this	region.	This	is	most	evident	in	the	trade,	en-
ergy	and	infrastructure	sectors.	Beijing	has	outstripped	its	competitors:	
Russia,	the	USA,	Turkey	and	Iran	over	a	relatively	short	period.	At	the	
same	time,	the	scale	of	co-operation	has	made	Central	Asia	an	important	
region	for	China	(especially	as	an	element	of	the	strategy	to	bring	stabi-
lisation	into	Xinjiang	and	as	a	major	gas	supplier).	Chinese	economic	en-
gagement	in	Central	Asia	–	considering	the	specifics	and	the	guidelines	
of	Beijing’s	policy	–	viably	contributes	to	China’s	growing	political	sig-
nificance	in	the	region;	with	regard	to	individual	republics	and	relations	
between	them	and	also	with	regard	to	Russia	and	the	USA.	At	the	pre-
sent	stage,	the	region’s	countries	benefit,	both	politically	and	economi-
cally,	from	this	situation.	It	is,	though,	giving	rise	to	serious	concern	in	
strategic	terms.	
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•	 Whatever	attainments	Central	Asia	or	China	have	made	over	the	past	two	
decades,	the	general	situation	in	and	around	the	region	remains	unstable,	
and	the	parties’	interests	have	been	fixed	and	secured	to	a	limited	extent.	
Therefore,	the	evolution	of	China’s	regional	policy	to	secure	its	own	inter-
ests	by	political	means,	the	ultimate	geopolitical	balance	of	powers	in	the	
region	between	China,	Russia	and	the	USA,	and	the	ability	of	the	countries	
of	Central	Asia	to	continue	to	use	China	to	reinforce	their	position	are	still	
open	questions.	However,	China’s	 stance	 is	playing	an	 increasing	 role	 in	
each	of	these	aspects.	
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I. ChIna and Central asIa – the baCkground  
for mutual relatIons
A	 superficial	 evaluation	 of	 relations	 between	China	 and	Central	Asia	might	
have	suggested	that	their	nature	is	strictly	local	and	temporary.	In	formal	and	
legal	terms,	their	bilateral	relations	date	back	to	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	in	
1991,	when	 the	new	 independent	Central	Asian	 republics	 (Kazakhstan,	Kyr-
gyzstan,	Tajikistan,	Turkmenistan	and	Uzbekistan)	were	established.	As	seen	
by	China,	whose	political	and	economic	potential	 is	concentrated	in	the	east	
of	the	country,	this	is	a	remote	area,	both	geographically	and	strategically,	es-
pecially	in	comparison	to	the	Pacific	or	even	Indian	Ocean	basin.	From	Cen-
tral	Asia’s	point	of	view,	the	internal	situation	(as	seen	by	both	the	region	as	
a	whole	and	individual	countries),	the	relations	with	the	traditional	political	
and	economic	centre,	i.e.	Russia,	and	possibly	relations	with	the	United	States,	
which	won	the	Cold	War	and	which	is	active	in	political,	military	and	economic	
terms	in	Asia,	are	the	issues	of	key	significance.
Today’s	Central	Asia,	however,	is	linked	to	China	by	a	long	and	tempestuous	
history	and	by	numerous	bonds	resulting	from	shared	historic	events.	China’s	
and	Russia’s	geopolitical	interests	in	Central	Asia	are	deeply	rooted	in	history.	
In	this	context,	the	sudden	changes	taking	place	in	Central	Asia	(the	appear-
ance	of	new	countries)	and	around	it	(primarily,	the	rapid	growth	of	China’s	
potential	and	economic	and	political	ambitions,	and	the	disintegration	of	the	
Russian	empire	of	the	19th	and	20th	centuries)	are	turning	the	region	into	a	dy-
namic	field	for	the	projection	of	Chinese	interests.	At	the	same	time,	the	re-
gion’s	countries,	Russia	and	other	international	players	are	developing	a	modus 
vivendi	with	China.	These	are	processes	of	great	significance	for	both	Central	
Asia	itself	and	also	for	China	and	Russia.	
Given	the	special	characteristics	of	China	(such	as	the	vast	and	rapidly	devel-
oping	economy)	and	Central	Asia	(such	as	the	enormous	need	for	investment,	
the	search	for	new	markets	and	significant	mineral	resources),	economic	is-
sues	have	thus	far	played	a	special	role	in	mutual	relations.	It	is	economic	is-
sues	which	have	affected	the	nature	of	mutual	relations	and	has	tangibly	been	
changing	Central	Asia.	
1. the historical background
From	a	historical	point	of	view,	what	are	today	Central	Asia	and	western	Chi-
na	(the	Xinjiang-Uyghur	Autonomous	Region)	used	to	form	a	rather	cohesive	
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cultural	and	political	area1,	which	was	divided	in	the	18th	and	19th	centuries	into	
the	Chinese	and	Russian	zones	of	influence,	and	was	effectively	made	part	of	
the	two	powers	over	time2.	Strong	social	bonds	between	the	Russian	and	the	
Chinese	Turkestan	were	expressed	on	numerous	occasions	also	in	the	20th	cen-
tury.	Manifestations	of	these	bonds	included	mass	migrations	of	refugees3	and	
the	permeation	of	nation-building	ideas	(from	Russia/the	USSR	to	China).	
Throughout	almost	the	entire	20th	century,	former	Turkestan	remained	a	field	
of	tacit	albeit	bitter	rivalry	between	Russia/the	Soviet	Union	and	China;	Russia	
being	clearly	 the	 stronger	and	more	active	 rival.	Moscow	strengthened	Bei-
jing’s	conviction	that	Soviet	Central	Asia	posed	a	serious	threat	to	China	in	the	
geographically	distant	and	underdeveloped	Xinjiang,	but	also	to	the	territorial	
integrity	of	the	country	as	a	whole.	The	starting	point	was	Beijing’s	criticism	
of	the	national	border	imposed	by	Russia	in	the	19th	century	(its	Central	Asian	
section	was	not	delimited	throughout	the	entire	Soviet	period).	Frustrations	
were	worsened	by	the	more	or	less	open	support	Moscow	used	to	offer	to	the	
Uyghur	separatists	(attempts	were	made	to	set	up	the	so-called	“First	Eastern	
Turkestan	Republic”	in	1933–1934	and	the	so-called	“Second	Eastern	Turkestan	
Republic”	in	1944–1949)4.	Individual	problems	were	manifestations	of	a	broader	
(de facto	global)	rivalry	between	the	USSR	and	China.	Tension	gave	rise	to	the	
Chinese-Soviet	border	conflict	in	1969,	one	of	the	conflict	sites	being	the	Ka-
zakh	section	of	the	border	(as	a	consequence	of	the	conflict,	the	Central	Asian	
section	of	the	border	remained	closed	until	1992).	Viewed	from	this	angle,	the	
1	 Throughout	the	first	millennium	A.D.,	this	was	the	area	of	Chinese	expansion	(which	was	
particularly	evident	in	its	eastern	part).	From	circa	8th	century	A.D.,	it	was	culturally	and	
politically	dominated	by	the	Turkish	and	Mongolian	element,	which	would	periodically	ex-
pand	at	the	expense	of	China.	Over	time,	Islam	has	become	another	essential	binding	factor	
(in	addition	to	ethnic	proximity)	which	has	unified	the	so-called	“Turkestan”.
2	 The	border	between	so-called	“Russian	Turkestan”	and	“Chinese	Turkestan”	was	imposed	
by	Russia	 in	the	 late	19th	century.	 It	can	be	assumed	principally	that	the	region	has	been	
effectively	controlled	by	Russia	since	the	end	of	 the	civil	war	triggered	by	the	Bolshevik	
revolution	(1920s)	and	by	China	since	Mao	Zedong’s	victory	in	the	civil	war	and	the	setting	
up	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(1949).	In	both	cases	increasing	control	of	the	region	
involved	the	use	of	vast-scale	repressions	against	the	local	population	and	resettlement	ac-
tions	aimed	at	weakening	their	demographic	predominance.	
3	 For	example,	at	least	hundreds	of	thousands	Kyrgyz	and	Kazakhs	fled	to	China	due	to	re-
pressions	following	the	suppression	of	the	rebellion	in	1916,	and	later	as	a	consequence	of	
the	Great	Famine	in	the	1930s;	the	Dzungar/Kalmyk	people	defeated	by	the	Chinese	in	the	
19th	century	and	Uyghurs	following	the	repressions	of	1962	moved	to	Russia.
4	 The	precedent	was	set	when	Russia	recognised	the	independence	of	so-called	“Outer	Mon-
golia”	in	1911,	which	was	confirmed	by	forcing	Chinese	troops	out	of	Mongolia	and	forcing	
Mongolia	to	accept	communism	in	1921.
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collapse	of	the	USSR	(1991)	spelt	a	serious	crisis	in	the	fragile	stability	around	
Central	 Asia5,	 created	 opportunities	 for	 reconstructing	 relations,	 but	 even	
more	so	gave	rise	to	fears,	mutual	distrust	and	cautiousness	among	the	parties	
involved.	
2. the strategic background for relations between China  
and Central asia
Relations	between	Central	Asia	and	China	over	the	past	two	decades	have	been	
an	effect	of	two	parallel	processes	of	fundamental	significance	for	the	global	
order.	One	of	 these	being	the	disintegration	of	 the	Russian/Soviet	empire	 in	
Asia	(especially	its	central	part),	and	the	other	–	the	sudden	rise	in	China’s	po-
sition	(in	Asia	and	worldwide).	
The	former	of	the	two	processes	has	injected	a	great	deal	of	dynamism	into	the	
situation	in	Central	Asia:	new	states	emerged,	and	at	the	onset	of	their	opera-
tion	they	needed	to	face	a	serious	political,	social,	economic	and	identity	crisis.	
This	crisis	has	been	made	manifest,	 for	 instance,	 through	military	conflicts	
(e.g.	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan),	political	coups	(Kyrgyzstan),	the	development	
of	nationalisms	and	Islamic	radicalism,	mass	migrations,	sudden	population	
growth,	etc.	Despite	the	enormous	progress	seen	over	the	past	two	decades,	it	
would	still	be	inaccurate	to	claim	that	the	situation	has	become	stable.	Russia	
has	strong	connections	–	both	those	inherited	from	the	USSR	and	those	newly	
created	–	and	thus	vast	influence	in	this	region.	Nevertheless,	its	monopolistic	
position	has	been	challenged:	the	region	has	opened	itself	up	to	political,	eco-
nomic,	military	and	civilisational	contacts	with	Moscow’s	rivals,	including	the	
USA	and	China.	The	region	has	been	strongly	affected	by	negative	(e.g.	the	war	
in	Afghanistan)	and	positive	external	impulses	alike.	Both	transient	problems	
linked	to	regional	security	and	building	durable	stability	in	the	region	have	al-
ways	been	granted	top	priority	in	Central	Asia’s	relations	with	China	and	also	
Russia	and	other	players.	
Another	–	and	by	no	means	less	significant	–	factor	in	the	background	of	rela-
tions	between	Central	Asia	and	China	has	been	the	enormous	increase	in	the	
significance,	activity	and	effectiveness	of	China’s	policy	worldwide,	the	start-
ing	point	for	which	was	China’s	rapid	economic	development	in	the	1980s.	The	
5	 This	also	challenged	the	stability	of	China	itself	–	perestroika	posed	a	serious	threat	to	the	sta-
bility	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	one	sign	of	which	were	the	student	protests	in	Beijing’s	
Tiananmen	Square,	which	were	in	part	triggered	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev’s	visit	to	Beijing.
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local	indicators	of	these	changes	include	Beijing’s	tightening	control	of	Xinji-
ang	and	the	rapid	economic	development	of	this	region,	though	it	remains	a	re-
gion	with	problems.	 In	economic	terms,	Beijing’s	rapidly	 increasing	demand	
for	energy	raw	materials	and	struggle	for	new	outlets	necessary	to	maintain	
economic	growth	and	internal	stability	are	important	factors.	In	strictly	geo-
political	terms,	this	is	China’s	ambition	(which	is	sometimes	understood	and	
recognised	worldwide)	 to	 gain	 a	 position	 of	 a	 leading	 global	 power.	 China’s	
serious	economic	interests	and	the	constantly	growing	strength	of	its	impact	
through	 economic	 influence	have	provided	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 spectacular	
development	of	relations	between	China	and	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	and	
for	a	gradual	reinforcement	of	China’s	position	in	this	region.
2.1. Central	Asia	as	seen	by	China	–	key	challenges
2.1.1.	Xinjiang	and	stability	issues	
The	Xinjiang	issue	has	been	the	first	and	the	foremost	challenge	for	China	in	
relations	with	Central	Asia	ever	since	1991.	This	region	has	been	underdevel-
oped	 for	 centuries.	Beijing	has	had	 relatively	weak	 control	 over	 it.	 Further-
more,	it	has	been	tormented	by	separatism	based	on	the	ethnic	and	religious	
distinctness	of	its	residents	(mainly	Uyghurs,	who	are	Muslims).	All	this	has	
made	Xinjiang	potentially	vulnerable	to	the	serious	threat	posed	by	an	unsta-
ble	Central	Asia.	China	was	above	all	anxious	about	Xinjiang	receptiveness	to	
the	ideological	ferment	originating	beyond	its	western	frontier	(a	mix	of	na-
tionalism,	Islam	and	democratic	slogans)	and	in	Afghanistan	(the	radical	and	
militant	Islam	propagated	by	the	Mujahideen	and	the	Taliban)6.	There	was	also	
a	serious	 threat	 in	which	Central	Asia	either	unintentionally	–	due	 to	being	
unable	to	control	the	situation	–	or	wilfully	–	whether	by	itself	or	inspired	by	
Russia	–	would	provide	a	logistic	base	for	Uyghur	separatists.	Objective	con-
firmations	of	 the	existence	of	 this	 threat	 included	 the	 increasing	 resistance	
demonstrated	by	Uyghurs	to	Beijing7	using	national,	religious	and	democratic	
slogans,	the	existence	of	a	strong	Uyghur	diaspora	in	Central	Asia,	the	limited	
6	 The	East	Turkestan	Islamic	Movement	(ETIM),	the	pillars	of	which	are	separatism	and	radical	
Islam,	which	has	been	involved	on	a	small	scale	in	terrorist	activity,	including	in	China,	has	
been	operating	since	circa	1993	in	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan’s	Waziristan.	In	practice,	China	
has	thus	far	successfully	neutralised	this	threat,	capitalising	on	its	influence	in	Islamabad	
(the	Pakistani	secret	services,	ISI,	have	a	major	impact	on	the	operation	of	Muslim	radicals	
and	the	Afghani	Taliban,	and	are	also	able	to	channel	their	activity	towards	Afghanistan	or	
India,	while	restricting	it	in	China,	on	which	Pakistan	is	strategically	dependent).
7	 Including	the	serious	riots	in	Ghulja/Yining	in	1997	and	in	Urumqi	in	2009.
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ability	of	Central	Asian	countries	to	control	their	national	territories	and	bor-
ders,	and	–	in	a	broader	context	–	conflicts	inside	the	individual	countries	in	
the	region8.	Over	the	past	two	decades,	Beijing	has	relatively	successfully	dealt	
with	the	problem	posed	by	this	province	employing	a	combination	of	the	use	
of	force,	demographic	methods	(promoting	the	settlement	of	the	Han	Chinese	
in	 the	 province,	 thus	weakening	 the	 ethnic	 predominance	 of	Uyghurs)	 and	
enormous	economic	engagement9.	However,	Central	Asia	still	remains	a	hypo-
thetical	threat	due	to	a	relatively	high	level	of	instability	there	and	the	neigh-
bourhood	of	Afghanistan.	 In	 this	 latter	aspect,	 the	 threat	 is	 ‘militant	 Islam’,	
which	Afghanistan	is	still	a	centre	of,	and	also	movements	which	find	shelter	
in	Afghanistan,	namely	the	radical	Uyghur	organisations:	the	East	Turkestan	
Islamic	Movement	 (ETIM)	 and	 the	 Turkestan	 Islamic	 Party	 (TIP),	 linked	 to	
the	radical	Central	Asian	organisations	operating	in	Afghanistan:	the	Islamic	
Movement	of	Uzbekistan	(IMU)	and	the	Islamic	Jihad	Union	(IJU).
2.1.2.The	geopolitical	rivals
The	collapse	of	the	USSR	and	the	emergence	of	the	new	states	in	Central	Asia	
offered	China	the	opportunity	to	radically	improve	its	position	in	the	region	
in	its	dealings	with	Russia:	Moscow	formally	withdrew	from	the	region,	and	
an	actual	buffer	was	created	between	China	and	Russia,	leaving	Beijing	more	
room	for	manoeuvre.	Although	China	temporarily	used	Russia’s	weakness	as	
an	opportunity	to	raise	the	issue	of	border	adjustment	with	the	regional	heirs	
to	the	USSR	in	the	1990s	(see	below),	it	rather	tended	not	to	openly	undermine	
Russia’s	 ambitions	 to	 retain	 political	 and	military	 hegemony	 in	 the	 region,	
partly	due	to	seeing	it	as	a	major	stabilising	factor	there.	
The	weakening	position	of	Russia	and	the	fact	that	Central	Asia	was	opening	up	
to	external	contacts	also	involved	the	need	to	confront	new	rivals.	The	players	
8	 Including	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	(1992–1997)	and,	when	it	ended,	the	activity	of	suprana-
tional	radical	and	terrorist	groups	(especially	the	Islamic	Movement	of	Uzbekistan);	mass	
socio-political	protests	in	2005	and	2010	in	Kyrgyzstan	using	democratic	slogans,	leading	to	
the	abolishment	of	the	then	presidents;	bitter	ethnic	and	social	tensions	with	Islamic	un-
dertones	in	Uzbekistan	(for	example,	the	early	1990s	and	between	1999	and	2005);	primarily	
conflicts	in	Afghanistan	(including	the	promotion	of	the	armed	and	effective	Muslim	‘In-
ternational’	under	the	aegis	of	al-Qaeda,	and	the	effectiveness	of	local	radicals,	the	Taliban,	
backed	by	foreign	Muslim	communities	and	Pakistan,	among	others).
9	 Including	the	development	of	agriculture,	and	the	communicational	 (roads	and	railways	
connecting	the	region	with	centres	in	eastern	China)	and	economic	infrastructure	(includ-
ing	the	development	of	special	economic	zones),	formalised	in	the	strategy	for	the	develop-
ment	of	the	western	provinces	adopted	in	2000).	
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interested	in	the	region	have	been:	Turkey	(posing	a	potential	threat	to	China,	
since	 it	has	been	playing	the	card	of	 the	community	of	Turkic	peoples),	 Iran	
(potentially	stoking	up	Islam	in	the	region),	Pakistan	(although	this	country	
is	China’s	ally,	it	has	actively	–	especially	in	Afghanistan	–	supported	Muslim	
radicals	and	used	them	in	its	political	games)	and	India10.
However,	it	turned	out	that,	in	addition	to	Russia,	the	main	challenge	China	
needed	to	deal	with	was	the	USA,	the	winner	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	indisput-
able	global	leader	in	the	1990s.	The	active	but	not	particularly	effective	promo-
tion	of	economic	interest	and	transformation	models	launched	by	the	USA	in	
the	1990s	in	Central	Asia	in	2001	in	the	context	of	the	global	war	on	terrorism	
and	the	operation	in	Afghanistan	turned	into	a	US	military	presence	in	Central	
Asia11.	Given	the	intensifying	geopolitical	rivalry,	the	US	presence	was	seen	by	
China	as	continued	encircling	by	US	military	bases12	and	as	potentially	pulling	
of	Central	Asia	into	the	orbit	of	US	political	influence.	The	US	political	activity	
in	certain	areas	Washington	is	particularly	interested	in,	especially	the	desire	
to	reconstruct	the	existing	socio-political	systems,	is	also	seen	as	a	threat	by	
Beijing.	From	China’s	point	of	view,	this	means	destabilisation	in	the	countries	
around	it,	and	gives	rise	to	suspicions	of	fomenting	political	unrest	(e.g.	the	col-
our	revolutions	or	even	the	Arab	Spring)	and	of	–	consciously	or	not	–	creating	
threats	 (the	case of	 intensifying	 Islamic	radicalism	 in	Afghanistan,	 starting	
with	the	support	offered	to	the	Mujahideen	in	the	1980s	resulting	ultimately	in	
the	emergence	of	al-Qaeda,	up	to	the	rise	of	radical	groupings	during	the	En-
during	Freedom	and	ISAF	operations	after	2001).	Since	Chinese-Russian	rela-
tions	in	Central	Asia	had	been	principally	regulated	and	Washington’s	activity	
had	been	on	the	rise,	the	USA	became	the	major	security	challenge	for	China,	
overtaking	Russia	and	other	minor	players.	
10	 India	is	one	of	China’s	key	geopolitical	rivals.	Along	with	(generally	unsuccessful)	attempts	
of	economic	activation	in	Central	Asia,	it	has	consistently	taken	action	to	build	its	military	
presence	in	the	region:	in	the	1990s,	it	was	co-operation	with	Russia	and	Iran	aimed	at	back-
ing	the	anti-Taliban	coalition	in	Afghanistan	(an	Indian	military	forward	operating	base	
and	a	military	hospital,	where	Ahmad	Shah	Massoud	reportedly	died	in	2001,	were	operat-
ing	in	Tajikistan).	Over	time,	efforts	to	open	an	airbase	in	Tajikistan	(India	modernised	the	
Ayni	airport,	but	Tajikistan	reportedly	had	to	withdraw	from	leasing	this	airport	to	New	
Delhi	due	to	Moscow’s	protests	in	2005).
11	 Strong	presence	in	Afghanistan	since	2001;	in	2001–2005	military	bases	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	
Uzbekistan	(and	NATO	member	state	bases	in	Tajikistan),	military	presence	in	Kyrgyzstan	
and	close	military	co-operation	between	the	USA	and	Uzbekistan	and	Tajikistan.
12	 In	addition	to	the	military	bases	in	Japan	and	South	Korea,	the	informal	alliance	with	Tai-
wan	and	the	presence	on	the	Pacific	and	Indian	Oceans.
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2.1.3.	The	economy
For	China,	Central	Asia	has	above	all	been	a	market	stimulating	the	economic	
development	 of	Xinjiang	 (exports	 of	Chinese	products);	 and	 for	 years,	 this	
has	 been	 the	most	 tangible	 aspect	 of	 economic	 co-operation.	 In	parallel	 to	
this,	China	was	preparing	itself	to	enter	the	oil	and	gas	market	in	the	region	
(especially	in	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan),	which	was	expected	to	ensure	
fuel	 supplies	 for	 the	 Chinese	 economy.	Unlike	what	 has	 been	 thus	 far	 the	
most	important	fossil	fuel	import	routes,	the	land	connections	with	Central	
Asia	are	seen	as	safer;	the	maritime	routes	running	from	the	Persian	Gulf	in	
the	case	of	crisis	can	be	easily	blocked	by	the	USA	or	India,	or	paralysed	due	
to	possible	problems	in	the	Strait	of	Malacca.	The	partners	from	Central	Asia	
are	weak,	and	thus	more	willing	to	collaborate	and	less	eager	to	use	the	‘gas	
weapon’	than	Russia.	In	addition	to	being	a	fossil	fuel	supplier,	Central	Asia	
represents	enormous	transit	potential	for	China:	it	potentially	offers	a	con-
nection	 for	 the	Chinese	market	 to	Europe	 and	 the	Middle	East	 (the	differ-
ent	variants	of	‘a	new	Silk	Road’),	Afghanistan	and	the	ports	(Pakistani	and	
Iranian)	by	the	Arabian	Sea	and	in	the	Persian	Gulf.	In	effect	of	the	rapid	in-
crease	in	the	Chinese	economic	presence	in	Central	Asia,	there	is	a	growing	
need	to	protect	Chinese	interests	in	the	region,	which	also	means	the	protec-
tion	of	China’s	political	interests.	
2.2. China	as	seen	by	Central	Asian	countries	–	key	challenges
2.2.1.	The	concerns
The	approach	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	take	to	China	is	characterised	by	
the	sense	of	foreignness	and	threat.	The	young	nations	whose	statehood	is	not	
yet	well-established,	 face	 numerous	 domestic	 problems,	 inherited	 from	 the	
USSR	and	a	whole	host	of	fears	and	problems	linked	to	their	eastern	neighbour.	
China	has	been	seen	as	a	traditionally	expansionist	power	entering	the	phase	
of	accelerated	development.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	Chinese	transformation	
model	–	in	contrast	to	fascinations	with	Western,	Turkish	and	Muslim	inspira-
tions	and	variations	of	all	these	applied	across	what	was	not	so	long	ago	a	zone	
of	Soviet	influence	–	has	not	attracted	so	much	interest.	In	turn,	quite	realis-
tic	concerns	have	been	raised	by	Chinese	border	claims,	Beijing’s	brutal	policy	
towards	Uyghurs	and	the	threat	that	China	could	interfere	with	the	internal	
affairs	 of	 Central	 Asian	 countries.	 A	 deeper	 foundation	 for	 such	 concerns	
originated	from	the	state-	and	nation-building	processes	and	the	developing	
nationalism	in	Central	Asian	communities	which	accompanied	them	and	was	
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reinforced	due	to	 the	alarmist	and	anti-Chinese	tone	present	 in	the	Russian	
media,	which	has	significantly	affected	the	views	in	Central	Asia.	
2.2.2.	The	opportunities
Along	with	the	concerns,	relations	with	China	brought	opportunities	for	support	
to	Central	Asia	from	Beijing:	diplomatic	relations	were	established	quickly	thus	
adding	credit	to	the	newly	established	states	in	the	region,	enabling	economic	
development	and	easing	the	consequences	of	the	crisis	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	
had	brought	 about	 (especially	 at	 the	 social	 level,	 owing	 to	 the	 ‘suitcase	 trade’	
typical	of	the	1990s).	The	rapidly	increasing	scale	of	China’s	economic	presence	
in	the	region	significantly	added	to	the	attractiveness	of	China	as	a	key	economic	
partner	for	Central	Asia	(see	below).	The	fact	that	China	(unlike	Russia	and	the	
USA)	demonstrated	its	lack	of	interest	in	imposing	any	of	its	domestic	policy	so-
lutions	upon	individual	Central	Asian	states	turned	out	to	be	a	major	positive	
element	in	relations	with	China	(especially	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century).	
Thus	China	became	a	factor	which	has	indirectly	been	stabilising	the	internal	
situation	and	de facto reinforcing	the	regimes	operating	in	Central	Asia.
2.2.3.	China	in	the	region’s	geopolitical	games
Russia	has	been	the	key	point	of	reference	in	international	politics	for	Central	
Asian	countries.	This	approach	 is	based	on	the	traditional	cultural,	political	
and	economic	bonds,	the	belief	that	this	is	a	country	which	guarantees	elemen-
tary	durability	of	the	regional	order	and	the	awareness	of	Russia’s	determina-
tion	to	maintain	Central	Asia	within	its	zone	of	influence	through	the	use	of	its	
strong	political,	military	and	social	instruments	in	the	region.	In	relations	be-
tween	Central	Asia	and	China,	Russia	aspires	to	be	the	patron	and	censor	of	the	
policies	adopted	by	the	region’s	countries.	One	special	manifestation	of	this	ap-
proach	is	the	domination	of	the	Collective	Security	Treaty	Organization13	(con-
trolled	by	Russia)	in	the	area	of	regional	security,	and	the	significance	of	the	
Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization14	as	the	main	platform	for	political	rela-
tions	between	Central	Asia	and	China.	Although	Russia	still	has	a	very	strong	
political	position	in	the	region,	it	has	been	constantly	weakened	by	the	activity	
13	 The	members	of	the	CSTO,	in	addition	to	Russia,	Belarus	and	Armenia,	include	Kazakhstan,	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	(Turkmenistan	has	consistently	remained	neutral,	and	Uzbeki-
stan	has	joined	and	left	the	alliance	twice	–	most	recently	in	2012).
14	 Members	of	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization	are:	China	and	the	post-Soviet	coun-
tries	which	border	it:	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	Uzbekistan.
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of	China	and	the	USA,	while	developing	co-operation	with	Russia’s	rivals	is	an	
important	element	strengthening	the	position	of	the	Central	Asian	states.	
3. each party’s interests
Given	 the	background	as	presented	above,	China’s interests with	regard	 to	
Central	Asia	in	political	and	security	terms	can	be	defined	as	follows:
•	 to	secure	the	stability	of	Xinjiang	and	to	avoid	any	negative	impact	from	
Central	Asia	on	this	region	of	China;
•	 to	maintain	and	extend	internal	stability	in	Central	Asia	as	a	condition	of	
security	in	Xinjiang	and	a	condition	necessary	to	implement	economic	(en-
ergy	and	communication)	objectives;	
•	 to	maintain	and	strengthen	the	sovereignty	of	the	states	of	Central	Asian	
and	 the	 regimes	operating	 there	 as	 a	 condition	 for	unrestricted	Chinese	
economic	(and	political)	activity	in	the	region;	
•	 to	weaken	the	domination	and	influence	of	its	geopolitical	rivals	in	Central	
Asia:	basically	(especially	in	the	initial	period)	of	Russia,	and	to	an	essen-
tial	and	constantly	increasing	degree	of	the	USA	(especially	after	2001);
In	the	case	of	Central	Asia,	subject	to	a	certain	differentiation	of	the	empha-
ses,	potentials	and	practices	of	individual	countries,	the	constant	goals in the 
policy of Central asian countries towards China are:
•	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 Chinese	 expansionism,	 a	 special	 aspect	 of	
which	has	been	 the	border	 issue,	 i.e.	 resisting	or	 restricting	China’s	 ter-
ritorial	claims;
•	 to	develop	in	a	controlled	manner	the	political	and	economic	co-operation	
initiated	 by	 China.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 co-operation	 is	 the	 factor	 which	
strengthens	individual	states	and	regimes	both	at	home	and	on	the	inter-
national	arena	(also	in	dealings	with	Russia),	while	allowing	them	to	avoid	
becoming	dependent	on	Beijing;
•	 to	maximise	the	profits	of	economic	and	infrastructural	co-operation	with	
China	for	instance	by	turning	Central	Asia	into	a	conveyor	belt	for	Chinese	
goods	exported	to	Europe	and	the	countries	of	the	Middle	East.
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The	 interests	of	China	and	Central	Asia	presented	 in	 this	way	put	Russia	 in	
a	difficult	position.	moscow’s traditional interests are:
•	 to	maintain	and	deepen	its	political	and	military	domination	and	to	regain	
economic	domination	in	Central	Asia.	Factors	which	contribute	to	this	in-
clude	the	weakness	of	the	individual	states	and	regimes	in	the	region	and	
Moscow’s	ability	to	use	local	conflicts	and	tensions	in	its	political	games;
•	 to	block	and	eliminate	the	influence	of	its	geopolitical	rivals,	especially	the	
USA	and	China;
•	 to	maintain	and	develop	strategic	co-operation	on	global	issues	with	China	
on	equal	terms.
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II. ChIna and Central asIa – the keY asPeCts  
of PolItICal relatIons and seCurItY Issues
Looking	back	to	the	past,	one	can	clearly	distinguish	between	two	periods	of	
relations	between	China	and	Central	Asia.	Fears	and	tension,	mainly	due	 to	
the	border	and	the	Uyghur	issues	were	predominant	in	the	1990s,	especially	at	
the	beginning	of	the	decade.	In	turn,	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century	has	seen	
a	harmonisation	of	the	policies	adopted	by	China	and	the	countries	of	Central	
Asia	resulting	in	rapidly	developing	co-operation.	The	future	of	these	relations	
is	still	unclear,	which	is	due	mainly	to	the	uncertain	stability	in	Central	Asia	
and	its	immediate	neighbourhood,	above	all	Afghanistan,	and	the	evolution	of	
China’s	policy.	The	degree	of	effectiveness	of	the	reintegration	actions	taken	by	
Russia	in	the	region	and	the	future	nature	of	relations	between	Moscow	and	
Beijing	will	also	have	an	impact.	
1. the borders and the uyghur issue – from conflicts  
to the shanghai Cooperation organization
The	Uyghur	and	the	border	issues	were	the	greatest	challenges	in	bilateral	re-
lations	between	China	and	Central	Asia;	and	these	issues	dominated	bilateral	
relations	in	the	1990s.	
The	most	serious	problem	was	the	unsettled	border	issue	with	China,	primar-
ily	in	Kazakhstan	but	also	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan.	From	the	early	1990s,	
China	openly	questioned	the	existing	borders,	and	put	military	and	economic	
pressure,	especially	on	Kazakhstan.	The	tension	reached	its	peak	in	1993–1994,	
one	manifestation	of	which	was	 the	 concentration	 of	Chinese	 troops	 on	 the	
border	with	Kazakhstan15.	At	the	same	time,	while	the	use	of	frontier	rivers	
had	 not	 been	 regulated,	 China	 embarked	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Black	
Irtysh–Karamai	Canal	and	on	irrigation	using	the	waters	of	the	Ili	River.	Both	
projects	adversely	affected	the	economic	interests	of	Kazakhstan	and	caused	
ecological	problems16.
15	 According	to	unofficial	statements	by	Kazakh	analysts	and	officials,	exchanges	of	fire	with	
Chinese	 troops	and	Chinese	raids	on	 the	 territories	controlled	 thus	 far	by	 the	USSR/Ka-
zakhstan	took	place	on	several	occasions	within	that	period.
16	 Cf.	e.g.	Effects	of	interdependency	in	the	Xinjiang-Central	Asian	region,	Ann	McMillan	
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN021190.pdf	
	 Temirbolat	Bakhytjan,	Water	Dispute	Threatens	Central	Asian	stability,	21	February	2005,	
IWPR,	http://iwpr.net/report-news/water-dispute-threatens-central-asian-stability	
	 Sebastien	Peyrouse,	Flowing	Downstream:	The	Sino-Kazakh	Water	Dispute;	16	May	2007;	
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The	final	establishment	of	 the	so-called	“Shanghai	Five”	 in	1996,	which	con-
sisted	of	the	Central	Asian	states	bordering	on	China,	China	itself	and	Russia,	
made	it	possible	to	find	a	preliminary	solution	to	the	Kazakh-Chinese	border	
problem	 (see	 below).	Russia’s	 participation	 clearly	 strengthened	 the	Central	
Asian	state	and	allowed	the	pressure	from	China	to	taper	off.	The	border	treaty	
was	signed	in	1996	(China	received	22%	–	which	it	saw	as	of	key	importance	–	of	
the	disputed	territories).	Since	then,	Kazakhstan	has	on	many	occasions	(and	
with	no	major	effect)	resumed	the	efforts	to	regulate	the	water	issues.	The	wa-
ter	management	issues	have	not	been	settled	so	far.	
The	border	treaties	with	the	other	neighbouring	states,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajik-
istan,	were	signed	in	1998	and	2002,	respectively.	It	needs	to	be	mentioned	that	
the	process	of	treaty	ratification,	and	the	delimitation	and	demarcation	of	the	
section	of	the	Chinese	border	with	Central	Asian	countries	was	significantly	
extended17.	Reasons	for	that	included	unfavourable	–	as	seen	by	Tajikistan	and	
Kyrgyzstan	–	solutions	to	the	border	issue	and	the	fear	that	the	public	in	these	
countries	would	oppose	the	deals	with	China.	In	effect,	the	Central	Asian	gov-
ernments	did	not	inform	the	public	of	the	terms	of	the	agreements,	and	above	
all	about	the	scale	of	concessions	made	to	China18.	
In	turn,	the	Uyghur	issue	was	resolved	in	a	relatively	painless	way.	Despite	the	
presence	of	the	numerous	Uyghur	minority	in	Central	Asia	(a	significant	group	
of	whom	was	formed	by	people	who	had	fled	from	China	in	1962)	and	support	
from	the	public	in	Kazakhstan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	where	Uyghurs	are	the	most	
numerous,	the	governments	in	Almaty/Astana	and	Bishkek	did	not	allow	the	
tension	based	on	the	Uyghur	issue	to	escalate.	Over	time	–	as	the	Shanghai	Five	
was	established	and	later	transformed	into	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organi-
sation	–	the	countries	in	the	region	made	active	efforts	aimed	at	significantly	
China	Brief	Volume:	7	 Issue:	 10;	http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/sin	gle/	
?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4131&tx_ttnews[backPid]=197&no_cache=1
	 Arthur	Dunn,	 The	 Problem	Of	 Transboundary	Rivers	 Being	A	 Factor	Of	 Strategic	 Secu-
rity	For	Countries,	http://www.eurodialogue.org/eu-central-asia/The-Problem-Of-Trans-
boundary-Rivers-Being-A-Factor-Of-Strategic-Security-For-Countries	
	 Ernst	Giese,	Jenniver	Sehring,	Alexej	Trouchine,	Zwischenstaatliche	Wassernutzungskon-
flikte	in	Zentralasien,	http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2004/1823/
17	 The	Tajik	parliament	ratified	the	border	treaty	with	China	as	late	as	on	12	January	2011,	thus	
granting	consent	to	relinquishing	a	disputed	area	of	1,000	km²	to	China.
18	 Part	of	 the	terms	of	 the	border	treaties	signed	by	Kyrgyzstan	with	China	were	 leaked	to	
public	opinion	in	late	2001,	which	led	among	other	thing	to	a	political	crisis	and	public	pro-
tests	(which	were	bloodily	suppressed	by	the	government	on	17	March	2002).
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reducing	the	activity	of	Uyghur	organisations,	especially	the	circles	engaged	in	
anti-Chinese	activity.	
from the shanghai five to the shanghai Cooperation organization
The	Uyghur	and	 the	border	 issues	 served	as	a	 foundation	 for	developing	
the	model	of	 co-operation	between	Central	Asia	and	China	and	between	
China	and	Russia,	namely	the	Shanghai	Five,	which	later	transformed	into	
the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation	(SCO).	The	onset	of	the	Shanghai	
Five	was	marked	by	the	post-Soviet	republics	bordering	on	China	(Russia,	
Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan)	signing	the	Treaty	on	Deepening	
Military	Trust	in	Border	Regions	on	26	April	1996.	This	was	supplemented	
a	year	later	by	the	Treaty	on	Reduction	of	Military	Forces	in	Border	Regions	
signed	in	Moscow.	In	parallel	to	this,	co-operation	on	combating	terrorism	
and	separatism	was	declared	(implicitly,	the	parties	committed	to	refrain	
from	playing	the	separatism	card	against	each	other).	It	was	the	first	time	
since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	that	the	former	Soviet	republics	had	acted	
together	(referring	to	their	post-Soviet	bonds	and	community	of	interests)	
to	deal	with	the	disputes	with	China	(for	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	this	
meant	reinforcing	their	position	owing	to	co-operation	with	Russia	and	an	
opportunity	to	mutually	coordinate	their	activity).	The	distrust	the	coun-
tries	of	Central	Asia	felt	towards	China	diminished	in	line	with	their	in-
creased	sense	of	self-confidence.	This	offered	Beijing	greater	opportunities	
for	co-operation	on	border	issues	and	the	stability	of	the	frontier	areas.	
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 relatively	 positive	 co-operation	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Shanghai	Five,	(including	a	significant	improvement	of	trust	between	the	
states)	 and	 in	effect	of	 increasing	 tension	 in	Central	Asia	 (the	activation	
of	 the	 Islamic	Movement	of	Uzbekistan	 in	 1999–2001),	Uzbekistan	 joined	
the	Shanghai	Five,	and	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization	was	estab-
lished	(15	June	2001,	Shanghai).	The	primary	goal	of	this	organisation	was	
determined	to	be	the	fight	against	terrorism,	extremism	and	separatism.	
Thus	China’s	key	demands	were	decreed	as	the	basis	for	co-operation	be-
tween	the	countries	in	the	region,	and	at	the	same	time	a	platform	was	cre-
ated	for	the	development	of	political,	security	and	(potentially)	economic	
co-operation.	This	was	also	beneficial	 for	 the	Central	Asian	states.	How-
ever,	 this	did	not	mean	 the	development	of	bilateral	 relations	was	relin-
quished.	Over	time,	the	SCO	has	become	the	most	important	platform	for	
dialogue	(co-operation	and	rivalry)	between	Russia	and	China	regarding	
Central	Asian	issues.	
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2. the stability issue in Central asia vs. relations with China
Central	Asia	is	a	region	with	a	high	potential	for	instability.	This	has	been	man-
ifested	through	military19	and	ethnic	conflicts20,	political	coups21,	the	activity	
of	Muslim	radicals22	and	socio-economic	tension23.	Other	sources	of	threat	in-
clude	the	limited	efficiency	of	government	structures24	and	the	unstable	politi-
cal	systems25.	Post-Soviet	Central	Asia	borders	directly	on	Afghanistan,	which	
has	been	traditionally	seen	as	a	hotbed	of	radical	Islam	and	ethnic	conflicts,	
and	a	cradle	of	powerful	 criminal	 structures	 involved	 in	 the	drug	business,	
which	are	used	by	external	powers	in	their	political	games26.	Neither	the	indi-
vidual	countries	in	this	region	or	Russia	(which	aspires	to	hegemony	in	Central	
Asia)	have	the	tools	to	resolve	these	problems	in	a	durable	and	effective	way.	
It	is	also	unclear	precisely	what	Russia’s	intentions	are;	should	the	instability	
issues	in	Central	Asia	be	resolved,	Moscow	would	be	deprived	of	its	most	effec-
tive	instrument	of	applying	pressure	on	the	region.
19	 In	particular,	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	in	1992–1997,	which	had	the	features	of	both	an	in-
ternal	(clan,	political	and	ideological)	and	regional	conflict	(due	to	the	engagement	of	other	
countries);	and	to	a	lesser	extent	the	activity	of	terrorist	organisations	(mainly	the	Islamic	
Movement	of	Uzbekistan).	The	threat	of	interstate	conflict	has	been	regularly	reiterated	in	
Uzbekistan’s	rhetoric	addressed	to	Tajikistan:	at	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	the	main	rea-
son	for	that	was	the	shelter	Uzbek	opposition	found	in	Tajikistan,	whereas	now	it	is	a	con-
flict	over	the	use	of	Tajikistan’s	water	resources	(Dushanbe	has	been	pushing	through	the	
construction	of	large	hydroelectric	plants	which	could	put	Uzbek	agriculture	at	stake).
20	 Including	violent	Kyrgyz-Uzbek	conflicts	in	1990	and	2010.
21	 This	concerns	especially	Kyrgyzstan,	where	public	protests	 (indirectly	supported	by	 the	
circumstances	and	external	players)	brought	about	replacements	of	the	presidents	in	2005	
and	2010.	Government	changes	in	the	other	countries	were	caused	either	by	civil	war	(Ta-
jikistan)	or	palace	coups	(Turkmenistan	in	2006).
22	 In	particular,	the	Islamic	Movement	of	Uzbekistan	in	operation	since	1998	(and	the	groups	
linked	to	it	and	to	al-Qaeda).	The	most	spectacular	actions	were	the	IMU’s	attacks	on	Kyr-
gyzstan	and	Uzbekistan	in	1999	and	2000.	The	mountainous	areas	of	Tajikistan	are	report-
edly	strongly	infiltrated	by	the	Mujahideen;	while	local	radical	groupings	have	been	active	
in	urban	areas	(especially,	but	not	only,	in	the	Fergana	Valley).
23	 E.g.	the	2005	‘rebellion’	in	Uzbekistan,	a	special	manifestation	of	which	were	the	bloodily	
suppressed	protests	in	Andijan	on	13	May	2005.
24	 Especially	evident	in	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan.
25	 The	 succession	 problems	 (and	 the	 questions	 about	 political	 stability	 and	 continuity)	 in	
Uzbekistan	and	Kazakhstan.	In	the	past,	the	possibility	of	the	violent	democratisation	of	
Kyrgyzstan	(the	coups	in	2005	and	2010	were	accompanied	by	democratic	slogans,	and	the	
first	of	the	two	fitted	in	with	the	wave	of	the	“colour	revolutions”,	which	were	believed	to	be	
linked	to	US	policy)	were	among	the	sources	of	anxiety.	
26	 The	tension	has	been	present	in	Afghanistan,	with	various	levels	of	intensity,	continuously	
since	at	least	1979.	As	the	NATO	and	US	missions	in	Afghanistan	are	set	to	end	(be	signifi-
cantly	reduced)	in	2014,	a	new	escalation	of	tension	is	expected	there.
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For	China,	the	instability	in	its	western	neighbourhood	is	a	serious	challenge;	
it	poses	a	threat	to	the	implementation	of	each	of	the	goals	of	the	Chinese	policy	
in	the	region.	However,	China	has	so	far	manifested	neither	the	will	nor	any	in-
struments	necessary	for	direct	engagement	in	the	tensions	inside	Central	Asia.	
Formally,	security	threats	to	Chinese	interests	in	Central	Asia	are	supposed	to	be	
regulated	by	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization,	which	has	not	practically	
developed	any	effective	instruments	necessary	to	deal	with	regional	security	is-
sues27,	and	as	a	consequence	has	not	played	any	role	in	resolving	subsequent	re-
gional	crises28.	In	fact,	Beijing	respects	Russia’s	interests	and	initiatives	regard-
ing	regional	security	issues.	For	the	time	being,	Beijing	has	been	able	to	forge	
its	weakness	 into	a	positive	 image	of	a	country	which	does	not	 interfere	with	
the	internal	problems	of	its	neighbours.	This	situation	has	also	stimulated	China	
to	develop	bilateral	political	and	military	co-operation	with	SCO	member	states	
(and	Turkmenistan),	especially	at	the	level	of	political,	financial	and	(to	a	lim-
ited	 extent)	military	 support	 (supply	 of	military	materials	 and	 financial	 and	
training	support).	However,	it	would	be	difficult	to	state	that	this	situation	has	
been	ultimately	resolved	in	a	way	satisfactory	to	China	and	resistant	to	regional	
turbulences.	In	particular	since	China	has	barely	concealed	its	annoyance	with	
Russian	activity	in	the	region	–	above	all	with	the	consent	granted	to	the	estab-
lishment	of	US	military	bases	after	2001	(which	was	seen	by	China	as	either	Rus-
sia’s	weakness	or	conscious	anti-Chinese	activity),	and,	in	broader	terms,	with	
Russia’s	inefficiency	in	bringing	stability	to	Central	Asia.	
3. China in regional geopolitical games
Both	China’s	global	ambitions	and	its	regional	potential	and	interests	place	it	among	
the	strongest	geopolitical	players	in	Central	Asia.	At	the	same	time,	the	interests	of	
Russia,	the	USA	and	China	overlap	in	this	region,	thus	turning	it	into	a	place	contrib-
uting	to	the	development	of	global	relations	between	these	countries.	
Chinese-Russian	relations	are	of	key	significance	for	the	region	itself	due	to	the	
historical	background	and	the	fact	that	both	of	these	countries	border	Central	
27	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 SCO’s	 flagship	 projects,	 the	 Regional	 Anti-Terrorist	 Structure	
(RATS),	established	 in	2002.	 It	still	remains	merely	a	platform	for	the	exchange	of	 intel-
ligence	information.	No	promised	constant	rapid	reaction	forces,	not	to	mention	a	base	for	
the	operation	of	such	forces	in	the	region,	have	been	created.	Common	exercises	are	limit-
ed.	Furthermore,	it	was	admitted	during	the	SCO	summit	in	2012	that	non-military	impact	
remained	the	main	area	of	the	SCO’s	activity	as	regards	security	issues.	
28	 For	example,	during	the	Kyrgyz	‘revolutions’	in	2005	and	2010,	and	especially	during	the	
violent	ethnic	conflict	between	Kyrgyz	and	Uzbeks	in	southern	Kyrgyzstan	in	2010.
22
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
Asia.	 The	 first	 and	 the	 fundamental	 circumstance	which	 has	 characterised	
Russia-China	relations	in	Central	Asia	since	1991	–	 in	addition	to	the	change	
in	both	countries’	global	potential	–	is	the	fact	that	Moscow	has	lost	its	direct	
and	unquestionable	control	over	 the	region.	 It	 is	 the	first	 time	over	the	past	
two	centuries	that	Russia	is	unable	and,	above	all,	has	no	political	will	to	treat	
Central	Asia	as	its	base	for	expansion	towards	China	or	to	use	Central	Asia	as	
a	means	to	apply	military	and	political	pressure	on	China.	In	strategic	terms,	
the	past	two	decades	have	brought	an	absolutely	new	quality	to	the	game	be-
tween	Beijing	and	Moscow	in	Central	Asia.	
As	has	been	mentioned	above,	Russia’s	and	China’s	strategic	interests	differ	at	
some	essential	points:	Russia’s	regional	domination	in	the	area	of	security	will	
be	 irreconcilable	with	China’s	economic	and	political	expansion	 in	 the	 long-
term.	 The	 two	 countries	 definitely	 have	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 ‘sover-
eignty’	and	‘independence’	of	the	Central	Asian	countries,	which	are	offering	
more	and	more	room	for	manoeuvre	to	China	and	are	reducing	the	significance	
of	Russia	as	a	patron	and	guarantor	of	regional	stability.	On	the	other	hand,	
one	may	also	notice	–	in	Moscow	and	Beijing	alike	–	similarities	of	interests	in	
global	politics	(primarily,	restricting	the	global	position	of	the	USA)	and	the	
common	will	to	reduce	tension	in	bilateral	relations.	In	this	context,	Central	
Asia	 is	one	of	 the	most	 interesting	and	most	versatile	fields	 for	 the	develop-
ment	of	Chinese-Russian	relations.	 In	 turn,	 these	are	best	 illustrated	by	 the	
Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization:	it	was	established	partly	with	the	aim	of	
neutralising	tension	between	Russia	and	China,	it	takes	into	account	the	ex-
istence	of	the	new	republics	in	Central	Asia	and	covers	up	the	differences	ex-
isting	between	 its	 two	major	member	 states.	Characteristically,	 the	Russian	
and	the	Chinese	concepts	 for	 the	development	of	 this	organisation	have	col-
lided:	while	Moscow	has	seen	it	primarily	as	a	new	geopolitical	bloc	which	adds	
strength	to	Moscow’s	voice	on	the	international	arena,	China	would	like	to	see	
the	SCO	as	a	platform	of	co-operation	in	security	and	economic	issues.	The	SCO	
remains	a	political	dialogue	platform:	this	organisation	has	not	undermined	
the	Russian	domination	in	the	security	area,	neither	has	it	channelled	Chinese	
economic	activity	away	from	the	region.	None	of	the	countries	can	claim	that	
strategic	goals	are	being	 implemented	here.	 It	 is	still	an	open	question	what	
role	the	SCO	could	play	when	the	ISAF	mission	is	over	in	Afghanistan.	On	the	
level	or	rhetoric,	the	SCO	aspires	to	share	the	responsibility	for	the	future	of	
Afghanistan,	while	in	practice	it	does	not	seem	to	be	prepared	for	this.	
While	relations	between	China	and	Russia	are	developing	in	Central	Asia	at	the	
level	of	political	co-operation	and	declarations	correctly	economic	issues,	to	say	
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the	least,	remain	a	field	of	bitter	rivalry.	After	the	twenty	years	of	the	so-called	
“New	Great	Game”,	i.e.	vying	for	access	to	Central	Asian	energy	resources	(which	
have	been	treated	as	a	useful	tool	in	the	struggle	for	maintaining	political	domi-
nation),	it	is	China	who	has	managed	to	implement	and	develop	the	oil	and	gas	
production	and	import	project	in	the	region.	This	means	that	the	previous	Rus-
sian	monopoly	has	been	broken	and	that	a	step	towards	implementing	the	stra-
tegic	goals	of	Chinese	policy	has	been	made.	Given	the	constant	increase	in	trade	
and	China’s	financial	engagement,	this	is	a	clear	sign	of	the	continuing	weaken-
ing	of	Russia’s	position	in	the	region.	China’s	successes	provided	a	strong	stimu-
lus	for	Russia	to	intensify	its	efforts	aimed	at	the	reintegration	of	the	post-Soviet	
area,	including	economic	reintegration.	Constantly	repeated	promises	(none	of	
which	have	been	fulfilled,	and	thus	are	becoming	less	and	less	credible)	that	seri-
ous	Russian	investments	will	be	made	in	Central	Asia,	and	above	all	the	hurried	
creation	of	the	Customs	Union	(whose	members	at	present	are:	Russia,	Kazakh-
stan	and	Belarus)	are	among	the	factors	intended	to	contribute	to	the	implemen-
tation	of	this	goal.	The	terms	of	economic	rivalry	in	Central	Asia	are	dictated	by	
China	and	are	clearly	favourable	for	this	country	–	the	political	framework	with-
in	which	this	is	taking	place	seems	to	be	more	and	more	at	variance	with	reality.
As	seen	from	the	perspective	of	the	two	past	decades,	China,	in	comparison	to	
its	Asian	competitors	vying	for	influence	in	the	region,	has	performed	really	
well:	Turkey	and	Iran,	which	have	been	playing	the	card	of	cultural	commu-
nity	with	Central	Asian	countries,	are	playing	a	very	limited	role,	as	is	the	in-
fluence	of	India	and	Pakistan,	for	whom	the	main	motivation	were	their	cal-
culations	regarding	security.	None	of	these	countries	have	managed	to	build	
a	strong	political,	economic	or	military	position,	and	none	of	them	is	playing	
a	major	political	role	in	the	region.	
The	US	achievements	and	position	in	the	region	are	still	an	open	question.	On	
the	one	hand,	despite	clear	economic	(including	the	expansion	of	US	energy	
companies,	especially	in	Kazakhstan),	political	(the	USA	has	become	a	signifi-
cant	political	reference	point	in	Central	Asia,	especially	in	the	area	of	security	
policy)	and	military	successes	(US	armed	forces	have	been	present	in	the	re-
gion	since	2001),	US	policy	appears	to	be	losing	momentum.	American	political	
and	military	engagement	seems	to	have	reached	its	peak	in	2005,	when	Central	
Asian	countries	started	noticing	its	side	effects29,	and	now,	as	the	ISAF	mission	
29	 The	Tulip	Revolution	of	2005	in	Kyrgyzstan	was	a	breakthrough.	It	was	seen	in	the	region	
as	a	coup	plotted	by	the	USA.	It	was	followed	by	a	rebellion	in	Uzbekistan	in	May	2005	(the	
violently	suppressed	protests	in	Andijan	and	other	cities	in	the	Fergana	Valley),	which	from	
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is	being	wound	up	in	Afghanistan,	it	will	further	decline.	Economic	engage-
ment,	including	a	number	of	infrastructural	projects	backed	by	the	USA	(in-
cluding	as	part	of	CAREEC),	has	also	failed	to	translate	into	durable	bonds	be-
tween	the	region	and	the	US	economy,	which	would	have	provided	grounds	for	
enhancing	the	political	engagement.	As	seen	from	this	viewpoint,	China’s	po-
sition	in	the	region	has	been	relatively	growing	as	compared	to	that	of	the	USA.	
However,	on	the	other	hand,	considering	China’s	growing	regional	and	global	
ambitions	and	the	fact	that	its	relations	with	Russia	have	been	normalised,	it	
is	the	USA	that	is	becoming	China’s	main	rival	as	regards	security	in	Central	
Asia.	The	presence	of	US	military	forces	in	the	region	(especially,	the	airbase	
in	Manas,	Kyrgyzstan)	has	been	perceived	as	indirectly	targeted	against	Chi-
na.	 In	turn,	America’s	determination	 in	 its	efforts	 to	continue	to	strengthen	
its	presence	in	the	region	once	the	ISAF	mission	is	wound	up	(which	does	not	
mean	at	all	that	the	Americans	will	no	longer	be	present	in	Afghanistan)	has	
given	rise	to	great	anxiety	in	China.	Furthermore,	it	is	feared	that	the	situa-
tion	both	in	Afghanistan	and	Central	Asia	could	destabilise	as	a	consequence	of	
the	weakening	Western	presence	in	the	region	and	this	could	affect	China’s	re-
gional	interests.	The	increasing	room	for	co-dependence	and	rivalry	between	
the	USA	and	China	on	the	global	scale	will	certainly	be	manifested	in	Central	
Asia,	and	will	affect	the	Chinese	perception	of	the	region	and	of	US	policy.	
4. the Chinese model of building its political position in Central asia 
When	compared	to	Russian	or	US	policy	in	Central	Asia	China’s	political	posi-
tion	in	the	region	is	far	from	impressive.	This	can	be	justified	by	comparison	
with	 the	 spectacular	manifestations	 of	Russia’s	 and	America’s	 presence	 and	
engagement	 in	 the	political	 and	military	areas:	 the	 formal	alliances	 (CSTO),	
economic	(the	Customs	Union)	and	political	organisations	(CIS),	civilisational	
bonds,	military	presence	(including	US	bases),	the	influence	on	internal	politi-
cal	games	in	individual	countries,	etc.	Formally,	the	SCO	is	the	only	regional	
organisation	China	is	a	member	of.	Despite	its	enormous	interest	in	security	
issues,	Beijing	has	none	of	the	hard	instruments	necessary	to	bear	influence	
in	 this	area,	and	 it	has	been	avoiding	 involvement	 in	domestic	games	 in	 the	
region’s	countries.	Nevertheless,	China	is	a	very	important	player	in	region-
al	 policy,	 primarily	 owing	 to	 its	 global	 significance	 and	 economic	potential.	
Tashkent’s	point	of	view	was	an	effect	of	US	pro-democratic	propaganda	and	attempt	 to	
interfere	with	the	country’s	domestic	affairs.	In	the	same	year,	Uzbekistan	ended	military	
co-operation	with	the	USA	and	NATO,	and	US	problems	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	also	in	relations	
with	Russia	intensified.	
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But	this	is	not	all:	a	typically	Chinese	model	of	building	a	political	position	in	
a	gradual	and	discreet	manner	(which	has	also	been	observed	in	other	parts	of	
the	world)	is	emerging	in	Central	Asia,	which	is	definitely	different	from	the	
Russian	and	the	US	models.	From	the	perspective	of	the	past	two	decades,	this	
model	can	be	recognised	as	internally	coherent	and	effective.	
the existence of the independent states which emerged from the rub-
ble of the ussr has been the foundation of China’s presence in Central 
asia – supporting their existence and the governments which guarantee 
their existence has been a constant element of Chinese policy. This	has	
been	clear	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR:	China	immediately	recognised	these	
countries’	 independence	 and	 opened	 up	 to	 economic	 co-operation	 (primar-
ily	trade).	Its	‘affirmative’	approach	towards	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	has	
been	manifested	through:	the	high	level	of	bilateral	visits,	China’s	interest	in	
signing	strategic	co-operation	agreements,	and	its	support	for	Central	Asian	
countries	on	the	international	scene,	especially	in	two	especially	sensitive	ar-
eas:	the	legitimisation	and	the	stability	of	the	regimes,	and	their	independence	
from	superpowers,	especially	the	USA	and	Russia.	
China has consistently accepted and strengthened the rights of the coun-
tries of Central asia to total freedom in creating their domestic situa-
tion, and	has	vehemently	opposed	e.g.	the	imposition	of	Western	democratic	
standards	or	 forcing	 them	to	respect	human	rights.	This	problem	was	espe-
cially	strongly	emphasised	after	2001,	during	the	US	expansion	in	the	region	
and	attempts	 to	push	 through	democratic	 solutions	 (an	extreme	example	of	
which	was	the	support	granted	to	the	colour	revolutions),	while	China	(both	
individually	and	as	part	of	the	SCO)	firmly	defended	the	local	regimes	and	its	
own	internal	stability.	
One	special	manifestation	of	this	approach	was	the	political	support	granted	to	
Uzbekistan	and	President	Islam	Karimov	following	the	Andijan	massacre	(May	
2005),	when	the	West	(including	the	USA)	was	insisting	that	an	international	in-
vestigation	into	the	massacre	needed	to	be	launched,	and	the	EU	imposed	sanc-
tions	on	Uzbekistan.	Tashkent	saw	this	as	direct	interference	with	the	country’s	
internal	affairs.	In	the	weeks	which	followed	the	Andijan	incidents,	while	Uz-
bekistan	was	being	isolated	by	the	West	and	had	difficult	relations	with	Russia,	
China	was	the	first	country	to	accept	and	back	Islam	Karimov.	
China’s	 relations	 with	 Turkmenistan	 serve	 as	 another	 vivid	 illustration	 of	
its	approach.	China	 is	a	country	whose	standards	are	extremely	at	variance	
26
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
with	the	Western	democratic	standards	and	which	is	distrustful	of	the	exter-
nal	world	(above	all	Russia).	Here	China	has	consistently	 turned	a	blind	eye	
on	extreme	shortcomings	regarding	not	only	democracy,	but	also	the	rule	of	
law.	Thus	it	has	been	gaining	the	trust	of	Turkmenistan’s	government	and	has	
been	capitalised	upon	this	in	economic	co-operation	and,	in	effect,	in	China’s	
increasing	influence	on	Turkmenistan’s	policy.
This	approach	which	China	takes	to	domestic	affairs	in	the	region	is	crowned	
with	the	strikingly	moderate stance it takes on internal political games in 
individual countries. By	comparison,	Russia	is	treated	as	a	state	which	can	
to	a	significant	extent	create	the	internal	situation	in	Central	Asian	countries,	
proofs	of	which	included	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	in	1992–1997	and	the	oust-
ing	of	President	Bakiyev	in	Kyrgyzstan	in	2010.	Russia	is	also	a	constant	factor	
being	considered	 in	 the	succession	scenarios	 in	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan	
(partly	due	 to	 its	 strong	connections	with	 the	opposition	and	 the	groupings	
inside	 the	 government	 elite).	 The	 United	 States	 similarly	 has	 been	 accused	
of	inspiring	the	Tulip	Revolution	in	Kyrgyzstan	(2005)	or	the	pro-democratic	
opposition	 (from	supporting	 the	 free	press	and	NGOs	 to	backing	potentially	
democratic	 parties,	 e.g.	 the	 Sunshine	 Coalition	 in	 Uzbekistan	 in	 2004/05),	
i.e.	 of	 having	 a	 desire	 to	 gain	 direct	 influence	 on	 the	 local	 political	 scene.	
Unlike	Russia	and	the	USA,	China	has	never	been	perceived	as	a	potential	pa-
tron	of	any	political	grouping	in	the	region.	
beijing’s moderation in pushing through political and legal solutions or,	
more	broadly,	promoting	the	Chinese	visions	for	the	modernisation	of	Central	
Asia,	fits	in	with	this	approach.	This	is	another	factor	which	makes	China	sig-
nificantly	distinct	especially	from	the	West	(open,	though	inconsistent,	pres-
sure	to	adopt	the	Western	model	of	political,	social	and	economic	transforma-
tion)	and	also	from	Russia	(cherishing	the	elements	of	the	Soviet	heritage,	and	
osmosis	based	on	participation	in	common	political,	economic	and	military	or-
ganisations).	In	effect,	co-operation	(especially	economic)	with	China	does	not	
involve	the	sensation	of	a	direct	threat	being	levelled	at	the	regional	regimes	
and	 is	 not	 conditioned	 by	 the	 policies	 the	 regimes	 adopt	 at	 home.	 Proofs	 of	
this	include	China’s	ability	to	co-operate	with	countries	following	such	differ-
ent	development	models	as	Turkmenistan	and	Kazakhstan	and,	on	the	other	
hand,	the	continuity	of	co-operation	with	all	the	governments	in	Kyrgyzstan,	
regardless	of	the	revolutions	in	2005	and	2010.	
Another	aspect	of	 the	 ‘affirmative’	policy	 towards	 the	region	 is	 the	discreet 
support for individual countries in case of tension in relations with 
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russia or the usa:	China	has	offered	disinterested	and	benevolent	backing.	
This	was	the	overtone	of	the	aforementioned	political	support	for	Uzbekistan	
in	2005	and	this	was	the	role	China	took	at	the	time	of	the	change	in	govern-
ment	 in	Turkmenistan	 (the	Russia-China-Turkmenistan	 talks	which	accom-
panied	the	funeral	of	Saparmurat	Niyazov	were	held	at	the	Chinese	embassy	
in	Ashgabat,	which	was	 ‘neutrally	benevolent	 for	Turkmens’).	An	especially	
vivid	manifestation	of	this	was	the	financial,	and	de facto political,	assistance	
granted	by	Beijing	to	Ashgabat	when	the	latter	had	found	itself	under	strong	
pressure	from	Moscow	during	the	Russian-Turkmen	gas	crisis	(2009).	A	very	
clear	symbolic	sign	of	China’s	support	for	the	durability	of	the	political	order	in	
the	post-Soviet	area	(and	one	desired	by	the	region’s	countries)	was	the	SCO’s	
stance	on	the	Georgia-Russia	war	(2008):	this	organisation	did	not	recognise	
the	independence	of	Abkhazia	and	Southern	Ossetia,	which	Moscow	was	in-
sisting	on	and	which	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	were	reluctant	to.	Support	
from	China	allowed	them	to	stand	their	ground	in	dealings	with	Russia.
Although	the	political	activity	model	adopted	by	China	over	the	past	two	dec-
ades	is	relatively	successful	(Central	Asian	countries	are	trusting	China	more	
and	more,	and	are	 increasingly	 interested	 in	developing	economic	co-opera-
tion),	 it	still	does	not	guarantee	Chinese	interests	 in	the	region	security	and	
sustainability.	China	is	unable	to	take	any	direct	action	in	case	of	major	inter-
nal	crises,	especially	military	conflicts,	or	–	more	broadly	–	processes	in	which	
the	military	factor	plays	the	decisive	role.	This	factor	is	of	great	significance	in	
the	region,	where	the	risk	of	such	conflicts	–	both	domestic	(e.g.	the	problem	
with	‘militant	Islam’	and	ethnic	conflicts)	and	external	(e.g.	threats	originat-
ing	from	Afghanistan,	and	the	presence	of	the	US	and	Russia	in	the	region	and	
with	the	possibility	of	Russia	using	force;	this	threat	hypothetically	also	exists	
in	the	case	of	the	USA)	–	is	quite	real.	Beijing	has	realised	this	on	several	oc-
casions	over	the	past	decade.	The	first	occasion	happened	during	the	military	
raids	by	the	Islamic	Movement	of	Uzbekistan	(in	1999	and	2000),	then	during	
the	US	and	NATO	operations	in	Afghanistan	(since	2001),	and	finally	at	the	time	
of	the	coups	in	Kyrgyzstan	(especially	in	2010)	and	the	violent	ethnic	conflict	
between	Kyrgyz	and	Uzbek	people	resulting	from	the	last	coup.	In	each	of	the	
cases	China	had	no	real	impact	on	the	situation,	despite	the	fact	that	the	basic	
condition	for	its	ability	to	influence	the	region,	i.e.	the	stability	and	efficiency	
of	local	governments,	was	put	at	stake	in	all	of	these	situations.	
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5. Central asian countries on China 
The	special	nature	of	China	and	its	policy	 in	the	region	(including	its	politi-
cal	and	economic	potential	and	tactical	minimalism	in	its	policy	towards	the	
region)	 offers	 the	 countries	 of	Central	Asia	no	 other	 choice	but	 to	maintain	
a	reactive	and	conservative	policy	towards	Beijing.	Furthermore,	political	re-
lations	are	a	function	of	economic	relations.	
This	became	a	well-established	status quo	once	the	problematic	border	issues	
had	been	settled,	the	SCO	had	been	constituted,	and	the	countries	of	Central	
Asia	 had	 accepted	 China’s	 key	 political	 interests.	 This	 status quo was	 tested	
in	practice	between	2001	and	2010,	a	tempestuous	decade	for	this	region.	Not	
even	once	did	China	take	a	political	stance	in	that	period,	nor	did	it	take	action	
that	could	raise	concern	in	Central	Asia.	As	mentioned	above,	Beijing	has	on	
numerous	occasions	offered	essential	political	support	to	the	regional	regimes,	
and	also	financial	support,	which	de facto	translated	into	political	support.	
In	 current	politics,	 the	 countries	 of	 the	 region	have	on	numerous	 occasions	
treated	China	 as	 a	 convenient	 counterbalance	 in	 their	 dealings	with	Russia	
and	 the	USA.	The	high	 frequency	of	visits	between	Central	Asian	 countries	
and	China,	which	have	been	 focused	on	bilateral	 co-operation,	especially	 in	
the	area	of	the	economy,	and	with	no	elements	of	political	dispute,	has	been	
aimed	at	proving	that	Beijing	offers	an	important	alternative;	primarily	finan-
cial,	but	also	political.	
However,	 given	 the	 positive	 atmosphere	 of	 current	 political	 co-operation	
(which	is	even	more	true	regarding	economic	co-operation),	the	way	bilater-
al	 relations	will	develop	 in	 the	 longer	 term	 is	 still	an	open	question.	This	 is	
the	area	where	the	differences	in	perceiving	the	problem	by	each	of	the	states	
show	up	most	clearly.	
The	 special	 features	 of	 the	 smaller	 states	 (especially	 Tajikistan	 and	 Kyr-
gyzstan),	their	political	and	economic	weakness,	and	the	fact	that	current	in-
ternal	problems	are	predominant	in	their	politics	–	all	this	causes	that	it	is	dif-
ficult	to	notice	any	potential	in	the	policies	adopted	by	these	countries	or	the	
ambition	to	create	long-term	strategies	for	developing	relations	with	China.	
The	situation	looks	different	when	seen	by	the	larger	states,	which	are	compar-
atively	better-established	and	have	political	ambitions	 (Kazakhstan	and	Uz-
bekistan).	They	are	forced	to	make	long-term	plans	due	to	the	need	to	develop	
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the	energy	sector	(Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan,	and	–	for	slightly	different	rea-
sons	–	Turkmenistan).	 In	 the	case	of	 these	countries,	 long-term	calculations	
are	more	noticeable,	and	concerns	can	be	seen	alongside	the	positive	aspects	
of	developing	co-operation	with	China.	In	practice,	this	boils	down	to	actions	
aimed	at	the	diversification	of	both	energy	co-operation	(all	the	countries	are	
developing	energy	co-operation	with	China,	and	each	of	them	has	taken	action	
to	develop	alternative	routes),	and	–	in	the	broader	sense	–	economic	and	politi-
cal	co-operation.
In	the	case	of	Kazakhstan,	China	is	a	key	political	and	economic	partner	along-
side	Russia.	Kazakhstan	 is	open	to	any	kind	of	co-operation	with	China	(es-
pecially	in	the	areas	of	economy	and	transport).	Their	bilateral	relations	may	
be	termed	a	strategic	partnership.	However,	in	line	with	the	development	of	
co-operation	with	China,	Kazakhstan	is	building	a	kind	of	security	against	be-
coming	excessively	or	too	quickly	dependent	on	China.	One	example	of	this	is	
the	development	of	co-operation	with	the	USA	and	the	EU,	and	above	all	with	
Russia,	which	 is	seen	as	counterbalance	 to	China.	Kazakhstan’s	accession	 to	
the	Customs	Union	was	symptomatic,	as	this	provided	Astana	with	grounds	
for	restricting	Chinese	economic,	and	consequently	political,	expansion.	
Uzbekistan	has	 treated	China	with	much	greater	 reserve.	Despite	 the	 crisis	
in	relations	after	2005,	Uzbekistan	has	been	actively	developing	political	and	
military	co-operation	with	the	USA	and	NATO,	especially	on	the	foundations	
of	the	ISAF	and	OEF	operations	in	Afghanistan.	While	developing	economic	co-
operation	with	China	(a	gas	pipeline	and	transportation	projects),	Uzbekistan	
of	all	 the	Central	Asian	countries	is	the	most	actively	engaged	in	developing	
economic	co-operation	with	Eastern	Asian	countries	which	are	China’s	de facto	
competitors:	South	Korea,	 Japan,	Malaysia	and	others;	 this	needs	 to	be	 seen	
as	a	sign	of	distrust	towards	China.	However,	Uzbekistan	is	the	Central	Asian	
state	which	has	most	strongly	been	expressing	its	ambitions	of	becoming	in-
dependent	from	Russia	in	political	and	military	terms,	and	its	government	has	
earned	a	reputation	of	being	capable	of	making	sudden	turns	in	foreign	policy	
(balancing	between	Russia	and	the	USA).	Tashkent	is	concerned	about	being	
possibly	dominated	by	Beijing,	but	at	the	same	time	cannot	afford	to	lag	behind	
the	other	Central	Asian	countries.	 It	 is	 thus	set	 to	develop	political	and	eco-
nomic	co-operation	with	China	(one	proof	of	this	can	be	President	Karimov’s	
productive	visit	to	Beijing	in	April	2011).	
For	Turkmenistan,	China	has	been	de facto	the	most	important	political	part-
ner	over	the	past	few	years.	This	is	linked	to	developing	energy	co-operation	
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and	 serious	politico-economic	 tensions	with	Russia.	However,	 following	 the	
euphoria	in	relations	with	China	in	2007–2009,	Ashgabat	has	sobered	up:	the	
temporary	benefits	of	co-operation	with	China	have	failed	to	compensate	for	
the	financial	losses	resulting	from	the	shrinking	gas	exports	to	Russia	and	the	
need	to	allocate	part	of	the	incomes	from	gas	sales	to	China	for	payments	for	
the	services	rendered	by	Chinese	companies	engaged	in	Turkmenistan.	Turk-
menistan’s	political	shift	towards	China	has	also	turned	out	to	be	an	illusion.	
The	short-term	benefit	gained	by	reducing	its	dependence	on	Russia	with	Chi-
na’s	help	pose	the	threat	that	Russia’s	difficult	patronage	will	be	replaced	with	
an	equally	 inconvenient	Chinese	patronage.	This	has	motivated	Ashgabat	 to	
search	for	new	political	and	economic	partners	(the	best	example	of	which	is	
the	fact	that	Turkmenistan	has	been	lobbying	for	a	gas	pipeline	project	run-
ning	to	India	and	Pakistan).	At	present,	however,	there	are	no	grounds	to	con-
clude	that	Ashgabat	has	found	a	real	alternative	to	China.	
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III. ChIna’s eConomIC PresenCe In Central asIa  
– the aChIevements of the Past two deCades
Chinese	engagement	in	the	Central	Asian	economy	has	been	aimed	at	imple-
menting	Beijing’s	strategic	interests	in	the	region	in	the	area	of	security	in	the	
strictest	sense, as	well	as	the	economic	security	of	China	involving	supplies	of	
natural	gas	and	uranium.	Given	the	wide	range	of	actions	and	close	connec-
tions,	it	is	economic	co-operation	that	China’s	position	in	the	region	is	based	
upon,	including	its	political	position.	
In	the	minimum	option,	from	China’s	viewpoint,	the	economic	tools	are	meant	
to	prevent	the	collapse	of	the	weakest	states	in	Central	Asia,	while	the	max-
imum	option	provides	 for	 the	construction	of	a	 ‘welfare	zone’	 in	 the	region,	
thus	contributing	to	an	improvement	of	its	stability.	The	stabilisation	of	Cen-
tral	 Asia	 through	 economic	 development	 and	 achieving	 ‘welfare’	 is	 in	 turn	
aimed	at	ensuring	stability	in	China’s	Xinjiang	province	owing	to	the	creation	
of	 economic	bonds	between	Central	Asia	 and	Xinjiang.	 Strong,	 consolidated	
and	well-functioning	states	in	Central	Asia	would	also	create	a	buffer	zone	be-
tween	China	and	Afghanistan.	In	geopolitical	terms,	China	wants	to	use	eco-
nomic	co-operation	to	reinforce	its	position	in	the	region	and	provide	a	balance	
to	Russian	and	Western	influences.
However,	economic	co-operation	with	Central	Asia	at	present	is	of	no	strategic	
significance	for	the	Chinese	economy:	exports	to	Central	Asia	have	a	marginal	
share	in	China’s	foreign	trade	(less	than	1%	in	2012).	Nevertheless,	trade	with	
Central	Asia	 is	 of	 fundamental	 significance	 for	Xinjiang:	 in	 2011,	 78%	of	 the	
province’s	exports	went	to	Central	Asian	countries30.	
China	in	economic	relations	with	Central	Asia	is,	then,	focused	on	achieving	
three	tangible	goals.	Firstly,	it	wishes	to	continue	developing	trade	relations,	
considering	that	they	are	of	fundamental	significance	for	Xinjiang.	Secondly,	it	
is	interested	in	supplies	of	raw	materials	from	Central	Asia	(above	all,	natural	
gas	and	uranium).	Thirdly,	it	wants	to	turn	the	region	into	a	transmission	belt	
for	exports	of	Chinese	goods	to	the	West	and	the	Middle	East.
30	 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/722972.shtml
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1.  regional differences in the level and nature of co-operation
The	level	of	economic	co-operation	between	China	and	the	countries	in	the	re-
gion	depends	on	their	economic	potential,	the	level	of	their	fossil	fuel	resources	
and	their	significance	as	transit	countries.	The	internal	stability	of	each	of	the	
Central	Asian	countries	and	their	policy	and	attitude	regarding	co-operation	
with	China	are	also	key	issues.	
From	China’s	point	of	view,	the	most	important	of	the	Central	Asian	countries	
is	Kazakhstan,	since	until	recently	it	was	the	only	country	in	the	region	to	have	
signed	a	strategic	partnership	agreement	with	China31.	Kazakhstan	has	enor-
mous	economic	potential	due	to	its	significant	natural	resources	(oil,	gas,	ura-
nium	 and	metals),	 geographic	 proximity,	 convenient	 transport	 connections	
(which	do	not	run	through	high	mountains,	as	is	the	case	with	Kyrgyzstan	and	
Tajikistan),	its	political	stability	and	the	essential	role	Kazakhstan	is	playing	
in	the	region.	Due	to	this,	economic	relations	with	Kazakhstan	are	the	strong-
est	and	have	vast	potential	for	further	development.	
The	other	two	of	China’s	Central	Asian	neighbours,	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	
are	given	far	less	significance.	Kyrgyzstan	plays	the	role	of	the	region’s	centre	
for	trade	in	Chinese	goods,	owing	to	its	WTO	membership	and	favourable	po-
litical	climate.	However,	its	role	has	weakened	due	to	the	development	of	trade	
and	the	infrastructure	to	support	it	between	Kazakhstan	and	China,	and	also	
due	to	the	emergence	of	new	barriers	as	a	consequence	of	the	creation	of	the	
Customs	Union.	Kyrgyzstan	has	been	attempting	 to	maintain	 its	position	as	
a	hub	by	joining	the	Customs	Union.	Both	Tajikistan	(especially	since	its	acces-
sion	to	the	WTO)	and	Kyrgyzstan	can	potentially	be	highly	significant	tran-
sit	 countries	 in	 the	 transport	of	Chinese	goods	and	can	become	a	bridge	 for	
exports	of	such	goods	to	the	other	Central	Asian	countries,	Afghanistan	and	
further	to	the	Persian	Gulf	and	the	countries	of	the	Middle	East.	
In	turn,	the	Chinese-Turkmen	co-operation	is	based	solely	on	supplies	of	natu-
ral	resources.	Turkmenistan	is	seen	in	China	as	the	most	important	supplier	of	
natural	gas,	with	potentially	the	greatest	capability	of	increasing	supplies.	For	
this	reason,	and	given	the	rapid	increase	in	gas	consumption	and	imports	to	
China,	relations	with	Ashgabat	are	of	strategic	significance	for	Beijing.	
31	 Uzbekistan	and	China	signed	a	strategic	partnership	declaration	as	late	as	in	2012.	
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Uzbekistan	 is	perceived	by	China	as	 an	 important	 transit	 country	 for	Turk-
men	gas	and	a	source	of	raw	materials	(gas	and	uranium).	Uzbekistan	is	also	
the	most	promising	outlet	for	Chinese	goods	in	the	region,	primarily	because	
it	has	the	largest	population.	However,	Uzbekistan	was	the	last	Central	Asian	
country	to	establish	relations	with	China.	It	took	Tashkent	the	longest	time	of	
all	the	Central	Asian	capitals	to	embark	upon	closer	co-operation	with	China.	
It	was	also	the	last	in	the	region	to	have	accepted	loans	offered	by	Beijing.	Co-
operation	with	China	will	be	carefully	channelled	and	in	practice	restricted	by	
Tashkent	(as	compared	to	the	region)	as	it	will	continue	a	protectionist	policy	
on	its	market.	
As	regards	China’s	direct	investments,	the	key	target	is	the	region’s	primary	
sector.	 Therefore,	 a	 great	 part	 of	 the	 investments	 go	 to	 Kazakhstan	 and	 to	
a	lesser	extent	to	Turkmenistan.	China	has	also	been	seen	to	invest	in	telecom-
munication	and	also	in	sectors	linked	to	trade	development	(infrastructure).	
However,	 in	practice,	Chinese	investments	 in	other	than	the	primary	sector	
are	not	large	and	until	now	have	failed	to	provide	a	stimulus	to	modernisation.	
2. China’s ‘assets’ in the region and plans for development
2.1. The	oil	and	gas	sector
China	has	been	most	active	and	successful	country	in	making	efforts	to	gain	
access	to	raw	material	assets	in	Central	Asia	over	the	past	decade.	China’s	in-
creasing	presence	in	the	region	has	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	role	of	economic	
co-operation	with	the	other	players	engaged	in	Central	Asia	(above	all	Russia)	
and	to	a	modification	of	the	significance	of	this	role.	The	primary	reasons	be-
hind	developing	 energy	 co-operation	 between	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	Asia	
and	China	included:	their	desire	to	become	less	dependent	on	Russia,	the	un-
successful	Western	plans	to	build	infrastructure	running	from	Central	Asia,	
and	the	 increasing	attractiveness	of	China	itself	as	a	global	player	with	vast	
economic	potential.	
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Table 1.	China’s	key	assets	in	the	Central	Asian	oil	and	gas	sector		
(as	of	1	January	2013)
Purchase 
date
share owner
kaZakhstan
key upstream assets (companies, shares in projects) Production in 2012
AktobeMunaiGaz
1997-
2003	
85% CNPC
6.1	million	
tonnes	of	oil,	
3.7	billion	m3	
of	gas
North	Buzachi	 2003	 50% CNPC	
2	million	
tonnes	of	oil
KAM	Project 2004 50%
CNPC	and	China	
North	Industries	
Corporation
0.7	million	
tonnes	of	oil
CNPC-Ai-Dan-Munai 2005	 100% CNPC
0.4	million	
tonnes
PetroKazakhstan	
Kumkol	Resources	
(please	note	that	
CNPC	sold	a	50%	stake	
in	the	Shymkent	
refinery	to	KMG)	
2005	 67%	 CNPC	
6	million	
tonnes	of	oil	
(2011)
KarazhanbasMunai	
(Nations	Energy)	
2006	 50% CITIC
2	million	
tonnes	of	oil
Mangistaumunaigaz	
(the	refinery	was	
excluded	from	the	
transaction	and	taken	
over	by	KMG)	
2009	
50%		
-2	shares
CNPC
5.9	million	
tonnes	of	oil
0.5	billion	
m3	of	gas
KazMunaiGas	E&P	 2009	 11%	
China	Invest-
ment	Corp.
7.9	million	
tonnes	of	oil
Urikhtau	field 2011 50% CNPC
Exploration	
work	(gas)
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minor upstream assets
Emir	Oil	 100% MIE	Holding
130	thou-
sand	tonnes	
of	oil
KMK	Munai 100%
Yukon	Energy	
Holding
90	thousand	
tonnes	of	oil
Sazankurak 100%
First	Interna-
tional	Oil	Com-
pany	(Sinopec)
93	thousand	
tonnes	of	oil
Pricaspian	Petroleum	
Co.
100%
First	Interna-
tional	Oil	Com-
pany	(Sinopec)
33	thousand	
tonnes	of	oil
Sagiz	Petroleum	Co.	 100%
First	Interna-
tional	Oil	Com-
pany	(Sinopec)
160	thou-
sand	tonnes	
of	oil
Adai	Petroleum	Co.	 50%
First	Interna-
tional	Oil	Com-
pany	(Sinopec)
138	thou-
sand	tonnes	
of	oil
Caspian	Investment	
Resources
50% Sinopec n/a
Tarbagatay	Munai	
(Zaysan	field)
49%
Guanghui	
Energy
n/a
refineries Capacity
Shymkent	refinery	 2005 50% CNPC
5.25	million	
tonnes	of	oil
transport infrastructure Capacity
Kazakhstan-China	
oil	pipeline	(Atasu-
Alashankou	and	
Kenkiyak-Kumkol	
sections)
1997-
2009
50% CNPC
12	million	
tonnes	
(with	the	
option	to	
increase	to	
20	million	
tonnes)
The	Kazakh	section	of	
the	Central	Asia-China	
gas	pipeline	(A,B	and	
C	lines)	–	the	transit	
pipeline	for	gas	from	
Turkmenistan,	Uzbeki-
stan	and	in	the	future	
Kazakhstan	to	China*
2007 50% CNPC
55	billion	m3	
of	gas
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Section	II	of	the	Cen-
tral	Asia–China	gas	
pipeline:	the	Kazakh	
section	from	Beyneu	
to	Shymkent,	where	
it	will	connect	with	
section	I	of	the	Central	
Asia–China	main	
pipeline	
2008 50% CNPC
10-15	billion	
m3	of	gas
Zaysan-Jeminay 2013 100%
Guanghui	
Energy
0.55	billion	
m3	of	gas
uZbekIstan
upstream assets (companies, shares in projects) status
5	investment	blocks	
located	in	Ustyurt	and	
Amu	Darya	regions	
and	in	the	Fergana	
Valley,	operator:	
CNPC	Silk	Road	Group
2006 n/a CNPC	
Exploration	
work
Rehabilitation	of	old	
fields	in	the	Fergana	
Valley
2008 n/a CNPC Exploration
The	Aral	Sea	Project
2006-
2011
26.6% CNPC Exploration
The	Mingulak	Project 2008 50%	 CNPC	 Exploration
transport infrastructure Capacity
The	Uzbek	section	
of	the	Central	Asia–
China	gas	pipeline	
(the	A,B	and	C	lines),	
operator:	Asia	Trans	
Gas	
C	line	construction	
cost:	US$2.2	billion
2008 50% CNPC 55	billion	m3
turkmenIstan
upstream assets (companies, shares in projects) status
The	Bagtyyarlyk	field	
on	the	right	bank	of	
Amu	Darya	
2007
PSA	(the	
number	of	
shares	is	
unknown)
CNPC
The	output	
is	set	to	
reach	
	17	billion	m3	
of	gas
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taJIkIstan
upstream assets (companies, shares in projects) status
Kulob	Petroleum	Ltd.	 2012
33.33%	
US$30	mil-
lion	
CNPC	(partners:	
Total,	Tethys	
Petroleum)
Exploration
kYrgYZstan
upstream assets (companies, shares in projects)
batkenneftegaz 2007 100% Chung	Company
refineries Capacity
kara-balta refinery 
(annual capacity at 
850 thousand tonnes 
of oil), greenfield	in-
vestment	cost:	US$250	
million
2009-
2013
99%	
Zhongda	China	
Petrol	Company
To	reach	850	
thousand	
tonnes	of	oil
tokmok refinery** 
(annual capac-
ity at 500 thousand 
tonnes), greenfield	
investment	cost:	
US$60	million
2012-
2013	
n/a
China	Natural	
Investment	
Holding	Co.,	
Ltd.	via	Xinjiang	
Natural	Energy	
Group	Co.,	Ltd
To	reach	500	
thousand	
tonnes	of	oil
source:	Company	websites,	news	agencies,	Argus
*	China	has	no	share	in	the	central	section	of	the	Kenkiyak-Kumkol	oil	pipeline,	which	is	controlled	by	
KazMunaiGas.
**	http://www.trend.az/regions/casia/kyrgyzstan/2084714.html
2.1.1.	The	characteristics	of	China’s	presence	in	the	oil	sector	
China	has	many	oil	assets	in	Central	Asia	but	is	not	the	largest	oil	producer	in	
the	region.	Furthermore,	the	assets	held	by	China	are	old	and	depleted,	which	
means	 that	 the	share	Chinese	companies	have	 in	 the	region’s	oil	production	
will	fall	unless	new	acquisitions	are	made.	The	impression	that	Chinese	firms	
were	expanding	without	 restraint	 in	 the	oil	 sector	was	an	effect	of	 the	 suc-
cessful	 asset	 acquisition	 strategy,	 beginning	 in	 2005,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	
rapid	growth	of	China’s	position	in	this	sector.	However,	this	does	not	mean	
that	China	is	playing	a	decisive	role	here.	From	Central	Asia’s	point	of	view,	co-
operation	with	China	offers	the	opportunity	for	diversification	of	oil	transport	
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routes	and	recipients.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	beneficial	 and	highly	 significant.	
From	China’s	point	of	view,	oil	supplies	from	Central	Asia	are	supplementary	
to	 the	 imports	 from	 other	 directions.	What	makes	 this	 region	 important	 is	
the	fact	that	it	enables	oil	supply	by	land.	If	existing	transport	routes	are	de-
veloped,	its	significance	can	grow	further,	but	this	will	never	compensate	for	
maritime	oil	 supplies.	China’s	presence	 in	 the	oil	 sector	 is	primarily	a	 chal-
lenge	to	Western	investors,	who	are	forced	to	compete	with	Chinese	firms.	In	
turn,	this	is	beneficial	for	the	countries	in	the	region.	
As	regards	China’s	activity	in	the	Central	Asian	oil	sector,	it	is	present	primar-
ily	in	Kazakhstan	and	to	a	very	limited	extent	in	Uzbekistan.	The	first	Chinese	
investments	 in	 the	region’s	oil	sector	were	made	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.	However,	
the	Chinese	expansion	began	in	earnest	in	the	second	half	of	the	first	decade	
of	the	21st	century,	when	all	the	most	important	and	largest	energy	assets	had	
already	been	allocated	mainly	to	Western	investors.	Symptomatically,	Chinese	
companies	 hold	 no	 shares	 in	 any	 of	 Kazakhstan’s	 three	 largest	 fields	 (Ten-
giz,	 Karachaganak	 and	 Kashagan),	 where	Western	 investors	 are	 dominant.	
Chinese	 investments	 were	 disfavoured	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Kazakhstan,	
which	feared	Beijing’s	excessive	expansion,	and	also	by	Western	energy	cor-
porations	unwilling	to	co-operate	with	China	(one	example	of	this	was	when	
Western	companies	blocked	CNPC’s	acquisition	of	shares	in	the	Kashagan	Field	
in	200332).	The	situation	changed	in	2005,	when	China’s	CNPC	bought	shares	
in	PetroKazakhstan,	a	company	registered	 in	Canada.	This	 transaction	ush-
ered	in	the	expansion	of	Chinese	companies	in	Kazakhstan,	and	opened	a	new	
field	for	co-operation	between	the	Kazakh	state-owned	holding	KazMunaiGas	
(KMG)	and	CNPC33.	Regardless	of	this,	Chinese	companies	were	still	denied	ac-
cess	to	the	largest	upstream	projects	in	Kazakhstan.	
Before	2010,	investments	in	the	Central	Asian	oil	sector	were	made	predomi-
nantly	by	the	state-owned	company	CNPC.	In	2010,	the	Chinese	government	
modified	its	strategy	and	encouraged	small	private	and	little-known	Chinese	
energy	firms	to	invest	in	Central	Asia	(one	example	was	the	purchase	of	the	
small	oil	producer,	Emir	Oil,	by	MIE	Holdings	in	February	2011).	Investments	
in	small	fields	are	also	made	by	large	corporations	acting	via	small	companies,	
which	are	not	 explicitly	 associated	with	Chinese	 capital	 in	Kazakhstan.	 For	
example,	Sinopec	 is	operating	via	 International	Oil	Co.	This	 strategy	means	
32	 http://www.gasandoil.com/news/central_asia/f31ce0c64e6401dfbf15e9f3baa53648
33	 When	CNPC	was	buying	PetroKazakhstan,	it	agreed	to	relinquish	a	50%	stake	in	the	Shym-
kent	Refinery	to	KazMunaiGas.	
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that	Beijing	is	making	efforts	to	use	Kazakhstan’s	potential	to	a	maximum	ex-
tent,	and	at	the	same	time	fears	public	reluctance	towards	Chinese	capital,	and	
also	increasing	nationalism	in	the	policy	adopted	by	the	Kazakh	government	
in	the	oil	sector,	which	bears	greatest	impact	on	large	projects.	Astana	wants	
the	state	to	regain	stakes	in	large	fields	at	the	expense	of	Western	corporations,	
one	example	of	which	was	the	acquisition	of	Kashagan	shares	in	2008.	
The	estimated	share	of	Chinese	firms	in	oil	production	in	Kazakhstan	is	22%	of	
total	production	(data	as	of	2010)34,	and	is	lower	than	that	of	US	firms	present	
in	Kazakhstan	(24%).	The	assets	owned	by	Chinese	firms	include	old	and	partly	
depleted	fields,	while	oil	production	growth	in	Kazakhstan	will	be	generated	
primarily	by	the	large	new	projects,	Tengiz	and	Kashagan.	This	means	that,	un-
less	new	acquisitions	are	made,	the	share	of	Chinese	firms	in	Kazakhstan’s	total	
oil	output	will	contract	and,	according	to	the	Oil	and	Gas	Ministry’s	forecasts,	
will	 reach	 11%	 in	2020.	Given	 the	controversies	 linked	 to	China’s	presence	 in	
Kazakhstan35	and	the	reluctance	of	Western	investors	to	co-operate	with	CNPC,	
Astana	has	been	quite	cautious	about	facilitating	further	asset	acquisition	 in	
Kazakhstan	to	Chinese	firms.	The	sale	of	shares	in	the	Kashagan	Field	by	Cono-
coPhillips	will	be	a	test	for	this	approach.	Kazakhstan	has	decided	to	acquire	
the	shares	(which	India’s	ONGC	wanted	to	take	over),	and	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	
that	it	will	resell	the	shares	to	China’s	CNPC	in	exchange	for	new	loans.	This	
would	bring	a	fundamental	change	to	Kazakhstan’s	approach	towards	co-oper-
ation	with	China,	and	would	make	the	implementation	of	the	Western	plans	for	
transporting	oil	from	Kashagan	via	the	Caucasus	more	difficult.	
One	 consequence	 of	 intensifying	 Chinese	 activity	 in	 the	 oil	 sector	 and	 the	
gradually	 improving	 disposition	 of	 Kazakhstan’s	 government	 was	 the	 con-
struction	of	the	oil	pipeline	running	from	Kazakhstan	to	China	(cf.	map	no.	1).	
This	route	was	constructed	in	stages,	starting	in	2001,	and	was	fully	launched	
in	2012.	This	pipeline	 is	running	from	the	Kazakh	shore	of	 the	Caspian	Sea,	
where	the	largest	oil	deposits	are	located,	through	central	Kazakhstan	(where	
CNPC	operates	on	the	smaller	fields),	 to	Alashankou	on	the	Kazakh-Chinese	
border.	The	route	is	used	for	transporting	both	Kazakh	oil	and	small	amounts	
34	 Article	by	Kanatbek	Safinov,	 secretary	at	 the	Oil	and	Gas	Ministry	http://www.kmg.kz/
press/company_news/publication/5935
35	 This	 issue	 is	 frequently	 raised	by	 the	media	which	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	 government,	 and	
China’s	impact	on	Kazakhstan	is	being	mythologised	among	the	residents	of	this	country.	
This	is	partly	due	to	the	government’s	failure	to	inform	the	public	about	the	real	presence	of	
Chinese	business	in	Kazakhstan.	
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of	Russian	oil	(transported	in	transit).	Its	annual	capacity	is	12	million	(2012)	
and	is	to	be	raised	to	20	million	tonnes	of	oil	in	coming	years.	The	pipeline	is	
used	by	China	as	a	source	of	raw	material	for	refineries	in	the	western	part	of	
the	country,	which	means	that	its	development	depends	largely	on	the	rate	of	
Xinjiang’s	economic	development.	
The	new	route	has	allowed	Astana	to	diversify	oil	exports,	and	has	provided	
China	with	the	first	land	route	which	enables	the	import	of	oil	via	a	pipeline36.	
Nevertheless,	China	is	not	a	major	recipient	of	Kazakh	oil.	In	2012,	supplies	to	
China	reached	10.4	million	tonnes	of	oil,	which	accounted	for	15%	of	Kazakh-
stan’s	total	oil	exports	(10.9	million	tonnes	of	oil	in	2011).	This	means	that	Rus-
sia	is	still	the	main	corridor	for	transit	of	Kazakh	oil	to	the	European	market,	
and	Europe	is	the	main	recipient	of	Kazakh	oil,	primarily	because	of	the	attrac-
tive	prices	there.	From	China’s	perspective,	oil	supplies	from	Kazakhstan	are	
at	the	most	supplementary	to	oil	imports	from	other	sources.	In	2012,	the	share	
of	Kazakh	oil	in	total	Chinese	oil	consumption	stood	at	2.3%,	and	its	share	in	
imports	reached	3%.	
However,	in	the	longer	run,	Kazakhstan’s	significance	for	China	will	be	grow-
ing,	especially	if	the	capacity	of	the	oil	pipeline	running	to	China	is	increased.	
Kazakhstan	and	Russia	are	the	only	two	countries	from	which	oil	is	transport-
ed	to	China	overland,	which	is	of	 fundamental	significance	for	security	rea-
sons;	most	of	the	oil	imported	by	China	is	transported	by	sea.	China	is	unable	
to	guarantee	the	security	of	maritime	routes	due	to	the	fact	that	the	USA	is	the	
dominant	naval	power.	The	increasing	significance	of	Kazakhstan	as	a	suppli-
er	of	raw	materials	to	China	is	also	very	likely	to	be	stimulated	by	the	continu-
ing	instability	in	the	North	African	and	Middle	Eastern	countries,	which	are	
important	sources	of	oil	 imports	 for	China.	Regardless	of	 this,	given	China’s	
enormous	demand	for	oil,	the	significance	of	Kazakh	oil	in	China’s	energy	bal-
ance	should	not	be	overestimated;	it	will	never	be	a	key	supplier.	
At	the	same	time,	the	possible	development	of	exports	to	China	will	depend	on	
Astana’s	route	diversification	policy	and	also	upon	the	stance	Azerbaijan	takes,	
since	it	wants	to	be	a	transit	country	for	the	Kashagan	Field	(from	2018).	Thus	
the	development	of	transport	routes	to	China	will	adversely	affect	above	all	the	
project	envisaging	oil	exports	in	the	Western	direction	via	the	Caucasus	(using	
the	Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan	pipeline).
36	 Railroad	oil	transport	from	Russia	was	launched	before	this.
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The	presence	of	Chinese	firms	in	the	oil	sector	poses	a	serious	threat	to	the	oth-
er	firms	operating	in	Kazakhstan	(predominantly	large	Western	corporations)	
mainly	due	to	the	fact	that	Chinese	firms,	both	state-owned	and	private,	have	
significantly	 larger	funds	and	facilitated	access	to	 loans,	and	investments	 in	
the	oil	sector	are	granted	strategic	priority	by	Beijing	and	are	backed	at	every	
level.	Since	2005,	China	has	acquired	the	largest	number	of	assets	in	Kazakh-
stan,	often	winning	out	against	other	bidders,	including	Russian	ones.	
2.1.2.	China	on	Central	Asia’s	fuel	and	petrochemical	market
Two	new	areas	of	co-operation	in	the	oil	sector	were	activated	in	2012:	the	refin-
ing	of	Kazakh	oil	under	tolling	contracts	at	Chinese	refineries	located	close	to	
the	border,	and	the	import	of	Chinese	petroleum	products.	The	supply	volume	is	
still	marginal:	it	reached	25,000	tonnes	of	fuel	in	2012,	but	in	2013	Kazakhstan	is	
planning	to	buy	0.5	million	tonnes	of	fuel	from	China.	The	Kazakh-Chinese	co-
operation	covering	petroleum	products	is	an	effect	of	misunderstandings	over	
Russian	oil	supplies	to	refineries	in	Kazakhstan37	and	clearances	for	Russian	fuel	
imported	by	Kazakhstan.	It	appears	that	co-operation	in	this	area	will	see	en-
hancements,	at	least	in	the	medium	term.	Kazakhstan	is	currently	modernising	
its	refineries;	and	this	process	is	to	be	finalised	within	three	to	four	years’	time.	
Until	then,	Astana	will	be	unable	to	reduce	the	deficit	on	the	internal	market	and	
will	have	 to	 import	petroleum	products	 from	neighbouring	countries.	 In	 this	
context,	co-operation	with	China	is	strengthening	Astana’s	position	in	negotia-
tions	with	Moscow	concerning	the	rules	of	trade	in	oil	and	petroleum	products	
within	the	Customs	Union.	Furthermore,	Russia	is	at	present	the	key	supplier	
of	fuel	to	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan	(and	indirectly	to	Afghanistan),	while	Ka-
zakhstan	and	China	seem	to	be	interested	in	driving	Russia	out	of	these	posi-
tions	and	in	embarking	upon	the	export	of	petroleum	products	to	the	neighbour-
ing	countries	by	themselves	in	the	long	term.	Kazakhstan’s	recent	investigations	
into	the	possibilities	of	building	a	 low-capacity	(1–1.5	million	tonnes	annually)	
product	pipeline	close	to	the	Chinese	border	is	yet	another	sign	of	the	long-term	
plans	for	developing	co-operation	covering	petroleum	products38.	
China	has	also	been	making	efforts	to	invest	in	the	region’s	refining	sector.	Its	pres-
ence	is	still	marginal,	however,	and	is	restricted	to	Kazakhstan	and	Kyrgyzstan.	
Kazakhstan’s	government	is	unfavourably	disposed	towards	Chinese	(and	more	
37	 The	Kazakh	refineries	in	Pavlodar	and	–	to	a	lesser	extent	–	in	Shymkent	import	Russian	oil	
due	to	the	infrastructural	connections	maintained	since	Soviet	times.	
38	 Argus	Rynok	Kaspiya,	6	February	2013.	
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broadly,	foreign)	activity	in	the	refining	sector,	and	is	making	efforts	to	regain	the	
refineries	which	were	privatised	at	the	onset	of	the	country’s	independence.	Proofs	
of	this	policy	included	forcing	CNPC	to	relinquish	a	66%	stake	in	the	Shymkent	
Refinery	to	the	state-owned	corporation	KazMunaiGas	during	the	acquisition	of	
PetroKazakhstan	in	2005,	and	excluding	the	shares	in	the	Pavlodar	Refinery	from	
the	process	of	the	sale	of	Mangistaumunaigaz	corporation	to	CNPC	in	2009.	Ka-
zakhstan	has	adopted	a	protectionist	policy	with	regard	to	the	refining	sector,	and	
one	should	expect	pressure	to	be	put	on	CNPC	to	sell	back	its	shares	in	the	Shym-
kent	Refinery	rather	than	consent	to	further	Chinese	investments	in	this	sector.	
In	turn,	Chinese	investments	in	the	oil	refining	sector	are	of	fundamental	sig-
nificance	for	Kyrgyzstan.	China	is	building	small	refineries	which	require	low	
outlays	(cf.	Table	1)	in	Kyrgyzstan;	their	capacity	will,	however,	be	sufficient	to	
satisfy	the	demand	for	the	less	advanced	fuels	on	the	domestic	market.	The	new	
refineries	are	likely	to	adversely	affect	the	interests	of	Gazpromneft,	the	key	fuel	
supplier	and	distributor	in	Kyrgyzstan39,	and	will	thus	deprive	Moscow	of	some	
instruments	of	pressure	on	Bishkek	and	improve	Kyrgyzstan’s	energy	security	
and	stability40.	Nor	can	it	be	ruled	out	that	fuel	produced	in	Kyrgyzstan	will	be	
exported	to	Tajikistan	and	Afghanistan	since	this	will	offer	China	greater	op-
portunities	to	bear	influence	in	the	region.	The	possibilities	of	co-operation	with	
China	on	building	refineries	are	also	being	checked	by	Tajikistan;	this	topic	was	
raised	during	the	visit	by	President	Emomalii	Rahmon	to	Beijing	in	May	2013.	
China	is	also	considering	the	use	of	refinery	infrastructure	in	Central	Asia	to	
refine	CNPC’s	Afghan	oil	output	and	re-export	petroleum	products	to	Afghani-
stan,	which	is	the	most	attractive	fuel	market	in	the	region	due	to	the	high	petrol	
prices	there.	China’s	CNPC	has	enquired	into	the	possibilities	to	refine	Afghan	
oil	at	the	Fergana	or	Shymkent	refineries	in	early	201341.	Likewise,	fuels	manu-
factured	in	Kyrgyzstan	can	be	exported	by	Chinese	companies	to	Afghanistan.	
Over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 Chinese-Kazakh	 and	 the	 Chinese-Uzbek	 co-oper-
ation	has	also	seen	expansion	into	the	petrochemical	sector42.	The	co-opera-
39	 Gazpromneft	supplies	fuel	to	the	Manas	base.	This	firm	also	owns	the	largest	chain	of	fill-
ing	stations	in	Kyrgyzstan.	
40	 The	imposition	of	customs	duty	on	Russian	petroleum	products	and	increasing	prices	on	
the	domestic	market	preceded	the	outbreak	of	the	revolt	in	April	2010.	President	Kurman-
bek	Bakiyev	was	forced	to	flee	the	country	as	a	consequence	of	this.
41	 Argus	Rynok	Kaspiya,	13	February	2013.	
42	 Although	CNPC	has	acquired	a	33%	stake	in	the	Shymkent	Refinery,	Chinese	companies	are	
not	present	in	the	oil	refining	sector.	This	is	primarily	due	to	the	fact	that	Astana	treats	it	as	
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tion	formula	is	based	on	loans	granted	by	China	for	the	construction	of	new	
petrochemical	plants	in	exchange	for	supplies	of	petrochemical	products.	One	
example	of	such	co-operation	is	the	US$1.25	billion	loan	granted	by	Sinopec	for	
the	construction	of	the	petrochemical	complex	in	Atyrau	(Kazakhstan)43.	Fur-
thermore,	Sinopec	 is	also	a	subcontractor	 in	this	project.	CNPC	is	also	plan-
ning	to	build	a	rubber	production	plant	in	Uzbekistan	and	is	offering	a	high	fi-
nancial	contribution.	This	strategy	is	an	effect	of	Chinese	companies	adjusting	
themselves	to	the	conditions	imposed	by	the	Central	Asian	states,	since	they	
are	unwilling	to	sell	their	key	assets	in	the	primary	sectors.	
2.1.3.		China’s	presence	in	the	gas	sector
The	key	platform	of	China’s	presence	in	the	Central	Asian	energy	sector	is	co-
operation	 in	 the	gas	sector,	and	 its	most	essential	element	 is	 the	new	Central	
Asia–China	gas	pipeline	running	 through	Turkmenistan,	Uzbekistan	and	Ka-
zakhstan.	This	is	the	first	infrastructural	project	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	
to	connect	most	of	the	region’s	countries	and	in	which	they	are	forced	to	co-oper-
ate	with	each	other.	This	is	also	the	only	large	gas	route	to	have	been	built	in	the	
region	since	199144.	The	launch	of	the	gas	pipeline	has	fundamentally	changed	
the	balance	of	power	in	Central	Asia	to	the	benefit	of	China	and	at	the	expense	of	
Russia.	This	turned	out	to	be	possible	even	though	China	has	relatively	small	as-
sets	in	the	region’s	gas	production	sector.	Its	force	is	primarily	an	effect	of	break-
ing	Russia’s	monopoly	on	gas	imports	from	the	region	and	the	increasing	signifi-
cance	of	the	Chinese	market	for	gas	exporters	in	Central	Asia.	
The	 gas	 contract	 signed	 with	 Turkmenistan	 (April	 2006),	 followed	 by	 the	
launch	of	the	Central	Asia–China	gas	pipeline,	which	was	built	at	an	express	
rate	(2008–2009),	was	a	turning	point	in	China’s	presence	in	the	Central	Asian	
gas	sector45.	Before	that,	Chinese	plans	for	the	import	of	gas	from	Central	Asia	
(despite	efforts	starting	in	the	1990s)	could	not	be	implemented	due	to	such	fac-
a	strategic	sector	as	a	consequence	of	constant	problems	with	fuel	supplies.	This	was	one	of	
the	reasons	why	refinery	assets	were	excluded	during	the	sale	of	Mangistaumunaigaz	and	
acquired	solely	by	KazMunaiGas.	China	has	accepted	this,	and	has	focused	on	developing	
its	own	oil	refining	sector	in	Xinjiang.	
43	 http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/viewstory.aspx?id=3790
44	 Two	gas	pipelines	running	from	Turkmenistan	to	 Iran	have	been	built	since	 1991	 in	Central	
Asia.	However,	in	terms	of	capacity,	these	projects	are	incomparable	to	the	Chinese	gas	pipeline.	
Furthermore,	they	have	never	been	used	at	full	capacity,	and	are	now	filled	to	around	30%.	
45	 The	total	annual	capacity	of	the	two	gas	pipeline	branches	constructed	in	2009	is	30	billion	m3.	
The	third	branch,	currently	under	construction,	will	have	an	annual	capacity	of	25	billion	m3.	
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tors	as:	resistance	from	Russia,	which	was	treating	the	region	as	its	exclusive	
zone	of	influence,	the	concern	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	have	about	Russia’s	
reaction,	and	what	they	saw	as	the	lack	of	attractive	terms	of	co-operation	with	
China.	The	contract	and	the	emergence	of	the	new	route	have	fundamentally	
strengthened	China’s	presence	in	the	Central	Asian	gas	sector.	
Despite	this,	China	is	not	currently	a	major	gas	producer	in	the	region.	Its	pres-
ence	in	the	upstream	sector	is	reduced	to	several	gas	fields	(cf.	Table	1)	in	Uz-
bekistan	and	Kazakhstan,	where	the	share	of	Chinese	firms	in	gas	output	is	
negligible.	One	exception	is	Turkmenistan,	where	the	gas	from	the	Bagtyyar-
lyk	field	controlled	by	CNPC	accounts	for	approximately	one	quarter	of	the	to-
tal	national	output.	However,	over	time,	as	production	is	launched	at	the	fields	
which	are	currently	being	explored,	the	gas	output	from	the	fields	controlled	
by	Chinese	companies	is	set	to	grow.	However,	against	the	background	of	the	
region	as	a	whole,	 this	share	will	remain	relatively	 low,	since	–	as	 in	 the	oil	
sector	–	no	Chinese	company	holds	a	majority	 stake	 in	any	of	Central	Asia’s	
largest	gas	fields46.	The	level	of	China’s	presence	in	Tajikistan	is	also	difficult	
to	estimate.	CNPC	holds	a	33%	stake	 in	 the	Bokhtar	fields,	where	 the	size	of	
the	deposits	has	not	yet	been	confirmed.	If	the	volume	of	the	resources	is	con-
firmed,	the	launch	of	gas	production	would	be	fundamental	for	Tajikistan	it-
self,	would	strengthen	China’s	position	in	this	country,	and	could	lead	to	trans-
port	infrastructure	running	from	Tajikistan	to	China	being	built	in	the	future.	
A	new	pipeline	such	as	this	would	diversify	the	gas	import	routes	from	Central	
Asia	to	China	and	thus	contribute	to	an	improvement	in	the	energy	security	of	
China	itself	and	would	help	stabilise	the	region,	from	Beijing’s	point	of	view47.	
However,	China’s	significance	at	present	is	primarily	an	effect	of	its	successes	in	
building	transport	infrastructure.	The	emergence	of	these	broke	Russia’s	monop-
oly	on	gas	imports	from	the	region	and	created	a	gas	market,	thus	forcing	the	lib-
eralisation	of	trade	relations	between	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	and	Gazprom48.	
By	constructing	infrastructure,	providing	loans	and	becoming	a	contractor	in	en-
ergy	projects,	China	is	gaining	de facto	control	over	the	gas	sector	in	Central	Asia.	
46	 The	estimated	reserves	of	 the	Bagtyyarlyk	field	are	at	 1.3	 trillion	m3,	while	 the	reserves	of	
Turkmenistan’s	largest	field,	Galkynysh,	are	estimated	to	be	between	13.1	and	21.2	trillion	m3.
47	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-06-26/will-tajik-gas-change-bal-
ance-power-central-asia
48	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2008-03-12/kraje-central-
noazjatyckie-koordynuja-polityke-w-kwestiach	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2008-08-06/gazprom-za-
biega-o-gaz-z-turkmenistanu	
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The	launch	of	the	infrastructure	has	also	made	the	transit	countries,	Uzbeki-
stan	and	Kazakhstan	(which	were	initially	sceptical	about	the	Chinese	plans),	
interested	in	exporting	gas	to	China.	In	effect,	all	the	regional	producers	signed	
gas	supply	contracts	with	China,	covering	a	total	of	85	billion	m3	(cf.	table	2),	
and	two	of	the	three	Central	Asian	countries	involved	in	gas	production	sup-
plied	their	output	to	China	in	2012.	Kazakhstan	will	embark	upon	gas	export	
once	the	second	section	of	the	Central	Asia–China	gas	pipeline,	running	from	
Beyneu	to	Shymkent,	is	built.	This	is	planned	for	2013	(cf.	map	no.	Contrary	to	
Russian	media	reports,	the	fact	that	more	countries	are	willing	to	use	the	Chi-
nese	gas	pipeline	proves	that	the	gas	import	terms	offered	by	China	are	seen	
by	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	as	being	competitive	when	compared	to	those	
of	Russia.	Other	proofs	of	China’s	attractiveness	as	a	gas	recipient	include	the	
fact	that	Uzbekistan	reduced	its	planned	annual	gas	supply	to	Russia	to	7.5	bil-
lion	m3	from	9.5	billion	m3	in	2012,	and	also	the	fact	that	LUKoil49,	operating	in	
Uzbekistan,	is	considering	the	launch	of	exports	to	China	(via	Uzbekneftegaz).	
Table 2.	Gas	supply	contracts	signed	with	China	
Country 
(contract year) Quantity Comments
Turkmenistan	
(2007)
30	billion	m3
Final	contract	–implementation	began	at	the	
end	of	2009	
Kazakhstan	(2009) 10	billion	m3	 Initial	agreement
Turkmenistan	
(2009)
10	billion	m3 Annexe	to	a	previously	concluded	contract
Uzbekistan	(2011) 10	billion	m3 Contract
Turkmenistan	
(2011)
25	billion	m3 Framework	agreement	
the total volume of gas to be supplied to China from Central asia under the contracts 
is 85 billion m3 
China’s	 readiness	 to	 provide	 financial	 resources	 for	 infrastructure	 devel-
opment	 is	 also	 of	 great	 significance	 for	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 Asia.	 The	
49	 LUKoil	 has	 launched	 work	 at	 the	 Kandym-Khauzak-Shady	 and	 Southern	 Gissar	 fields,	
whose	output	is	expected	to	reach	12	billion	m3	of	gas	in	2018	as	compared	to	3	billion	m3	
produced	in	2011.	LNG Intelligence,	24	January	2012.	
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construction	of	the	A	and	B	branches	of	the	Central	Asia–China	gas	pipeline,	
with	a	total	annual	capacity	of	30	billion	m3	of	gas,	the	estimated	cost	of	which	
was	US$8	billion,	was	funded	by	Beijing,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	Chinese	
firms	hold	a	 50%	stake	 in	 the	operators	of	 the	Uzbek	and	Kazakh	sections,	
and	none	at	all	in	the	Turkmen	section.	China	is	also	financing	the	C	branch	
which	is	currently	under	construction	and	which	will	have	an	annual	capac-
ity	of	25	billion	m3	of	gas.	The	volume	of	the	gas	to	be	supplied	under	contracts	
from	Central	Asia	to	China	suggests	the	need	for	further	development	of	the	
region’s	 infrastructure	–	 the	existing	 routes	and	 those	under	 construction	
have	 a	 total	 annual	 capacity	of	 55	billion	m3	 of	 gas.	 In	 future,	when	one	of	
the	world’s	largest	gas	fields,	Galkynysh	in	Turkmenistan	(formerly	known	
as	Southern	Yolotan)	is	developed,	exports	to	China	will	grow,	and	its	posi-
tion	in	the	region	will	be	even	stronger.	Its	dependence	on	gas	supplies	from	
Central	Asia	will,	however,	also	be	higher.	Transport	infrastructure	running	
to	China	 is	developing	much	 too	 slowly	and	 this	may	 turn	out	 to	be	 a	 real	
problem.	
Beijing	is	also	ready	to	grant	loans	for	the	development	of	the	energy	sector	in	
Central	Asian	countries.	However,	in	exchange	for	this	it	is	demanding	access	
to	deposits,	supplies	of	raw	materials	and	for	Chinese	firms	to	be	granted	con-
tracts	for	the	implementation	of	specific	projects;	for	example,	CNPC	is	a	sub-
contractor	on	the	Galkynysh	field	in	Turkmenistan.	Owing	to	the	loans,	CNPC	
is	the	only	foreign	investor	to	have	been	given	access	to	Turkmen	onshore	gas	
fields	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 incumbent	 president,	 Gurbanguly	 Berdymuk-
hammedov,	(CNPC	signed	a	production	separation	agreement	(PSA)	concern-
ing	the	Bagtyyarlyk	field)	and	it	has	also	received	shares	in	the	Urikhtau	field	
in	Kazakhstan.	
China’s	presence	has	also	contributed	to	an	improvement	in	the	level	of	energy	
security	in	the	region.	The	construction	of	the	gas	pipeline	broke	the	previous	
pattern	of	gas	supplies	in	Central	Asia,	where	gas	was	supplied	from	Uzbeki-
stan	 to	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	 the	mountainous	regions	of	Kazakhstan.	
These	supplies	were	often	disrupted	in	the	past	due	to	problematic	and	at	times	
even	hostile	relations	between	the	countries	of	the	region.	The	new	gas	pipe-
line	running	to	China	has	made	it	possible	to	make	emergency	supplies	of	Turk-
men	gas	contracted	by	China50	to	Kazakhstan	(November–December	2011)	and	
Kyrgyzstan	(December	2012),	 thus	reducing	the	possibility	for	Uzbekistan	to	
50	 The	countries	which	received	Turkmen	gas	had	to	enter	into	a	relevant	agreement	concern-
ing	this	issue	with	China.	Symptomatically,	this	was	not	a	contract	with	Turkmenistan.	
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put	pressure	on	Kazakhstan	or	for	Kazakhstan	to	put	pressure	on	Kyrgyzstan.	
Kazakhstan’s	 energy	 security	will	 be	 improved	owing	 to	 the	 second	 section	
of	the	Central	Asia–China	gas	pipeline	which	is	currently	under	construction	
and	which	will	run	from	western	Kazakhstan	to	Shymkent,	where	it	will	con-
nect	to	the	main	pipeline	(cf.	map).	Half	of	this	route	will	be	used	for	the	export	
of	gas	to	China,	and	the	other	half	to	serve	Kazakhstan’s	requirements.	This	
means	that	the	country	will	no	longer	be	dependent	on	supplies	from	neigh-
bouring	Uzbekistan.	The	infrastructure,	which	is	being	built	by	China	and	for	
China’s	needs,	is	thus	improving	the	region’s	energy	security51	and	forcing	all	
of	the	transit	countries	to	co-operate	with	each	other.	The	Central	Asia–China	
gas	pipeline	is	the	only	project	to	de facto integrate	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	
since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	Due	to	this,	China	can	become	the	region’s	gas	
distributor.	
From	China’s	point	of	view,	gas	supplies	from	Central	Asia	are	of	key	signifi-
cance	(unlike	oil	supplies),	and	their	role	is	set	to	grow.	Due	to	the	pollution	of	
the	natural	environment,	China	needs	to	continue	increasing	the	share	of	nat-
ural	gas	in	its	energy	balance	(its	present	level	is	5%),	and	at	the	same	time	to	
continuously	increase	its	gas	imports.	Central	Asia	has	a	strategic	importance	
as	a	source	of	gas	for	China	because	it	is	able	to	provide	large	supplies	by	land.	
The	share	of	Central	Asian	gas	in	total	gas	imports	to	China	reached	approxi-
mately	65%,	and	in	consumption	approximately	17.6%	in	201252.	As	production	
and	transport	infrastructure	are	developing	and	consumption	in	China	is	in-
creasing,	the	region’s	significance	is	set	to	grow.	
China’s	increasing	presence	in	Central	Asia	has	changed	the	balance	of	power	
in	the	region	by	breaking	the	monopoly	of	Russia’s	gas	corporation	Gazprom,	
which	had	for	years	been	the	most	important	recipient	of	Central	Asian	gas53.	
In	the	short	term,	given	the	continuing	low	demand	for	gas	in	the	EU	and	the	
progress	 in	developing	the	infrastructure	running	to	China,	 it	 is	China	that	
will	become	the	key	recipient	of	gas	from	Central	Asia	(cf.	Table	3).	
51	 China’s	presence	(as	a	joint	venture	with	France’s	Total	and	Canada’s	Tethys	Petroleum)	in	
Tajikistan,	 and	planned	gas	production	 in	 this	 country	will	 improve	Tajikistan’s	 energy	
security,	which	has	so	far	relied	on	supplies	from	Uzbekistan.	
52	 Own	calculations	based	on	the	data	from	http://www.interfax.cn/news/21423
53	 Gazprom	imports	gas	from	Central	Asia	via	its	subsidiary	registered	in	Switzerland,	Gazprom	
Schweiz	AG.	Gazprom	uses	its	gas	from	Central	Asia	to	fulfil	its	obligations	in	Europe.	
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Table 3.	Structure	of	gas	exports	from	Central	Asia	in	2012	and	a	forecast		
for	2013	(in	billion	m3)
2012 2013
exporter/recipient*
russia 
(to eu-
rope)
China Iran
russia 
(to eu-
rope)
China Iran
Kazakhstan 10.3 0 0 10.3 0 0
Turkmenistan 11.5 24 10 11.5 25 10
Uzbekistan 10.5 2 0 7.5 5 0
Total	 32.3 26 10 29.3 30 10
Share	in	total	
exports	from	the	
region	(in	%)
47 38 15 42 43 15
source:	Own	calculations	based	on	information	from	Gazprom	Schweiz,	CNPC,	PressTv54	and	Uzbekneftegaz
*	In	addition	to	the	aforementioned	recipients,	marginal	quantities	of	Central	Asian	gas	are	supplied	to	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan.
Nevertheless,	 the	countries	of	Central	Asia	understand	that	continuing	sup-
plies	to	Gazprom	and	thus	ensuring	good	relations	with	Moscow	is	the	neces-
sary	condition	in	order	to	keep	the	good	prices	of	gas	exported	to	China.	This	
means	that	the	significance/share	of	gas	supplies	to	Gazprom	will	drop	in	the	
future,	but	it	is	in	Central	Asia’s	political	interests	to	maintain	them.	
China’s	presence	 is	principally	adversely	affecting	 the	 interests	of	 the	West,	
which	wishes	 to	 launch	 gas	 imports	 from	Central	 Asia	 independently	 from	
Russia.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 competition	 from	 China,	 the	
countries	of	Central	Asia	expect	the	West	(the	EU,	the	USA	and	energy	firms)	to	
provide	them	with	similar	co-operation	conditions	as	those	offered	by	Chinese	
partners,	i.e.	the	possibility	of	financing	transport	projects55.	As	a	consequence,	
the	West	finds	it	more	difficult	to	implement	its	projects,	above	all,	the	supplies	
of	Turkmen	gas	to	the	Southern	Gas	Corridor	via	the	planned	Trans-Caspian	
54	 http://presstv.com/detail/2012/12/18/278780/iran-to-resume-turkmenistan-gas-import/
55	 Manifestations	of	this	strategy	include	Turkmenistan’s	announcement	it	will	sell	gas	at	its	
border	(including	to	the	EU)	and	its	unwillingness	to	participate	in	the	costs	of	infrastruc-
ture	development	outside	its	borders.	
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gas	pipeline.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 increasing	dependence	on	co-operation	
with	China,	especially	in	the	case	of	Turkmenistan,	is	giving	rise	to	a	growing	
desire	to	diversify	gas	supply	routes	and	recipients,	one	proof	of	which	is	seen	
in	Ashgabat’s	efforts	aimed	at	 the	construction	of	 the	TAPI	 (Turkmenistan	-	
Afghanistan	-	Pakistan	-	India)	gas	pipeline.	In	the	case	of	Turkmenistan,	it	is	
also	unclear	whether	Ashgabat	will	be	able	to	repay	its	loans	to	China,	which	
gives	rise	to	concern	that	Turkmenistan	could	be	forced	to	hand	over	shares	in	
its	energy	assets	to	China.	
Chinese	 firms	 invest	 not	 only	 in	 large	 infrastructural	 ventures,	 but	 also	 in	
smaller	projects	contributing	to	the	enhancement	of	co-operation	between	the	
two	countries.	These	are	not	widely	publicised	by	the	media	in	Central	Asia.	
One	example	of	such	actions	is	the	gas	pipeline,	measuring	approximately	100	
km,	 connecting	 the	 Zaysan	 field	 in	 Kazakhstan	 and	 a	 liquefied	 natural	 gas	
(LNG)	factory	in	Jeminay	in	China,	which	was	built	by	a	private	Chinese	com-
pany,	Guanghui	Energy.	The	annual	capacity	of	this	route	is	approximately	0.5	
billion	m3	of	gas.	Guanghui	Energy	holds	a	49%	stake	in	the	field.	The	construc-
tion	of	this	pipeline	was	barely	mentioned	in	the	Kazakh	press.	In	turn,	Chi-
nese	media	gave	it	some	publicity	since	this	was	the	first	private	gas	pipeline	
running	to	China	to	have	been	constructed.	
2.2. The	uranium	sector
China	co-operates	in	the	area	of	uranium	mining	primarily	with	Kazakhstan,	
which	is	the	world’s	largest	producer	of	uranium	ore	(in	2012,	it	accounted	for	
37%	of	global	uranium	output)	and	owns	around	15%	of	global	uranium	re-
serves56.	Co-operation	with	Kazakhstan	is	multi-dimensional,	covering	joint	
development	 and	 the	use	 of	 uranium	deposits,	 supplies	 to	China,	 and	 also	
advanced	technological	co-operation	(cf.	Table	4).	In	the	case	of	Uzbekistan	
and	Kyrgyzstan,	China’s	engagement	is	small.	This	is	primarily	due	to	these	
countries’	 low	production	potential.	However,	 if	 the	exploration	work	con-
ducted	 by	 a	Chinese-Uzbek	 company	proves	 to	 be	 successful,	 co-operation	
may	develop	further.	
56	 Data	as	provided	by	the	World	Nuclear	Association.
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Table 4.	The	key	agreements	concerning	uranium	between	China	and	the	
countries	of	Central	Asia
Year Partners type of co-operation
kYrgYZstan
2009
Gate	Bridge	Co.	(Hong	Kong)	/	Monaro	
Mining	NL	(Australia)
Acquisition	by	the	Chinese	company	
of	75%	of	the	exploration	licence	for	
Aramsu,	Utor,	Naryn,	Sumsar,	Sogul,	
Djurasay,	Hodjaakan	and	Gavas
uZbekIstan
2009
China	Guangdong	Nuclear	Uranium	
Corp.	/	Goscomgeo
The	establishment	of	the	50%/50%	JV	
Uz-China	Uran	for	exploration	and	
mining	in	Boztau	region	(Navoiy),	
production	is	to	be	launched	in	2014,	
China	holds	the	pre-emptive	right	to	
the	company’s	output
2011
China	Guangdong	Nuclear	Uranium	
Corp/	Geology	and	Mineral	Resources	
Committee
Framework	agreement	expanding		
the	scope	of	co-operation	with	China	
to	include	for	example	exploration		
on	additional	sites
kaZakhstan
2006
China	National	Nuclear	Corporation	
and	GNPGH/Kazatomprom
Strategic	co-operation	agreement
2007
China	National	Nuclear	Corporation	
and	GNPGH/Kazatomprom
Agreement	envisaging	the	takeover	of	
a	49%	stake	in	Zhalpak	JV	and	the	sale	
of	two	thousand	tonnes	of	uranium	
annually	to	them
2007/2008
China	National	Nuclear	Corporation/
Kazatomprom
Long-term	co-operation	agreement	
which	provides	for	Chinese	invest-
ments	in	Kazakhstan
2008
Guangdong	Nuclear	Power	Group	
Holdings/Kazatomprom
Co-operation	agreement	covering	
uranium	mining,	nuclear	fuel	and	
reactor	production,	long-term	trade	
in	uranium	ore,	electricity	production	
and	the	construction	of	nuclear	power	
plants.	The	Chinese	partner	acquired	
a	49%	stake	in	the	Kazakh	company	
Semizbai-U	operating	at	the	Irkol	
and	Semizbai	sites	(annual	uranium	
output	at	750	tonnes)
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Year Partners type of co-operation
2009
Guangdong	Nuclear	Power	Group	
Holdings/Kazatomprom
Agreement	establishing	a	special	
company	for	building	nuclear	power	
plants	in	China
2010
CGNPC	Uranium	Resources	/
Kazatomprom
Long-term	contract	regulating	the	
purchase	and	sale	of	uranium	concen-
trate
2010
Ulba	Metallurgical	Plant	and	China	
Jianzhong	Nuclear	Fuel
Ending	the	process	of	uranium	tablet	
certification	–	the	tablets	are	to	be	
used	for	fuel	production	
2011
China	National	Nuclear	Corporation/
Kazatomprom
Agreement	envisaging	supply		
of	25,000	tonnes	of	uranium	
Co-operation	with	Kazakhstan	may	be	described	in	terms	of	strategic	relations	
and	even	mutual	dependence	between	Kazakhstan	and	China	resulting	from	
the	vast	significance	both	countries	attach	to	uranium	trade.	Even	though	Chi-
na	has	a	small	share	in	uranium	production	(the	mines	co-owned	by	Chinese	
companies	produced	approximately	 1,200	 tonnes	of	uranium	 in	 2012,	which	
accounted	for	around	5%	of	Kazakhstan’s	total	output),	it	is	the	main	recipient	
of	uranium	from	Kazakhstan.	 In	2011,	Kazakhstan	exported	to	China	10,492	
tonnes	of	uranium,	i.e.	54%	of	its	total	output	that	year	(19,450	tonnes)	and	77%	
of	 total	uranium	imports	 to	China57.	 In	the	case	of	Uzbekistan,	 the	company	
co-owned	by	China’s	Guangdong	Nuclear	Power	Group	Holdings	still	does	not	
produce	uranium.	Basically,	though,	China	is	the	sole	uranium	importer	from	
Uzbekistan:	in	2010,	it	bought	the	country’s	entire	output,	which	accounted	for	
21%	of	total	uranium	imports	to	China58.	This	means	that	almost	all	of	uranium	
imported	by	China	is	supplied	from	Central	Asia.	
China	 is	 set	 to	be	 even	more	active	 in	 the	 region,	 above	all,	 in	Kazakhstan.	
The	factors	that	will	contribute	to	this	include	the	still	very	high	production	
57	 Uranium Intelligence Weekly,	2	March	2013.	
58	 Data	concerning	uranium	imports	from	Uzbekistan	to	China	is	unclear.	Currently,	all	ura-
nium	production	assets	 in	Uzbekistan	are	owned	by	the	state-controlled	company	Navoi	
Mining	and	Metallurgical	Combine,	and	output	reached	2,350	tonnes	in	2010.	Meanwhile,	
data	on	Chinese	imports	indicates	3,000	tonnes	in	2010.	Uzbekistan	probably	exports	ura-
nium	via	a	German	agent,	NUKEM,	and	the	trade	operations	lack	transparency.	Part	of	the	
uranium	supplies	 from	Kazakhstan	 to	China	 is	probably	also	exported	via	NUKEM;	and	
this	suggests	that	the	share	of	Kazakh	uranium	in	China’s	imports	could	be	even	larger.	
Cf.	Uranium Intelligence Weekly,	14	March	2011.	
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growth	potential	in	Kazakhstan59,	and	Chinese	plans60	to	develop	nuclear	pow-
er	plants.	China’s	presence	in	this	sector	is	first	of	all	a	challenge	to	Russia	since	
it	has	ambitious	plans	for	global	nuclear	expansion	and	is	cranking	up	its	in-
vestment	in	uranium	mines,	including	those	in	Kazakhstan.	China’s	expansion	
is	also	putting	Japan’s	interests	in	the	region	at	stake;	especially	given	the	fact	
that	Tokyo,	having	recovered	from	its	shock	following	the	Fukushima	disaster,	
is	 returning	 to	 the	global	uranium	market	and	 is	 interested	 in	co-operation	
with	Kazakhstan,	covering	for	example	the	construction	of	a	nuclear	power	
plant	and	the	production	of	rare	earth	metals	(in	order	to	reduce	its	depend-
ence	on	China).	The	Japanese-Chinese	competition	for	uranium	in	the	region	
is	an	opportunity	for	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	to	maximise	their	profits.	
2.3. Other	selected	areas	of	co-operation
2.3.1.	Metals	and	precious	metals
Other	areas	of	co-operation	 include	 investments	 in	coal,	metal	and	precious	
metal	 deposits.	However,	China	has	managed	 to	make	 investments	 in	 these	
sectors	only	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	where	it	is	one	of	the	key	investors.	
From	China’s	point	of	view,	presence	in	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan	is	strategi-
cally	insignificant;	it	is	merely	a	form	of	diversification	of	its	engagement,	and	
an	addition	to	its	other	investments	worldwide.	Meanwhile,	Kyrgyzstan	and	
Tajikistan,	being	the	poorest	countries	in	the	region,	attach	great	significance	
to	the	Chinese	investments,	since	the	countries	are	economically	underdevel-
oped	and	generally	have	problems	attracting	foreign	investments	(primarily	
due	to	the	lack	of	proper	infrastructure	and	the	high	risk	of	instability).	
59	 According	to	Kazatomprom’s	forecasts,	uranium	output	will	grow	to	30,000	tonnes	annu-
ally	in	2018	from	the	level	of	approximately	20,000	tonnes	in	2012.	phttp://www.kazatom-
prom.kz/ru/news/1/kazahstan_hochet_dobyvat_do_25.000_t_urana_v_blizhajshie_gody
60	 China	is	planning	to	put	150	nuclear	power	plants	into	operation	by	2030.	They	have	an	es-
timated	annual	uranium	requirement	of	30,000	tonnes.
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Table 5.	Selection	of	China’s	largest	investments	in	Central	Asia	outside	the	
energy	sector
Company
(country) shareholders asset type when
estimated investment 
value (purchase  
and investments  
in development)
Altynken
(kyrgyzstan)
Zijin	Mining	
(60%),
Kyrgyzaltyn	
(40%)
Gold	mine	 2011 US$66	million
Zaravshan	
(tajikistan)
Zijn	Mining	
75%,	Tajikistan	
25%
Gold	mine 2007 US$250	million
Zarnisor	JV	
(tajikistan)
China	Global	
New	Technol-
ogy	Imp	&	Exp	
100%
Zinc,	lead 2007
US$150	million		
(a	US$500	million	
investment	in	a	met-
allurgical	project	has	
been	announced)
Chon-Alay	
(kyrgyzstan)
Asia	Gold	
Enterprises,	
100%
Gold,	silver,	
copper
2012 n/a
TK	Mobile
(tajikistan) ZTE	100%
Telecom-
munication	
network	
operator
2006 n/a
source:	News	agencies,	company	websites
In	turn,	both	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan	denied	Chinese	investors	access	to	
their	mineral	resources	sectors.	Uzbekistan	has	even	thwarted	an	attempt	by	
Chinese	investors	to	buy	shares	in	Oxus	Gold61.	Although	China	has	no	mineral	
assets	in	these	countries,	it	is	an	important	recipient	of	raw	materials;	for	ex-
ample,	Kazakhstan’s	largest	copper	producer,	Kazakhmys,	exports	60%	of	its	
output	to	China.	At	the	same	time,	although	it	has	no	stakes	in	this	sector,	Chi-
na	has	been	willing	to	offer	loans	for	its	development.	For	example,	it	granted	
loans	worth	a	total	of	US$4.2	billion	in	2009–2011	to	Kazakhmys	for	production	
development62.	Chinese	partners	have	also	been	making	efforts	to	ensure	the	
stability	of	supplies	by	entering	into	long-term	contracts;	domestic	producers	
are	also	satisfied	with	these.	
61	 Chinese	firms	made	attempts	in	2011	to	buy	into	the	shares	of	the	UK-based	company	Oxus	
Gold,	but	this	company’s	assets	in	Uzbekistan	were	ultimately	nationalised.	
62	 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/8573834/Ka-
zakhmys-gets-1.5bn-loan-from-China.html
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2.3.2.	The	hydroelectric	sector
China	is	interested	in	investing	in	hydroelectric	production	in	the	region	(es-
pecially	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan).	It	has,	however	avoided	becoming	en-
gaged	in	controversial	projects.	For	instance,	it	chose	not	to	invest	in	the	power	
plants	 in	 Nurabad	 and	 Zarafshan	 because	 Uzbekistan	was	 opposed	 to	 this.	
Chinese	firms	have	been	unsuccessful	at	acquiring	assets	in	the	hydroelectric	
sector,	and	have	no	shares	in	any	of	the	large	water	power	plants	in	the	region.	
Nevertheless,	it	was	Chinese	loans	that	enabled	the	development	of	the	power	
supply	grids	in	Tajikistan:	ExIm	Bank	granted	a	US$300	million	loan	for	the	
construction	of	the	North-South	and	the	Lolazor-Khatlon	high-voltage	power	
transmission	lines.	
In	turn,	China’s	TBEA	is	engaged	in	the	construction	of	the	Datka-Kemin	high-
voltage	line	in	Kyrgyzstan,	which	will	facilitate	power	transmission	from	the	
south	to	the	north	of	the	country,	and	thus	reduce	its	dependence	on	Uzbeki-
stan	and	make	electricity	exports	to	Kazakhstan	possible.	The	project	has	an	
estimated	cost	of	US$400	million	and	is	being	financed	by	a	 loan	from	ExIm	
Bank.	Chinese	firms	also	participate	as	subcontractors	in	the	construction	of	
smaller	hydroelectric	power	plants	in	these	countries	since	these	do	not	raise	
controversy.	 The	 main	 goals	 of	 Chinese	 engagement	 in	 this	 sector	 include	
gaining	electricity	sources	for	Xinjiang,	to	prevent	the	collapse	of	the	region’s	
weakest	states	(Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan)	and	to	support	the	development	of	
electricity	exports	to	Afghanistan,	and	thus	contribute	to	its	stabilisation.	
2.3.3.	Telecommunication
The	telecommunication	sector	is	not	so	spectacular	in	terms	of	investments,	
but	 is	 still	 an	 interesting	 area	 of	 Chinese	 commercial	 activity.	 ZTE,	 a	 tel-
ecommunication	firm	from	China,	has	 its	mobile	network	operator	only	 in	
Tajikistan	(TK	Mobile),	but	Chinese	firms	are	playing	an	essential	role	in	pro-
viding	communication	solutions	to	all	the	countries	in	the	region.	It	cannot	
be	ruled	out	that	the	capability	of	using	Chinese	technologies	for	monitoring	
the	public	in	the	authoritarian	Central	Asian	states	is	a	helpful	factor	in	this	
co-operation.	
2.3.4.	Agriculture
China	 is	 also	 interested	 in	 agricultural	 co-operation	 by	 leasing	 arable	 land	
from	Tajikistan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Kazakhstan.	
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However,	these	issues	come	in	for	enormous	public	resistance	fuelled	by	anti-
Chinese	phobias,	and	do	not	play	a	major	part	in	bilateral	co-operation	as	yet.	
Meanwhile,	China	 is	becoming	an	 increasingly	 important	 recipient	of	grain	
from	Kazakhstan.	
2.3.5.	Common	investment	funds
Kazakhstan	is	the	only	country	where	China	is	involved	in	this	kind	of	co-op-
eration.	The	Kazakh	holding	Samruk-Kazyna	and	its	Chinese	partner,	CITIC,	
established	 an	 investment	 fund	 worth	 US$200	million	 in	 2009.	 The	 fund’s	
overriding	goal	is	to	back	infrastructure	development	beyond	the	oil	and	gas	
sectors.	In	turn,	in	2010,	Samruk-Kazyna	and	billionaires	from	Hong	Kong	(Li	
Ka-shing,	Larry	Yung	and	Cheng	Yu	Tung)	decided	to	create	a	private	invest-
ment	fund	worth	US$400	million.	This	fund	will	primarily	be	involved	in	help-
ing	large	Kazakh	mineral	corporations	(e.g.	Kazakhmys)	enter	the	Hong	Kong	
stock	exchange63.	During	President	Nazarbayev’s	visit	to	China	in	2011,	the	par-
ties	agreed	to	establish	an	investment	fund	worth	US$1	billion,	which	would	
invest	 in	both	countries.	The	emergence	of	such	funds	 is	a	proof	of	growing	
capital	 connections	 between	 Kazakhstan	 and	 China,	 and	 could	 also	 signify	
that	joint	investments	in	the	Kazakh	mineral	resources	sector	will	be	made	in	
the	future.	This	kind	of	co-operation	looks	set	to	develop	further	due	to	China’s	
significance	as	a	source	of	capital	for	investments.	
2.4. Trade	
China	is	also	beyond	any	doubt	the	most	important	trade	partner	for	Central	
Asia.	 Even	 if	 the	 estimated	value	 of	 gas	 exports	 from	Central	Asia	 is	 added	
(which	is	not	taken	into	account	in	the	statistics	of	the	Russian	Federal	Customs	
Office),	China	became	the	region’s	key	partner	in	2011,	outperforming	Russia.	
In	2012,	China’s	advantage	over	Russia	in	the	region’s	trade	balance	grew	even	
further	 (cf.	Table	6).	Given	China’s	 economic	potential	 and	 the	desire	of	 the	
countries	of	Central	Asia	to	develop	trade,	and	also	the	lack	of	effective	means	
to	counteract	Chinese	expansion,	trade	volumes	are	set	to	rise	even	more	in-
tensively.	Increasing	imports	of	energy	raw	materials	from	the	region	(oil,	gas	
and	uranium)	will	be	another	catalyst.	Trade	development	is	also	triggered	by	
the	development	of	transport	infrastructure	connecting	the	region	with	China	
(cf.	2.5.	Transport	infrastructure	–	the	New	Silk	Road).	The	total	trade	balance	
63	 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-14/kazakhstan-hong-kong-billionaires-li-
cheng-yung-plan-fund-premier-says.html
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is	unfavourable	for	the	region,	but	this	is	not	the	case	with	the	region’s	largest	
oil	and	gas	exporters,	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan.	
What	also	helps	 in	 trade	development	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 international	 cur-
rencies	are	not	used	in	settlements	between	the	countries,	and	thus	currency	
risk	is	avoided.	China	wants	to	replace	the	dollar	with	the	yuan	in	mutual	set-
tlements.	The	first	results	of	this	strategy	included	the	currency	swap	agree-
ments	signed	with	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan	in	2011.	This	added	significance	
to	the	national	currencies.	
The	goods	predominant	in	China’s	exports	to	Central	Asia	are:	consumer	goods,	
and	machinery	and	equipment.	In	turn,	Central	Asia	is	a	source	of	raw	materi-
als	for	China,	and	exports	oil,	gas,	uranium	and	other	mineral	resources	(cop-
per	and	lead),	grain	and	cotton.	
Table 6.	The	volumes	of	imports	to	individual	Central	Asian	states	from	China	
and	Russia	(US$	million)	
kazakhstan kyrgyzstan tajikistan turkmenistan uzbekistan
Year From	
China
From	
Russia
From	
China
From	
Russia
From	
China
From	
Russia
From	
China
From	
Russia
From	
China
From	
Russia
2003 1,566 3,279 245 161 21 128 79 222 147 512
2004 2,212 4,664 493 268 53 183 85 242 172 767
2005 3,899 6,534 866 377 144 240 90 224 230 861
2006 4,752 8,967 2,113 561 306 378 162 229 406 1,087
2007 7,447 11,920 3,666 879 514 607 302 384 766 1,729
2008 9,820 13,299 9,214 1,308 1,480 794 803 808 1,277 2,038
2009 7,750 9,147 5,228 916 1,217 573 916 992 1,560 1,694
2010 9,280 10,690 4,100 991 1,375 673 522 757 1,179 1,889
2011 9,568 13,348 4,879 1,159 1,997 719 786 1,156 1,359 2,107
2012 11,002 14,558 5,073 1,634 1,748 678 1,700 1,251 1,784 2,325
source:	Statistical	Offices
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Table 7.	The	volumes	of	exports	from	individual	Central	Asian	states	to	China	
and	Russia	(US$	million)
kazakhstan* kyrgyzstan tajikistan turkmenistan* uzbekistan*
Year To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia
2003 1,721 2,475 69 104 17 70 4 28 200 484
2004 2,281 3,429 109 150 15 76 14 43 403 613
2005 2,902 3,225 105 146 14 95 19 77 451 904
2006 3,607 3,840 113 194 18 126 16 80 566 1,292
2007 6,419 4,623 113 291 10 162 49 69 363 1,471
2008 7,726 6,379 121 491 20 213 28 100 330 1,300
2009 6,231 3,697 48 367 185 213 38 45 349 847
2010 11,034 4,449 70 393 56 214 1,045 148 1,299 1,557
2011 15,329 7,146 98 293 72 89 4,693 143 807 1,860
2012 14,647 7,870 88 195 109 67 8,022 183 1,091 1,390
source:		Statistical	Offices	
*	Gas	exported	by	Central	Asian	countries	is	not	taken	into	account	in	the	export	data.	Since	2011,	natural	
gas	has	been	purchased	exclusively	by	Gazprom’s	subsidiary,	Gazprom	Schweiz64.	The	estimated	value	of	
gas	purchased	in	Central	Asia	in	2011,	according	to	Gazprom	Schweiz’s	report,	was	approximately	US$8	
billion	(the	company	stated	8.18	billion	Swiss	francs	as	a	cost	linked	to	gas	purchase	in	2011)65.	These	esti-
mates	correspond	to	media	reports	on	the	gas	price,	which	is	around	US$250	per	1,000	m3	of	gas.	
Table 8.	Central	Asia’s	trade	volumes	with	Russia	and	China	in	2011	and	2012	
2011 2012
imports exports
trade	
volume
imports exports
trade	
volume
from/to	China 18,589 20,998 39,587 21,308 23,957 45,265
from/to	Russia 18,489 12,392 30,881 20,446 10,978 31,424
source:		Statistical	Offices
64	 http://www.gazprom-schweiz.ch/en/company.html
65	 http://www.gazprom-schweiz.ch/en/publications.html	 during	 the	 purchase	 of	 35	 billion	
m3	of	gas	from	the	Caspian	region	(including	1.5	billion	m3	from	Azerbaijan).	
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Chart 1.	The	dynamics	of	Central	Asia’s	trade	with	Russia	and	China		
in	2003-2012	(source:		Statistical	offices)	
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2.4.1. Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan	 is	China’s	most	 important	 trade	partner	 in	 the	region,	 in	 terms	
of	both	imports	and	exports.	The	high	trade	volumes	have	been	generated	by	
exports	of	oil,	uranium	and	metals	 from	Kazakhstan	to	China.	Trade	devel-
opment	is	stimulated	by	both	countries	through	the	construction	of	adequate	
transport	 infrastructure	 (railways	 and	 roads)	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 modern	
transport-and-trade	centres	located	on	the	borders.	Besides	the	Jeminay	and	
Alatau	trade	centres	which	have	been	in	operation	since	the	early	1990s,	the	
most	 spectacular	 example	 is	 the	 trade-and-transport	 centre,	which	 is	being	
built	in	Khorgos	next	to	the	border.	Both	Kazakhstan	and	China	are	also	intro-
ducing	legal	solutions	to	stimulate	trade.	Kazakhstan	is	also	planning	to	create	
a	special	economic	zone	around	Khorgos	and	to	embark	upon	industrial	devel-
opment	with	the	aid	of	Chinese	investors	and	a	Chinese	workforce	(sic!).	Khor-
gos	is	expected	to	become	a	gateway	to	Asia	for	Kazakhstan,	while	for	China	it	
will	be	a	way	to	gain	access	to	the	area	of	the	Customs	Union	and	a	transmis-
sion	belt	for	Chinese	products	to	be	sent	further	on	to	Europe.	
59
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
khorgos 
The	 Khorgos	 International	 Border	 Co-operation	 Centre	 is	 a	 land	 transit	
port	and	a	logistics	hub	on	the	Kazakh-Chinese	border.	A	Special	Economic	
Zone	will	operate	here.	The	decision	to	build	the	centre	was	made	in	2002,	
and	the	first	part	of	the	project	was	launched	on	1	July	2011.	
The	busy	Khorgos	border	checkpoint	is	the	pivot	of	the	centre.	A	visa-free	zone	
for	citizens	of	the	two	countries	has	been	established	within	its	area	(they	are	
allowed	to	stay	there	for	30	days	solely	on	the	basis	of	an	identity	card).
The	Xinjiang–Khorgos	 railway	 line	 (which	was	put	 into	operation	 in	De-
cember	2012)	runs	through	the	zone.	An	international	airport	is	earmarked	
for	construction	close	to	the	centre	(in	2018).	The	Central	Asia–China	gas	
pipeline	also	runs	next	to	Khorgos	(from	Turkmenistan	via	Uzbekistan	and	
Kazakhstan	–	in	five	years’	time	this	will	be	the	most	important	gas	export	
route	running	from	Central	Asia).	Khorgos	is	situated	approximately	320	
km	from	Almaty	and	670	km	from	Urumqi.	
The	centre	will	cover	an	area	of	528	hectares	(185	hectares	on	the	Kazakh	
side	and	343	on	the	Chinese	side).	transshipment terminals will	be	built	
there.	Five	terminal	sectors	are	planned,	including	a	goods	processing	sec-
tor.	The	centre’s	annual	transshipment	capacity	is	planned	to	reach	120,000	
goods	containers.	
According	to	estimates	from	the	Japan	International	Co-operation	Agency,	
the annual volume of shipments transported via the port will	 grow	
from	19	million	tonnes	in	2008	to	around	46	million	tonnes	in	2020.	
Khorgos	is	also	a	modern	business	complex,	with	offices,	hotels,	a	conference	
and	exhibition	centre,	 a	 sports-and-recreation	and	culture-and-entertain-
ment	complex,	and	an	ethnographic	park.	A	sewage	system	and	treatment	
plant,	a	landfill	and	waste	processing	and	recycling	plants	will	also	be	built	
as	part	of	the	project.	
The	estimated	project	implementation	cost	is	approximately	US$3.5	billion.	
gateway to the east: the special economic Zone (being established in 
the immediate vicinity of khorgos)
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The	Special	Economic	Zone	will	cover	5,840 ha of the frontier Panfilovs-
kiy region (Almaty	Province).
The	zone	is	expected	to	contribute	to	the	creation	of	220,000	new	jobs,	and	
its	annual	income	will	reach	around	US$1	billion.	
The	Kazakh	part	has	been	granted	the	status	of	a	Special	Economic	Zone.	
A	zero	VAT	rate	is	expected	to	be	imposed	on	goods	manufactured	within	
this	 zone.	 Furthermore,	 the	 zone	will	 be	 exempted	 from	 social	 tax,	 and	
special,	simplified	procedures	for	employing	citizens	from	third	states	will	
apply	there.
2.4.2. Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan,	like	Turkmenistan,	has	the	lowest	import	levels	from	China	and	
a	relatively	low	negative	trade	balance	(approximately	US$	700	million	in	2012).	
This	is	an	effect	of	the	protectionist	policy	adopted	by	the	Uzbek	government,	
which	is	attempting	to	protect	the	country	from	being	flooded	with	cheap	Chi-
nese	goods	and	is	imposing	prohibitive	customs	duties	on	imports	of	consumer	
goods66.	At	the	same	time,	the	high	import	volume	is	generated	by	supplies	of	
technologically	 advanced	machinery	 and	 equipment	 from	China,	which	 are	
bought	using	Chinese	loans.	Uzbekistan	exports	to	China	primarily	uranium	
and	natural	gas,	and	also	cotton	and	gold.	Considering	the	plans	to	increase	gas	
exports	to	China	and	Uzbekistan’s	imports	of	equipment	from	China	(backed	
by	Chinese	loans	worth	US$5	billion,	granted	in	2012),	the	trade	structure	could	
be	maintained.	Uzbekistan	is	interested	in	developing	trade	co-operation	and	
investments	from	China,	but	only	to	a	limited	extent.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	
Tashkent	sees	the	South-East	Asian	(South	Korea)	economies	as	a	model,	and	is	
unwilling	to	become	dependent	on	China.	
2.4.3.	Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan’s	 gas	 exports	 to	 China	 generated	 a	 positive	 trade	 balance	 of	
US$6.3	 billion	 in	 2012,	 an	 unprecedented	 result	when	 compared	 to	 the	 oth-
er	countries	 in	the	region.	Given	the	plans	to	 increase	gas	exports	to	China,	
Turkmenistan’s	positive	trade	balance	is	likely	to	be	maintained.	At	the	same	
time,	the	rapid	increase	in	imports	from	China	is	linked	to	the	engagement	of	
66	 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39646&cH
ash=ec65823bc326166eb210879fcbdffc94
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Chinese	firms	in	the	development	of	Turkmen	gas	fields	(CNPC	is	operating	on	
the	right	bank	of	Amu	Darya,	at	the	Bagtyyarlyk	field,	and	is	a	subcontractor	at	
Turkmenistan’s	largest	field,	Galkynysh).	China	has	outpaced	the	other	coun-
tries,	and	is	undoubtedly	the	largest	trade	partner	for	Turkmenistan,	whose	
economy	is	based	on	gas	exports.	This	means	that	Turkmenistan’s	economy	is	
too	heavily	reliant	on	gas	exports	to	China	when	compared	to	other	partners,	
and	this	could	turn	into	political	dependence.	
2.4.4.	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan
These	two	countries	are	primarily	outlets	for	Chinese	goods.	Their	exports	to	
China	are	marginal	and	limited	to	raw	materials	produced	by	the	countries	and	
scrap	metal.	Their	negative	balances	in	trade	with	China	are	the	largest	in	the	
region:	in	2012	the	levels	were	US$5	billion	for	Kyrgyzstan	and	US$1.7	billion	
for	Tajikistan.	Both	countries	import	consumer	goods,	machinery	and	equip-
ment	from	China,	and	these	purchases	–	as	 is	 the	case	with	the	other	coun-
tries	in	the	region	–	are	financed	by	Chinese	loans.	Kyrgyzstan	also	plays	the	
role	of	regional	hub	for	distribution	of	Chinese	goods,	and	re-exports67	them	
to	the	neighbouring	countries,	primarily	to	Uzbekistan	and	Kazakhstan.	The	
two	countries	will	keep	their	negative	trade	balance	since,	being	the	region’s	
and	the	world’s	most	economically	backward	countries,	they	have	no	potential	
to	develop	their	exports.	What	plays	a	key	role	in	developing	trade	with	these	
countries	is	their	WTO	membership	(Tajikistan	finalised	the	accession	proce-
dures	in	2013).	
China	 is	 interested	 in	 extending	 trade	 relations.	 There	 are	 plans	 to	 establish	
a	Kyrgyz-Chinese	company,	which	would	manufacture	goods	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	
thus	reduce	the	negative	impact	of	Kyrgyzstan’s	possible	accession	to	the	Cus-
toms	Union68.	The	establishment	of	 the	Customs	Union	of	Russia,	Kazakhstan	
and	Belarus	alone	has	adversely	affected	the	possibilities	of	exporting	goods	from	
Kyrgyzstan	to	Kazakhstan.	However,	it	is	impossible	to	state	beyond	any	doubt	
that	this	has	hampered	the	development	of	trade	between	China	and	Kyrgyzstan	
to	a	major	extent.	Imports	from	China	were	almost	halved	in	2009,	i.e.	before	the	
67	 Re-export	of	goods	 from	Kyrgyzstan	 is	not	 reflected	 in	official	 statistics.	This	 is	outdoor	
market	 trading.	According	 to	CAREC	estimates,	 it	generates	much	greater	volumes	 than	
official	exports	from	these	countries.	
http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/events/2011/14th-TPCC/Customs-Union-Impact-
-Kyrgyz-Republic-Tajikistan.pdf	
68	 AKIpress,	12	June	2012.	
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Customs	Union	was	established,	as	a	consequence	of	the	global	economic	crisis.	
Since	then,	imports	from	China	to	Kyrgyzstan	have	not	reached	2008	levels.	The	
reasons	for	this	include	both	the	poor	economic	situation	in	the	country	(espe-
cially	in	2010	due	to	the	coup	and	ethnic	riots)	and	the	restricted	possibilities	to	
re-export	goods	due	to	procedures	introduced	by	Astana69.	
the Customs union was	 established	 on	 1	 January	 2010	 by	 Russia,	 Ka-
zakhstan	and	Belarus.	It	is	the	first	stage	in	the	integration	process	being	
pushed	through	by	Moscow	(its	subsequent	elements	include	the	Common	
Economic	Space,	which	was	formally	set	up	on	1	January	2012,	and	the	Eur-
asian	Union	not	yet	established).	All	these	projects	are	aimed	at	integrating	
the	post-Soviet	countries	economically,	and	in	the	longer	term	also	politi-
cally,	with	Russia	being	the	leader.	Kazakhstan	is	strongly	opposed	to	this	
vision	of	the	union.	This	country	is	determined	to	restrict	its	integration	to	
economic	issues	alone,	and	is	not	ready	to	relinquish	its	ambitions	to	play	
an	important	role	on	the	global	arena	for	Moscow’s	sake70.	Kyrgyzstan	is	
clearly	interested	in	joining	the	Customs	Union.	
2.5. Transport	infrastructure	–	the	New	Silk	Road	
Chinese	engagement	 in	developing	 transport	 infrastructure	 in	 the	region	 is	
unprecedented	 and	 covers	 infrastructure	 development	 in	 both	Central	Asia	
and	 Xinjiang	 in	 order	 to	 build	 cohesive	 transport	 corridors.	 There	 are	 two	
railway	lines:	from	Urumqi	to	Astana	and	from	Urumqi	to	Almaty71,	and	three	
land	ports	with	roads	running	to	them	in	operation.	China	also	supports	the	
development	of	road	infrastructure	in	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	and	is	ready	
to	back	up	such	projects	in	these	countries	with	loans	(for	example,	the	US$75	
million	loan	for	the	rehabilitation	of	the	road	running	from	Osh	to	Irkeshtam	
by	the	Kyrgyz-Chinese	border,	the	US$282	million	loan	for	the	reconstruction	
of	 the	 road	 from	Dushanbe	 to	Chanak	 (in	Uzbekistan)	 and	 the	US$200	mil-
lion	 loan	for	 the	reconstruction	of	 the	Bishkek-Torugart	road).	The	plans,	 in	
addition	to	further	support	for	road	development,	include	the	construction	of	
a	railway	line	running	from	Kashgar	to	Uzbekistan	via	Kyrgyzstan	and	a	rail-
way	line	to	Afghanistan	(cf.	Map	3).	
69	 http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/events/2011/14th-TPCC/Customs-Union-Impact-
Kyrgyz-Republic-Tajikistan.pdf
70	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-01-23/kazakhstan-distances-itself-
moscow-s-integration-projects
71	 It	was	opened	in	December	2012.	
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Chinese	firms	are	the	most	competitive	in	the	region.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	
they	are	usually	chosen	as	subcontractors	for	the	projects	sponsored	as	part	of	
the	CAREC	programme	by	 international	financial	 institutions	 (primarily	 in	
Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan).	Air	connections	from	Central	Asia	to	Urumqi	and	
other	parts	of	China	are	also	rapidly	developing.	Investments	in	infrastructure	
development	in	Central	Asia	are	made	primarily	by	financial	institutions	im-
plementing	the	CAREC	programme	(cf.	Map	4).	
the CareC programme covers	 ten	 countries,	 including	 all	 the	 Central	
Asian	states,	and	is	aimed	at	supporting	regional	co-operation	through	the	
development	of	 transport	and	trade	 infrastructure	 (such	as	border	check-
points,	etc.).	Six	transport	corridors	running	through	Central	Asia	are	also	
being	developed	using	CAREC	funds.	The	programme’s	donors	are:	the	Asian	
Development	Bank,	the	EBRD,	the	IMF,	the	Islamic	Development	Bank,	the	
UNDP	 and	 the	World	 Bank.	Over	 one	 hundred	 projects	worth	more	 than	
US$17	 billion	were	 executed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 programme	 between	 2001	 and	
201172.	Beyond	any	doubt,	CAREC	is	the	key	source	of	funds	for	the	develop-
ment	of	transport	infrastructure	(other	than	energy)	in	the	region73.	
One	of	the	goals	of	China’s	engagement	in	infrastructural	projects	is	to	cre-
ate	 durable	 connections	 between	 the	 states	 of	 Central	 Asia	 and	 Xinjiang.	
The	 new	 infrastructure	 is	 expected	 to	 nurture	 trade	 developing	 between	
Xinjiang	and	the	countries	of	Central	Asia,	to	reinforce	China’s	presence	and	
to	make	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	stronger.	Infrastructural	connections	
between	Central	Asia	and	China	are	developing	at	a	much	more	rapid	rate	
than	those	with	other	neighbouring	countries.	Furthermore,	the	infrastruc-
ture	which	 is	built	by	other	donors	or	 the	Central	Asian	states	 themselves	
will	 anyway	 be	 used	 for	 the	 development	 of	 trade	 between	China	 and	 the	
region,	and	for	transforming	Central	Asia	into	a	transit	platform	for	Chinese	
goods.	This	will	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 a	 further	 enhancement	of	 the	 economic	
bonds	between	Central	Asia	and	China,	and	a	continuing	decrease	in	Russia’s	
significance.	
72	 The	 list	 of	 transport	 projects:	 http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=transport-
projects
73	 http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=projects-list
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3.  the instruments of co-operation: loans and the sCo 
3.1. Loans
To	 stimulate	 the	 development	 of	 co-operation	with	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	
Asia,	China	lavishes	loans	on	them	for	infrastructure	development	and	for	the	
import	of	Chinese	goods,	above	all	machinery.	The	loans	are	also	secured	on	
the	basis	of	future	supplies	of	raw	materials	from	Central	Asia.	
Until	 2009,	 the	key	recipients	of	Chinese	 loans	were	Tajikistan,	 followed	by	
Uzbekistan	and,	to	a	much	lesser	extent,	Kyrgyzstan.	Kazakhstan	and	Turk-
menistan	did	not	take	Chinese	loans.	China	was	not	the	main	source	of	loans	
to	Central	Asia	in	this	area,	either;	it	lagged	far	behind	international	financial	
institutions.	The	region’s	countries	became	more	interested	in	Chinese	loans	
due	to	the	economic	crisis	and,	in	the	case	of	Turkmenistan,	the	crisis	in	rela-
tions	with	its	key	trade	partner,	Russia.	
Chinese	loans	are	expected	to	boost	infrastructure	development,	trade	and	ac-
cess	to	natural	deposits,	and	possibly	supplies	of	raw	materials	from	the	region.	
Characteristically,	in	the	case	of	loans	granted	for	infrastructure	development	
and	plant	modernisation,	Chinese	firms	operate	as	subcontractors	and	suppliers	
of	technologies	and	manpower.	In	trade,	meanwhile,	Chinese	loans	are	used	to	
buy	Chinese	products.	Similarly,	in	exchange	for	loans	granted	for	the	develop-
ment	of	natural	deposit	sites,	China	expects	supplies	of	these	natural	resources.	
Turkmenistan	is	the	region’s	most	indebted	country.	In	2009	and	2011,	it	signed	
loan	agreements	with	Chinese	institutions	worth	a	total	of	US$8.1	billion,	mak-
ing	up	over	90%	of	this	country’s	total	estimated	foreign	debt.	Turkmenistan	
had	traditionally	used	hardly	any	external	forms	of	financing,	but	in	2009	it	
was	 forced	 to	 take	a	Chinese	 loan	 in	order	 to	stabilise	 its	financial	situation	
in	connection	with	the	crisis	in	relations	with	Russia	and	the	withholding	of	
gas	supplies	to	Gazprom74.	The	next	loan,	granted	in	2011,	was	needed	to	fund	
the	development	of	Turkmenistan’s	largest	gas	field,	Galkynysh.	In	exchange	
for	this	loan,	Turkmenistan	agreed	to	guarantee	additional	supplies	of	gas	at	
25	billion	m3	(cf.	Table	1),	and	CNPC	is	set	to	be	a	subcontractor	at	the	field.	It	is	
highly	likely	that	part	of	the	debt	will	be	repaid	with	gas	supplies.	
74	 Gas	supplies	to	Russia	were	interrupted	following	the	explosion	at	the	Central	Asia–Centre	
gas	pipeline	in	April	2009.	Supplies	were	resumed	in	December	2009,	however	at	a	 level	
almost	four	times	lower	than	before	the	explosion.	
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Table 9.	Turkmenistan’s	foreign	debt
loan provider debt value debt share
China
US$8.1	billion		
(August	2011)*
91.6%
ADB
US$125	million		
(31	December	2011)**
1.4%
IDB
US$613	million		
(25	November	2011)***
7%
total US$8,838	million
source:	Own	estimates	based	on	data	from	IDB,	ADB	and	press	agencies
*	Chinese	loans	are	not	taken	into	account	in	the	estimates	of	international	financial	institutions,	e.g.	the	
IDB	and	ADB.
**	http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Publi-
cations/Member_Countries_Facts_Figures/FactsFigures2012.pdf
***	http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Pu-
blications/Member_Countries_Facts_Figures/FactsFigures2012.pdf
http://www.adb.org/countries/turkmenistan/main
China’s	second	largest	debtor	is	Tajikistan,	which	took	a	Chinese	loan	for	the	
first	time	in	2008.	In	five	years,	China	has	become	Tajikistan’s	main	creditor	in	
the	area	of	bilateral	loans	(its	share	has	reached	84%),	replacing	Russia,	whose	
share	in	bilateral	 loans	granted	to	Tajikistan	stood	at	39%	at	the	end	of	2007	
and	fizzled	out	completely	in	2012.	Chinese	loans	are	given	primarily	for	the	
development	of	 infrastructure	in	Tajikistan	(power	supply	lines,	roads,	etc.)	
and	for	the	purchase	of	Chinese	goods.	Tajikistan	is	also	ready	to	take	more	
loans	from	China;	for	example,	in	2012,	it	was	announced	following	President	
Rahmon’s	visit	that	China’s	investments	and	loans	to	Tajikistan	would	reach	
a	total	of	US$1	billion75.	
75	 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39503&cHash=c
09678c17ad8078ba5cb0cc1e14c0431
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Table 10.	Tajikistan’s	foreign	debt	(as	of	1	January	2012)
Country debt value foreign debt share
China US$878.5	million 41.3%
Russia 0 0
total US$2,124.3	million
source:	Ministry	of	Finance	of	Tajikistan76
Uzbekistan,	which	had	not	previously	been	willing	 to	enhance	co-operation	
with	China,	became	more	interested	in	Chinese	loans	over	the	past	two	years.	
Although	it	had	obtained	a	loan	worth	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	in	2006,	
the	 key	 creditors	were	 international	 financial	 institutions	 and	Asian	 coun-
tries,	including	South	Korea.	At	present,	Uzbekistan	is	using	Chinese	loans	for	
the	purchase	of	machinery	and	equipment	necessary	to	improve	the	country’s	
production	facilities	and	to	develop	its	energy	sector,	including	transport	in-
frastructure.
uzbekistan’s foreign debt
The	country’s	total	debt	estimated	by	CIA	Factbook	reached	US$10.5	billion	
at	the	end	of	201277.	The	estimated	value	of	Chinese	loans	allocated	to	Uz-
bekistan	stood	at	US$4.5	billion	in	September	201278.	The	greater	part	of	this	
sum	was	most	likely	allocated	in	2012,	when	the	agreement	on	the	loan	of	
US$2.5	billion	for	the	construction	of	the	third	branch	of	the	gas	pipeline	
running	to	China	and	the	US$1.5	billion	credit	line	agreement	were	signed.
Kyrgyzstan	 has	 used	 Chinese	 loans	 to	 a	 limited	 extent,	 but	 it	 is	 constantly	
striving	for	more.	China’s	share	in	this	country’s	total	foreign	debt	is	relatively	
low	(17.4%).	Like	Tajikistan,	Kyrgyzstan	is	also	using	Chinese	loans	to	finance	
the	development	of	energy	and	road	 infrastructure	and	 for	buying	machin-
ery	and	equipment.	The	ratio	of	foreign	debt	to	the	volume	of	trade	between	
the	two	countries	clearly	indicates	that	Kyrgyzstan	imports	mostly	consumer	
goods	from	China.	
76	 http://minfin.tj/downloads/files/otjet-2011.pdf
77	 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
78	 http://uza.uz/en/politics/3017/
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Table 11.	Kyrgyzstan’s	bilateral	loans	(as	of	December	2012)
Country entity debt value
foreign debt 
share
China
Bank	Export-
Import	
US$527.5	million 17.4%
Russia government US$488.9	million 16.1%
Total	debt US$3,031.8	million
source:	Ministry	of	Finance	of	Kyrgyzstan79
For	Kazakhstan,	Chinese	loans	are	primarily	a	source	of	funds	for	the	construc-
tion	of	new	infrastructure	(gas	pipeline).	Kazakh	companies	are	taking	loans	
from	China	 in	order	 to	develop	 their	 raw	material	production	base	 (e.g.	 the	
loan	granted	to	the	copper	potentate,	Kazakhmys,	for	the	development	of	new	
production	sites).	Chinese	 loans	are	also	used	 to	modernise	and	develop	 the	
country’s	energy	sector,	e.g.	the	loan	for	the	construction	of	the	petrochemical	
complex	in	Atyrau,	where	China’s	SINOPEC	is	a	project	subcontractor.	
The	global	financial	crisis	and	problems	with	obtaining	loans	for	development	
from	international	financial	markets	(partly	due	to	the	default	of	Kazakhstan’s	
largest	bank,	BTA,	in	2009)	have	been	of	key	significance	for	the	expansion	of	
Chinese	 loans	 in	Central	Asia.	China	 is	 the	 source	of	 almost	 11%	of	Kazakh-
stan’s	total	debt.	The	level	of	financing	from	China	is	likely	to	be	maintained	
in	the	coming	years,	given	the	work	on	C	branch	of	the	gas	pipeline	running	
to	China,	but	its	significance	may	decline,	since	it	 is	primarily	international	
consortiums	engaged	 in	 the	work	at	Kazakhstan’s	 largest	oil	fields	who	will	
be	taking	the	loans,	and	also	because	Kazakhstan	is	currently	promoting	the	
policy	of	using	its	own	financial	sources	(e.g.	pension	funds)	to	finance	the	de-
velopment	of	its	economy.	
79	 http://www.minfin.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1923:-------c-
1992-2012--31122012&catid=61:2010-10-05-10-30-35&Itemid=131
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Table 12.	Kazakhstan’s	foreign	debt	(as	of	September	2012)	
Country debt value foreign debt share
China US$14.65	billion 10.9%
Russia US$3.96	billion 2.9%
Total	 US$134.88	billion
source:	National	Bank	of	Kazakhstan80
3.2. The	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization	(SCO)	
The	SCO	is	also	seen	by	China	as	a	tool	for	economic	co-operation	with	Central	
Asia.	This	 is	 the	purpose	 the	Business	Council	was	 set	up	 for	 as	part	 of	 the	
organisation	in	2003,	and	the	SCO	Interbank	Consortium	was	established	in	
2005.	China	was	also	hoping	 that	a	 free	 trade	zone	would	be	created	within	
the	 SCO	 framework.	 Furthermore,	 for	more	 than	 a	 half	 of	 the	 past	 decade,	
China	was	offering	 loans	to	 the	countries	of	Central	Asia	almost	exclusively	
as	part	of	the	SCO.	This	policy	has	been	adjusted	due	to	resistance	from	Rus-
sia,	which	does	not	want	the	SCO	to	be	transformed	into	an	efficient	economic	
organisation,	and	is	even	creating	competitive	institutions	(the	EurAsEC,	and	
since	2010,	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space).	Finally,	Bei-
jing	has	chosen	to	develop	bilateral	economic	co-operation.	The	best	example	
of	this	is	the	multi-billion	loans	granted	to	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan	in	
2009.	This	means	that	China	is	ready	to	develop	bilateral	co-operation	in	the	
areas	which	it	sees	as	important,	regardless	of	the	Russian	stance.	Neverthe-
less,	Beijing	will	not	give	up	its	efforts	to	transform	the	SCO	into	an	economic	
co-operation	platform,	and	 it	has	upheld	 its	offers	 to	grant	 loans	within	 the	
organisation’s	framework	(in	December	2012,	it	declared	its	willingness	to	al-
locate	US$10	billion	as	loans	to	SCO	member	states).	China	also	wants	an	SCO	
bank	 to	be	 established,	which	would	become	an	 institution	 supporting	 eco-
nomic	development	as	part	of	the	organisation	and	which	would	be	in	charge	
of	granting	 loans.	These	 ideas	have	been	backed	by	 the	countries	of	Central	
Asia.	It	should	be	expected	that	Beijing	will	continue	its	efforts	to	transform	
the	SCO	into	a	regional	co-operation	platform,	and	will	also	develop	bilateral	
co-operation	independently	of	Russia.	
80	 http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=346
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4.  the balance of economic co-operation 
4.1. The	geopolitical	dimension
The	depth	and	the	potentially	long	durability	of	the	economic	bonds	(achieved	
through	the	development	of	infrastructure)	between	China	and	Central	Asia	
offer	Beijing	the	opportunity	to	influence	the	region’s	politics	and	security	is-
sues.	China	has	apparently	not	used	the	influence	to	the	full	here.	The	reasons	
for	this	include	its	attachment	to	the	principle	of	refraining	from	interfering	
with	the	political	processes	in	the	region,	the	lack	of	a	concept	for	such	inter-
ference	and	its	unwillingness	to	have	a	confrontation	with	Russia.	However,	
the	increasing	debt	which	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	owe	to	China	could	in	
future	be	used	to	force	these	countries	to	make	political	concessions.	
The	success	of	the	policy	seen	this	way	depends	on	Russia’s	presence	and	suc-
cess	 in	 the	 area	 of	 security	 in	Central	Asia,	 as	well	 as	 –	 contrary	 to	 official	
statements	full	of	criticism	towards	Washington	–	on	the	success	of	the	US	and	
NATO	stabilisation	mission	in	Afghanistan.	China’s	economic	presence	is	still	
nonetheless	 too	 small,	 and	 other	 tools	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 developed	
(military)	or	verified	(political)	for	China	to	play	the	role	of	regional	hegemon	
by	itself.	
China’s	 increasing	economic	presence,	especially	 in	 the	energy	sector,	poses	
a	challenge	to	Russia	and	the	West	in	their	rivalry	for	access	to	Central	Asian	
natural	resources.	Even	though	China’s	presence	in	the	Central	Asian	energy	
sector	has	been	presented	in	Russia	by	politicians	and	the	media	as	being	ben-
eficial	for	Russia	(making	exports	of	raw	materials	from	the	region	to	the	West	
more	difficult),	in	practice,	China’s	engagement	is	seriously	jeopardising	Rus-
sian	interests	in	the	region.	It	is	precisely	due	to	China’s	activity	that	Russia	
can	no	longer	see	the	region	as	its	exclusive	source	of	raw	materials.	It	is	also	
competition	from	China	which	has	forced	Russia	to	liberalise	the	rules	of	its	
co-operation	with	the	countries	of	Central	Asia.	Furthermore,	increasing	im-
ports	of	raw	materials	from	Central	Asia	to	China	has	also	been	used	as	an	ar-
gument	in	Chinese-Russian	negotiations	regarding	gas	supplies.	Central	Asia	
has	thus	become	Russia’s	competitor	on	the	Chinese	market.	China’s	economic	
engagement	has	also	laid	bare	just	how	unattractive	the	offer	from	Russia	is	
and	it	is	no	longer	seen	as	the	key	sponsor	and	economic	patron	of	the	region.	
In	the	case	of	the	West,	which	has	for	two	decades	been	seeking	for	opportuni-
ties	import	raw	materials	from	Central	Asia,	the	Chinese	activity	has	revealed	
70
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
the	ineffectiveness	and	unattractiveness	of	the	offer	presented	by	the	USA	and	
the	EU.	Competition	from	China	is	forcing	the	West	to	come	up	with	an	offer	
comparable	 to	China’s.	Nor	does	 the	West	have	an	alternative	but	 to	 change	
its	stance	on	human	rights	issues	within	the	broad	meaning	of	the	term,	if	it	
wishes	to	establish	closer	economic	co-operation.	
Regardless	of	this,	given	increasing	fears	of	Chinese	influence,	the	countries	
of	Central	Asia	are	more	frequently	making	attempts	to	counterbalance	this	
influence.	Signs	of	this	have	included	Kazakhstan’s	accession	to	the	Common	
Economic	 Space	 (along	with	 Russia	 and	 Belarus)	 and	Kyrgyzstan’s	 declared	
will	to	join	this	organisation.	
4.2. 	The	economic	dimension
Over	the	past	decade,	China	has	become	the	key	economic	partner,	the	main	
sponsor	 and	 the	most	 promising	 partner	 in	 future	 co-operation	 for	 Central	
Asia.	 This	 has	 been	 a	 consequence	 both	 of	 China’s	 growing	 significance	 as	
a	global	player	and	of	 its	activity	in	the	region.	Despite	the	difference	in	the	
levels	of	co-operation	between	individual	Central	Asian	states	with	China,	this	
co-operation	is	the	key	element	of	the	economic	policy	of	each	of	these	states.	
Central	Asian	countries	are	unable	to	withdraw	from	or	even	reduce	their	eco-
nomic	co-operation	with	China.	This	means	a	serious	difference	in	potentials:	
China,	for	which	co-operation	with	Central	Asia	is	of	minor	economic	signifi-
cance,	has	gained	an	enormous	tool	for	influencing	the	region.
As	regards	the	energy	sector,	China	is	the	only	player	to	have	successfully	im-
plemented	its	interests	in	the	region.	One	measure	of	the	success	of	Chinese	
policy	is	the	fact	that	almost	all81	new	routes	used	for	the	transport	of	raw	ma-
terials	from	Central	Asia	put	into	operation	over	the	past	ten	years	are	run-
ning	in	the	eastern	direction.	 It	 is	co-operation	with	China	that	has	made	it	
possible	 to	break	 the	Russian	monopoly,	diversify	 the	routes	and	recipients,	
and	strengthen	the	states	in	this	region.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	precisely	the	
development	of	exports	of	energy	raw	materials	to	China	that	has	the	greatest	
potential:	in	the	short-term,	China	will	become	the	most	important	recipient	
of	natural	gas	from	Central	Asia.	This	means	that	the	region’s	(above	all,	Turk-
menistan’s)	dependence	on	China	will	grow.	
81	 One	exception	is	the	gas	pipeline	running	from	the	Dauletabad	field	to	Iran,	which	was	built	
in	2010	at	the	time	of	a	major	gas	crisis	between	Turkmenistan	and	Russia.	However,	it	is	
not	used	at	full	capacity.	
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The	process	of	 transforming	 the	region	 into	a	 transmission	belt	 for	Chinese	
goods	exported	to	the	West	and	the	Middle	East	is	also	rather	advanced.	The	
most	 important	 trans-regional	 connections	 run	 through	 Kazakhstan,	 thus	
connecting	Russia	with	China.	Routes	connecting	the	region	with	the	Middle	
East	are	also	being	developed	(the	railway	line	from	Kazakhstan	via	Turkmen-
istan	to	Iran).	Furthermore,	the	construction	of	these	connections	has	backing	
from	the	West82	as	a	means	of	providing	economic	assistance	to	the	countries	
of	Central	Asia.	China	is	an	inevitable	element	of	this	policy.	This	means	that	
the	newly	constructed	infrastructure	will	contribute	to	durable	bonds	being	
forged	between	the	region	and	China.	
China	has	been	able	to	achieve	its	goals	even	though	it	has	no	major	assets	in	
the	region.	The	success	of	its	policy	is	an	effect	of	its	adaptability	to	the	con-
ditions	 created	by	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 region.	China	 is	 capable	of	 investing	
in	the	development	of	energy	infrastructure	without	gaining	control	over	it,	
of	financing	 the	development	of	oil	 and	gas	fields	without	holding	shares	 in	
them,	and	of	developing	trade	by	offering	enormous	loans	for	the	purchase	of	
Chinese	equipment.	In	effect,	it	has	become	the	most	important	trade	partner	
for	the	region	and	is	starting	to	be	the	main	recipient	of	energy	and	mineral	
resources.	
82	 The	so-called	“New	Silk	Road”	has	been	backed	by	the	USA;	see	for	example	the	statement	
made	by	then	US	Secretary	of	State,	Hillary	Clinton,	in	October	2012.	
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Iv. ChIna’s PresenCe In Central asIa In the soCIal 
dImensIon – the aChIevements of the Past two 
deCades
In	parallel	to	its	ambitious	political	and	economic	activity	in	Central	Asia,	Chi-
na	faced	the	need	to	develop	a	model	for	functioning	in	Central	Asian	societies.	
Recent	key	challenges	have	included	overcoming	distrust	among	residents	of	
the	region	towards	China,	and	developing	the	contacts	necessary	to	implement	
its	economic	and	political	interests,	and,	in	strategic	terms,	creating	an	image	
of	China	as	an	appealing	civilisational	model	so	as	to	strengthen	China’s	posi-
tion	against	Russia	and	other	players.	
The	attitude	towards	China	which	the	residents	and	states	of	Central	Asia	have	
has	been	burdened	with	strong	distrust	and	historical	resentments	(the	afore-
mentioned	negative	perception	of	 the	policy	China	has	adopted	 towards	 the	
Uyghur	people,	coupled	with	the	baggage	of	Soviet	and	Russian	anti-Chinese	
propaganda).	
The	fears	of	mass	migrations	from	China	to	Central	Asia	 (strongly	mytholo-
gised),	changes	in	the	ethnic	structure,	etc.	have	been	very	strong	among	the	
young	Central	Asian	states	and	societies	(the	colonisation	of	Xinjiang	province	
by	Han	Chinese	has	provided	good	grounds	 for	 these	 fears).	Other	potential	
sources	of	threat	were	land	purchases	by	Chinese	people	and	business	compe-
tition	on	many	levels.	These	two	issues	gave	rise	to	tension	and	public	protests.	
In	the	case	of	‘land	defence’	these	included	the	protests	in	Kyrgyzstan	which	
resulted	in	the	overthrow	of	the	government	after	the	scale	of	border	adjust-
ments	in	favour	of	China	had	been	revealed	(2002).	An	example	in	Kazakhstan	
saw	people	protesting	against	leasing	land	to	Chinese	people	with	an	undertone	
of	corruption	and	politics83.	The	fears	of	the	market	being	flooded	with	Chinese	
goods	and	of	unfair	competition	from	Chinese	traders	and	businessmen	were	
expressed	with	equal	strength.	These	gave	rise	to	protests	(leading	even	to	lo-
cal	clashes	at	marketplaces)	entailing	legislative	action	restricting	the	freedom	
83	 Protests	were	seen	in	December	2009	and	January	2010.	Possibly	as	many	as	2,500	people	
took	to	the	streets	in	2010	in	Almaty.	Corruption	charges	brought	against	President	Naz-
arbayev’s	extremely	influential	son-in-law,	Timur	Kulibayev	were	the	immediate	cause	of	
the	demonstrations	(Kulibayev	was	reportedly	corrupted	by	Chinese	investors	and	was	for	
example	lobbying	for	Chinese	citizens	to	be	allowed	to	lease	land).	The	demonstrators	called	
for	the	dismissal	of	Prime	Minister	Karim	Massimov,	who	is	believed	to	be	the	author	of	the	
policy	establishing	closer	relations	with	China,	and	demanded	the	Chinese	loan	be	given	up	
(US$10	billion	granted	in	2009).
73
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
0/
20
13
of	operation	for	Chinese	traders.	For	example,	in	2003–2004	Uzbekistan	intro-
duced	a	number	of	laws	resulting	in	the	concentration	of	imports	of	goods	sold	
at	marketplaces	in	the	hands	of	a	small	group	of	Uzbek	wholesalers.	In	turn,	
Kyrgyzstan	imposed	a	formal	(albeit	unenforceable)	ban	on	foreigners	work-
ing	at	marketplaces	(2007).	Anti-Chinese	sentiments	have	reverberated	widely	
in	both	media	publications	and	political	discourse	(for	example,	they	are	a	con-
stant	 element	 in	parliamentary	debates	 in	Kazakhstan;	 and	protecting	Kyr-
gyzstan	from	Chinese	domination	was	among	the	issues	on	the	agenda	in	the	
electoral	manifesto	of	the	Ata-Zhurt	party	in	201084).	
The	special	characteristics	of	Central	Asia,	including	the	scale	of	anti-Chinese	
sentiment,	which	are	reflected	in	the	stances	taken	by	each	of	the	countries’	
approaches,	 have	 created	 an	 exceptional	 situation:	 unlike	with	 other	 areas	
where	China	is	very	active	economically	(from	South-East	Asia	to	Russia’s	Far	
East),	no	strong	migration	pressure	has	been	observed	here	so	far85.
Both	China’s	constantly	growing	potential	and	ambitions,	as	well	as	the	scale	
of	its	economic	and	political	interests,	are	causing	increasing	concern	and	cre-
ating	a	situation	wherein	the	Central	Asian	public	are	pinning	more	and	more	
hope	on	the	possible	benefits	of	co-operation	with	China.	Furthermore,	China	
has	more	and	more	 instruments	 to	 influence	 its	neighbours.	Along	with	en-
hancing	direct	trade	contracts	(including	numerous	trips	for	residents	of	Cen-
tral	Asia	 to	China),	 this	 is	also	reflected	primarily	 in	education.	One	special	
example	of	this	is	the	constant	development	of	the	network	of	Confucius	Insti-
tutes	across	the	region,	promoting	Chinese	culture	and	the	language:	by	2009	
six	Confucius	Institutes	had	begun	operation	in	Central	Asia,	the	most	buoy-
ant	of	which	(at	the	Al-Farabi	University	in	Almaty)	has	already	educated	over	
2,000	students.	In	parallel	to	this,	the	attractiveness	and	the	offer	of	Chinese	
higher	education	for	Central	Asia	is	constantly	improving	(the	key	academic	
centre	being	Urumqi).	This	not	only	offers	the	opportunity	to	learn	an	appeal-
ing	foreign	language,	but	also	ensures	a	relatively	high	level	of	technical	and	
84	 Cf.	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4F5j3gSd0Yc&feature=related
85	 The	official	data	on	Chinese	migration	does	not	take	into	account	illegal	migration,	which	
is	most	widespread	in	Kazakhstan	and	Kyrgyzstan:	traders	working	at	local	marketplaces	
predominantly	hold	tourist	visas	and	frequently	extend	their	stay	illegally.	This	is	prob-
ably	the	reason	why	the	estimates	differ	so	much,	ranging	between	70,000	and	300,000	for	
Kazakhstan,	and	between	10,000	and	100,000	in	the	case	of	Kyrgyzstan.	It	should	also	be	
assumed	that	an	essential	proportion	of	Chinese	citizens	linked	to	Central	Asia	are	still	not	
the	Han	Chinese	but	Uyghurs.	The	presence	of	Chinese	citizens	in	Tajikistan	is	of	a	different	
nature;	they	are	predominantly	employed	at	infrastructural	projects.	
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medical	education86.	The	Chinese	language	learning	offer	is	also	constantly	be-
ing	enhanced	 in	Central	Asia,	both	at	university	 level	 (at	 least	 ten	universi-
ties	in	Kazakhstan	and	several	 in	Kyrgyzstan)	and	in	the	form	of	individual	
courses87.
Given	China’s	rapidly	developing	economic	activity	and	growing	political	posi-
tion,	the	social	dimension	appears	to	be	the	most	difficult	and,	so	far,	the	least	
successful	manifestation	of	 its	presence	 in	 the	 region,	 including	when	com-
pared	to	its	political	and	civilisational	competitors.	In	this	area,	China	is	far	
behind	Russia,	whose	influence	has	been	rooted	in	this	region	for	two	centu-
ries,	and	which	still	has	the	most	appealing	and	widespread	cultural	models	(at	
the	level	of	both	high	and	pop	culture).	Since	relatively	many	residents	of	Cen-
tral	Asia	speak	Russian,	and	considering	the	similarity	of	the	institutions	and	
the	mechanisms	public	life,	Russia	is	still	easily	accessible	and	appealing,	for	
instance,	as	a	labour	market	and	a	migration	direction.	China	is	also	unable	to	
compete	in	culture	and	education	with	Turkey	and	the	West,	whose	presence	in	
Central	Asia	in	these	areas	is	strong.	However,	given	the	clearly	worse	starting	
position	(not	to	mention	the	fact	that	Russia,	Turkey	and	the	West	were	viewed	
quite	positively	following	the	collapse	of	the	USSR)	and	the	delayed	start	time	
(a	more	extensive	Chinese	offer	has	been	addressed	to	the	region’s	public	in	the	
past	decade,	while	Western,	Turkish	and	Muslim	institutions	have	been	active	
there	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR),	China’s	position	has	been	growing	at	an	
significant	rate.	Considering	the	expected	continuous	growth	of	its	economic	
attractiveness	and	political	position,	China’s	position	in	the	social	dimension	is	
also	likely	to	improve	already	in	the	medium	term,	especially	among	the	most	
active	and	influential	groups	of	the	Central	Asian	public.
86	 In	2010,	the	number	of	students	from	Kazakhstan	exceeded	6,500,	which	means	a	350%	in-
crease	in	comparison	to	2006	(the	studies	are	financed	by	the	students	themselves,	as	part	
of	national	scholarships,	including	the	Bolashak	programme,	as	part	of	the	scholarship	pool	
financed	by	Beijing	–	200	students	annually	as	part	of	the	SCO	scholarship	programme	–	
and	also	by	Chinese	firms,	including	CNPC).	Over	500	students	from	Tajikistan	are	study-
ing	in	China.	The	Kyrgyz-Chinese	intergovernmental	agreement	provides	for	27	scholar-
ship	holders	annually.	The	number	of	students	who	organise	their	education	in	China	by	
themselves	is	difficult	to	estimate.	
87	 Based	on	press	advertisements	and	own	observations.	
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v. ConClusIon – future Challenges
The	achievements	of	the	past	two	decades	in	relations	between	China	and	Cen-
tral	Asia	are	impressive.	From	the	level	in	1991,	characterised	by	a	lack	of	direct	
relations	and	enormous	mutual	distrust,	China	has	gained	the	position	of	stra-
tegic	economic	partner	and	a	player	with	a	real	impact	on	the	Central	Asian	
economies.	It	is	also	becoming	more	and	more	clear	that	the	scale	and	nature	
of	 China’s	 economic	 engagement	 in	 Central	 Asia	 is	 fundamentally	 affecting	
the	region’s	politics	and	global	position.	Importantly,	each	of	the	Central	Asian	
countries	 is	part	of	these	processes	and,	furthermore,	they	are	beneficiaries	
of	these	processes.	If	the	current	trends	and	their	dynamics	are	continued,	it	
may	be	 expected	 that	China’s	 significance,	 including	political,	 in	 the	 region	
will	continue	to	grow.	
The	success	of	the	Chinese	strategy	towards	the	region	is	at	contrast	with	the	
relatively	low	success	rate	of	its	geopolitical	competitors:	Russia	and	the	West	
(the	USA	and	the	EU).	
Although	Russia	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	region	and	still	has	a	strong	position	
here,	it	has	failed	to	develop	a	concept	for	the	region’s	development	in	line	with	
its	expectations.	Russia’s	actions	are	conservative	and	defensive;	their	goal	be-
ing	to	preserve	the	old	bonds	in	the	areas	of	security	and	economy,	and	in	doing	
so	to	maintain	its	political	position.	
Actions	taken	by	the	West	are	focused	on	individual	sectors:	in	the	area	of	se-
curity	they	are	signified	by	the	US	military	presence	in	Central	Asia,	while	in	
the	energy	sector	attempts	are	made	to	build	oil	and	gas	export	routes	running	
from	the	region	to	the	West,	bypassing	Russia.	As	regards	security,	it	can	be	
assumed	that	the	US	presence	in	Central	Asia	in	this	area	will	be	reduced	to	
a	minimum	as	the	mission	in	Afghanistan	is	wound	up	(2014).	As	regards	the	
energy	sector,	attempts	to	build	new	routes	will	run	up	against	serious	resist-
ance	from	Russia	and	economic	competition	from	China.	In	this	context,	one	
should	expect	a	constant	increase	in	China’s	political	significance	in	Central	
Asia	 and	 continuously	 strengthening	 connections	 between	 the	 region	 and	
China.	At	the	same	time,	each	of	the	Central	Asian	countries	will	be	making	
attempts	to	create	a	counterbalance	for	China	through	developing	further	co-
operation	with	Russia	and	the	West.	
However	impressive	the	successes	and	the	dynamics	of	Chinese	policy	in	Cen-
tral	Asia	are,	China	is	still	far	from	gaining	the	position	of	key	player	in	the	
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region,	and	its	political	and	economic	influences	are	not	secured.	This	is	due	to	
China’s	political	restrictions	revealed	so	far	and,	to	an	even	greater	extent,	to	
the	development	of	the	situation	inside	Central	Asia	and	within	its	immediate	
neighbourhood	(Afghanistan).	Above	all,	the	future	of	China	itself,	i.e.	its	abil-
ity	to	maintain	stable	economic	growth	and	a	further	efficient	evolution	of	the	
Chinese	political	and	social	model,	remains	an	open	question.
Despite	the	achievements	of	the	past	two	decades,	Central	Asia	is	still	unstable.	
In	politics,	changes	in	power	in	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan,	the	continuing	
socio-political	tension	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	and	the	unpredictability	
of	 the	 internal	 evolution	of	Turkmenistan,	 are	all	huge	challenges.	 It	 is	 also	
unclear	whether	the	political	system	models	these	countries	have	developed	
will	be	durable.	This	problem	is	even	more	serious,	since	the	region	is	undergo-
ing	major	social	changes:	a	new	generation	has	grown	up,	strong	demographic	
pressure	is	continuing,	a	revision	of	ideological	and	identity	values	has	been	
observed,	including	the	strengthening	of	national	and	state	identity;	this	could	
potentially	 reduce	 the	public	acceptance	of	China’s	actions.	This	means	 that	
China’s	policy,	which	is	fitted	to	the	current	model	and	based	on	today’s	leaders,	
is	facing	a	serious	test.	In	the	medium	term,	the	problem	of	the	functionality	
of	the	present	politico-economic	model	(and	as	a	consequence	of	its	evolution	
and	the	evolution	of	foreign	policy)	will	also	concern	Russia	and	China	itself.	
Another	serious	challenge	for	China	will	be	the	development	of	the	situation	
in	Central	Asia	after	the	ISAF	mission	in	Afghanistan	has	ended	(2014),	espe-
cially	due	to	the	radical	reduction	of	US	and	NATO	forces	 from	Afghanistan	
and	Central	Asia,	most	likely	followed	by	a	total	withdrawal.	On	the	one	hand,	
this	would	mean	a	reduction/end	of	the	pressure	on	the	western	frontiers	of	
China,	and	would	be	beneficial	for	Beijing	in	strategic	terms.	Nevertheless,	the	
winding	up	of	the	mission	in	Afghanistan	is	seen	as	a	portent	of	the	breakdown	
of	the	existing	unsteady	order	in	Afghanistan	and,	as	a	consequence,	of	insta-
bility	spilling	over	from	Afghanistan	to	Central	Asia	(and	further	to	Xinjiang).	
Even	though	the	risks	linked	to	the	year	2014	are	clearly	exaggerated	(especial-
ly	as	regards	the	capabilities	and	the	desire	of	any	Afghan	political	and	mili-
tary	groupings	to	have	an	impact	on	Central	Asia,	 let	alone	Xinjiang),	China	
sees	the	need	to	develop	a	set	of	instruments	that	will	allow	it	to	influence	se-
curity	 in	Central	Asia.	The	diminishment/disappearance	of	 the	US	presence	
in	Central	Asia,	China’s	increasing	interest	in	Central	Asia’s	security,	and	Rus-
sia’s	intensive	efforts	aimed	at	reintegrating	the	post-Soviet	area	(such	as	the	
development	of	the	Customs	Union,	the	plans	to	set	up	the	Eurasian	Union	and	
the	efforts	to	strengthen	the	CSTO)	are	all	creating	more	room	for	increasingly	
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open	rivalry	in	the	coming	years	between	China	and	Russia	in	Central	Asia.	
This	will	scale	up	the	opportunities	and	the	risks	the	countries	of	Central	Asia	
are	facing	at	present.	
The	nature	of	the	Chinese	presence	in	Central	Asia	will	also	be	influenced	by	
the	development	of	 the	global	 situation,	 especially	 in	 areas	vital	 for	 the	 en-
ergy	sector.	A	possible	escalation	of	the	problems	in	the	Persian	Gulf	would	add	
significance	to	Central	Asia	as	a	source	of	raw	materials	for	China.	A	possible	
destabilisation	 in	 the	Southern	Caucasus	 (including	 the	 threat	of	 conflict	 in	
Nagorno-Karabakh)	would	impede	the	development	of	transport	routes	run-
ning	from	Central	Asia	to	the	West,	and	would	thus	stimulate	further	develop-
ment	of	co-operation	with	China.	
aleksandra JarosIewICZ, krZYsZtof straChota 
Work on this text finished in July 2013
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CareC transport corridors in Central asia
International	financial	institutions,	such	as	the	Asian	Development	Bank,	
the	EBRD,	the	IMF,	the	Islamic	Development	Bank,	the	UN	(UNDP)	and	the	
World	Bank	offer	support	for	the	development	of	six	transport	corridors,	
five	of	which	run	directly	through	Central	Asia	(CAREC	corridor	number	
4	connects	Russia	via	Mongolia	with	East	Asia,	and	does	not	run	through	
Central	Asia),	as	part	of	the	Central	Asia	Regional	Economic	Cooperation	
(CAREC)	programme.	The	overriding	goal	 of	CAREC	 is	 to	 create	 connec-
tions	within	 the	regional	network	between	Central	Asian	countries	and,	
more	precisely,	between	their	economic	centres.	Furthermore,	CAREC	is	
expected	to	enable	 the	creation	of	routes	 that	will	allow	the	countries	of	
Central	Asia,	which	are	 situated	 far	 away	 from	seas	 and	oceans,	 to	 gain	
access	to	the	global	market.	The	programme	envisages	that	the	emerging	
transport	routes	will	over	time	transform	into	logistic	routes	(with	the	en-
tire	 necessary	 logistic	 infrastructure)	 and	 later	 into	 economic	 corridors	
triggering	development	through	the	influx	of	new	investments.	
Corridor I:	Europe–East	Asia,	runs	through	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Kyr-
gyzstan.	It	consists	of	13,600	km	of	roads,	12,000	km	of	railroads,	one	logis-
tical	hub	and	three	airports.	This	is	the	corridor	with	the	heaviest	traffic.	
Corridor II:	Mediterranean	 Sea–East	 Asia,	 connects	 the	Mediterranean	
Sea	region	and	the	Caucasus	with	East	Asia	running	through	Azerbaijan,	
Kazakhstan,	Turkmenistan,	Uzbekistan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	China.	This	cor-
ridor	consists	of	9,900	km	of	roads	and	9,700	km	of	railroads.	
Corridor III:	Russia–Middle	East	and	South	Asia,	connects	Russia’s	Siberia	
with	 the	Middle	East	and	South	Asia	 running	 through	Afghanistan,	Ka-
zakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan,	Turkmenistan	and	Uzbekistan.	 It	 con-
sists	of	6,900	km	of	roads	and	4,800	km	of	railroads.	
Corridor v: East	 Asia–Arabian	 Sea,	 runs	 through	 China,	 Kyrgyzstan,	 	
Tajikistan	and	Afghanistan.	This	corridor	consists	of	3,700	km	roads	and	
2,000	km	railroads.	
Corridor vI:	Europe–Middle	East	and	South	Asia,	consists	of	three	routes	
running	through	Kazakhstan,	Uzbekistan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	
Afghanistan	to	the	Gwadar	and	Karachi	ports	in	Pakistan	and	the	Bandar		
Abbas	port	in	the	Persian	Gulf	(Iran).	This	corridor	consists	of	10,600	km		
of	roads	and	7,200	km	of	railroads.
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